R v Morgan

[2021] NZHC 3352

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE

CRI-2020-025-419

[2021] NZHC 3352

THE QUEEN

v

ANARU MORGAN

Hearing:	7 December 2021
Appearances:	R W Donnelly for Crown H T Young for Defendant
Judgment:	8 December 2021

JUDGMENT OF MANDER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 8 December 2021 at 4 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:     .

R v MORGAN [2021] NZHC 3352 [8 December 2021]

[1]                 Mr Anaru Morgan was found guilty following a jury trial of a charge of unlawful detention for the purpose of sexual connection and remanded for sentence on 7 December 2021.1 He was acquitted on charges of unlawful sexual connection and rape arising out of the same incident. Mr Morgan received a stage-1 warning in July 2013 after being convicted of a charge of indecent assault, and a stage-2 warning in March 2016, again for a charge of indecent assault.

[2]                 For present purposes the circumstances of the offending can be shortly stated. Mr Morgan contacted the victim who was a sex worker and arranged to meet at her motel room. Shortly after his arrival there was a dispute over the need for payment to be in cash. Mr Morgan only had a bank card. The victim opened the door and told him to go and get cash but he pushed it closed, trapping her arm in the doorway, and a struggle took place before the victim was pushed by Mr Morgan onto the bed. A further attempt to physically push Mr Morgan out of the motel unit was abandoned by the victim after he referred to what she understood was a reference to his membership of a gang. She said to him, “Okay, I do for you, but you not hurt me”. The victim described how she decided with some reluctance that she had to give in because of fear of being harmed and his association with a gang. Mr Morgan is a physically large man while the victim is a small 63-year-old Asian woman who suffers from Bell’s Palsy.

[3]                 The offence for which Mr Morgan is for sentence is a “serious violent offence”,2 and therefore constitutes a stage three offence under the statutory three strikes regime. As a result, pursuant to s 86D(2) and (3) of the Sentencing Act 2002, the Court is obliged to sentence Mr Morgan to the maximum term of 14 years’ imprisonment prescribed for the offence, and must order him to serve the sentence without parole, unless satisfied such an order would be manifestly unjust.3

[4]                 Mr Young, on behalf of Mr Morgan, has formally applied to adjourn sentencing4 because the Government has announced its intention to repeal the three strikes regime and a bill has been introduced in Parliament. The Three Strikes

1      Crimes Act 1961, s 208(b) – maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.

2      Sentencing Act 2002, s 86A.

3      Sentencing Act, s 86D(2) and (3).

4      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 167(1).

Legislation Repeal Bill 2021 (the Bill) is currently before the Justice Select Committee. Mr Young argues that if Mr Morgan is sentenced under the current three strikes regime, he will receive a significantly higher term of imprisonment than he will otherwise be liable to after the Bill is passed. The Crown opposes sentencing being delayed because of the indeterminate length of the adjournment that is not anticipated to be less than some seven months, and emphasises that the victim is entitled to have the criminal proceeding finalised.

The Three Strikes Legislation Repeal Bill 2021

[5]                 The Bill was introduced on 11 November 2021 and had its first reading  on  17 November when it was referred to the Justice Committee. Submissions on the Bill are to be received by 7 January 2022 and the Committee is to provide its report by 17 May. The Bill provides that the proposed legislation will come into force on 1 July 2022.5

[6]                 The General Policy Statement in the Explanatory Note to the Bill relevantly states:

The Government’s objectives in repealing the law are to remove the mandatory sentencing requirements that result in excessive and disproportionate sentence outcomes by preventing Judges from taking the individual circumstances of the offender and the offending into account.

…

Repealing the three strikes law will revert the sentencing process for strike offences to standard sentencing practices by allowing the Judge to reach an appropriate outcome on a case-by-case basis. This Bill expressly excludes any entitlement to compensation relating to the impacts of the three strikes law, and no transitional arrangements for those currently serving sentences of imprisonment for a strike offence are included.

[7]                 Clause 10 of the current Bill  inserts  various  transitional  provisions  into  sch 1AA of the Sentencing Act. That schedule is amended to provide that if a person is convicted and sentenced for a stage-2 or stage-3 offence before 1 July 2022 that person will not be eligible for release or re-sentencing as a consequence of any provision brought into force under the proposed Act.6 However, cl 14 of the amended

5      Three Strikes Legislation Repeal Bill 2021 (79-1), cl 2.

6      Schedule 1AA, cl 13.

schedule in the Bill explicitly provides that a person who, on or after that date, is convicted of or sentenced for an offence that would have been a stage-2 or stage-3 offence but for the proposed legislation having been brought into force will receive the benefit of the third strike regime’s repeal. Notwithstanding s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1999, which provides that the repeal of an enactment does not affect liability to a penalty for an offence committed before its repeal, s 6 of the Sentencing Act or s 25(g) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) will prevail.7 Those provisions provide that an offender has the right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty.

[8]                 It follows that if Mr Morgan’s sentencing is delayed until on or after 1 July 2022, he would be entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty and effectively avoid the effect of the three strikes regime which currently applies.

Argument in support of adjournment

[9]                 In support of his application that Mr Morgan’s sentencing be adjourned until the repeal of the three strikes regime, Mr Young emphasises the reasons publicly articulated by the Minister of Justice for the reform of the law. These include that the three strikes regime has failed to meet its objectives of reducing violent crime and improving public safety, and produced “absurd outcomes” by requiring Judges to impose particular sentences without allowing them to consider the seriousness of the offending or other circumstances relating to the offending and the offender. It is noted that other sentencing options and orders are available, such as preventive detention, extended supervision orders, minimum periods of imprisonment, and the existing maximum penalty range, to provide justice in the individual case.

[10]             Mr Young places particular emphasis on the Government’s statement set out in the Explanatory Note to the Bill, that the mandatory sentencing regime created by the three strikes law has resulted in unjust outcomes that affect Māori disproportionately, and raised concerns regarding inconsistencies with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

7      Schedule 1AA, cl 14(2).

[11]             To a large extent, sentencing has been delayed to date because of the need to obtain a cultural report. Mr Morgan identifies as Māori and the information provided in the s 27 report discloses a childhood of deprivation, including family violence, sexual abuse and neglect, periods of state care when he was disconnected from his whānau and Māoritanga, and a lack of social support. As Mr Young submitted, this personal information relating to Mr Morgan’s background cannot bear on the mandatory imposition of the maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment, with the only residual consideration required of the Court being his parole status.

[12]             Mr Young submits that, but for the application of the three strikes regime, an appropriate starting point for Mr Morgan’s offending would likely be not more than approximately six years’ imprisonment.8 It is suggested that a possible uplift of one year for Mr Morgan’s previous sexual offending would be offset by a corresponding discount of at least the same amount for personal mitigating factors, as detailed in the s 27 report. Mr Young submits that Mr Morgan would receive an end sentence of less than half the current mandatory 14 year maximum prison term that he will otherwise be facing if his sentencing is not adjourned. He argues that such an outcome falls into the category of the “absurd outcome”, which the repeal legislation seeks to bring to an end, and may potentially result in Mr Morgan being subject to a disproportionately severe punishment, in breach of NZBORA.

The Crown’s response

[13]             The Crown is opposed to the sentencing being adjourned. Mr Donnelly, who appeared on behalf of the Crown, noted that the charges in relation to this matter were filed on 10 March 2020 and that the trial concluded on 13 August 2021. He observes that any delay in sentencing until after the repeal of the three strikes regime would, at the least, involve an approximate 11-month hiatus in the criminal proceeding between verdict and sentence, and that, in any event, the time required for the passage of the Bill into law will remain uncertain and could be of indeterminate length.

[14]             Mr Donnelly further notes that much of the defendant’s arguments in support of the application to adjourn his sentencing focusses on the disproportionate effect of

8      Citing Lepper v R [2016] NZCA 209.

having to serve the maximum sentence without parole and that this aspect can be appropriately addressed, or at least mitigated, under the current law by considering whether it would be manifestly unjust to require him to serve the maximum sentence without parole. Finally, and perhaps most pertinently, Mr Donnelly submits that the Court is obliged to apply the law as it is presently enacted.

Analysis

[15]             Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides the Court with the power to adjourn any proceeding. The decision to do so is discretionary and, as noted by Moore J in R v Zhang, the provision “imposes no express restrictions or conditions on how the Court’s power is to be exercised”.9 Following the observation made by Katz J in Mizsey v Police, that an adjournment will only be granted for good reason, with the ultimate question being whether an adjournment is expedient in the interests of justice,10 a similar “interests of justice” approach was adopted to the question of adjournment in that case.

[16]             The application made on behalf of Mr Morgan is effectively to delay sentencing until the law has changed. Mr Young argues that the interests of justice favour such a course. However, adopting such a course and awaiting the outcome of the legislative process in order to permit Mr Morgan to receive a materially lesser sentence comes into conflict with an obvious principle of comity between the courts and the legislature. As a matter of unassailable general principle, the courts must interpret and apply the law as it currently stands. The courts are not permitted to pre- empt Parliament as to what the law will be, nor may they proceed in the expectation that the parliamentary process, which is pre-eminently political, will result in a particular legislative outcome. These principles and similar issues regarding the courts’ obligation to apply the law as it presently stands have been considered in a number of cases, albeit in a non-criminal context.

[17]             In Genesis Power Ltd v Environment Court, Genesis sought judicial review of the Environment Court’s decision to adjourn an appeal affecting resource consent

9      R v Zhang [2021] NZHC 2140 at [26].

10     Mizsey v Police [2017] NZHC 3130 at [5], citing Gray v Thom (1997) 10 PRNZ 373 (HC) at 377.

applications for a power development.11 The Whanganui River Maori Trust Board and other associated bodies applied to adjourn the appeal on the grounds that Treaty of Waitangi settlement negotiations were shortly to begin in earnest and issues before the Court were likely to be affected by the outcome of those negotiations. A letter from the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations was produced in which she signalled a commitment to introducing settlement legislation which might affect any consents that had been granted in favour of Genesis.

[18]             Ronald Young J observed that if the rationale for the adjournment was the prospect of settlement negotiations narrowing the issues for the Court and the parties, then this would be a reasonable and rational basis to grant such an application.12 However, if the reason for the adjournment was that it was pointless and a waste of resources to hear the appeal given the prospect of legislative change affecting Genesis’s consent rights, then the Court had fallen into fundamental error.13 The Judge explained:

[28]      Prospective amending or validating legislation if inevitable can be a basis to defer a decision of the Courts (see Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615, Turners & Growers Exports Ltd v Moyle (High Court, Wellington CP 720/88, 15 December 1988, McGechan J)).

[29]      This however is rare. The important principle is that the Court’s function and that of Parliament and the Executive are obviously separate. The function of the Courts is to deal with its business on the law that applies when the case before it is heard. Expressions of legislative intent by Ministers are no more than that. The letter from the Minister herself expressly recognises that truth. The Minister’s letter proposed no more than the possible introduction of legislation. For this to come to fruition and affect Genesis, the Government and iwi would need to agree on a settlement which affected Genesis consents. And Parliament would need to pass any Bill introduced which gave effect to such a settlement. As the Minister earlier recognised, legislation would be required to effect Genesis’ consents. It may be that the legislation would need to be retrospective.

[30]      The principle against granting adjournments based on prospective legislation can be seen in such cases as Ngai Tahu Trust Board v Attorney- General (High Court, Wellington CP 553/87, 1 November 1989, McGechan and Greig JJ) and more recently in Meggitt Overseas Ltd v Grdovic (1998) 43 NSWLR 527 where the New South Wales State Court of Appeal considered an adjournment based on the contents of a Ministerial announcement. Mason P observed:

11     Genesis Power Ltd v Environment Court [2003] NZAR 371 (HC).

12     Genesis Power, above n 11, at [26].

13 At [27].

The learned Judge erred in taking into account the prospect of legislative amendment as a controlling factor in the decision granting the adjournment. The error was compounded by the apparent intent that the hearing date will, as presently advised, be deferred until the amending legislation is passed and the plaintiff becomes thereby entitled to take advantage of it. (Page 529 at (g).)

...

Does such announcement qualify in any way the judicial branch’s obligation to uphold the existing — I emphasise the word “existing”

— law? And does it enliven a power to grant a contested adjournment of proceedings fixed for hearing so as to enable one party to gain the benefit of proposed legislation to the detriment of another party? The answer to each question must be a categorical “no”. (Page 531 at (f).).

...

In my view, Judge Armitage erred in granting the contested adjournment of the fixed hearing date on the basis that he did. It is clear that his reason was to enable one party to the litigation to be in a position to take advantage of a legislative change, substantive and not procedural in nature that would accrue to that party’s benefit. In so doing, His Honour contravened the principles which I have endeavoured to state. (Page 536 at (c).)

...

If a Court were to exercise a discretion to adjourn pending litigation by reference to the substantive benefits foreshadowed by proposed legislation, it would inevitably be drawn into the type of considerations referred to in the passage I have just quoted. A Court of law cannot choose to favour one class of litigants over another without lawful authority. (Page 537.)

[19]             In Unitec Institute of Technology v Attorney-General, Unitec had applied under the Education Act 1989 to become a university.14 However, following a change of government, the Associate Minister of Education introduced legislation limiting the total number of universities and advised NZQA to suspend processing Unitec’s application, which it did. After a government agency review that recommended no limit to the number of educational institutions, Unitec requested the Minister recommence processing the application, but the Minister refused, saying it would be premature to do so when new legislation was proposed. NZQA also refused to recommence the application process on the grounds the amending legislation was before the House and its fate had not yet been determined. The university-limiting legislation was eventually dropped and different legislation introduced and enacted.

14     Unitec Institute of Technology v Attorney-General [2006] 1 NZLR 65 (HC).

Unitec requested to have the processing of its application resumed and brought an action against the Minister seeking remedies for delay and breaches of natural justice. In considering the application, Miller J stated:

[76] Ms Clark did not contend that anything turned on the government's intention to implement its policy by means of a Bill. Under s 16 of the Constitution Act, a Bill becomes law only when it has been passed by the House of Representatives and receives the royal assent. Prospective amending or validating legislation does not qualify the obligation of the judicial branch of government to uphold existing law: Meggitt Overseas Ltd v Grdovic (1998) 43 NSWLR 527 (CA) at p 531. The Court may have regard to new legislation during the period between enactment of legislation and its coming into force, as was done in W v W (2000) 14 PRNZ 157 and Tyler v Attorney-General [2000] 1 NZLR 211. It has also been held that in rare cases, impending legislation, if inevitable, may justify a decision to defer judgment: Genesis Power Ltd v Environment Court [2003] NZAR 371. In Fitzgerald v Muldoon Wild CJ declined to grant relief in the nature of injunction or mandamus for that reason. In this case, the Bill was to be referred to the select committee, and it cannot be assumed that the Bill would be enacted at all, or in the same form, or that its enactment was imminent. It has been held that the Court will not speculate on whether a Bill before Parliament will be passed in its present form: Willow Wren Canal Carrying Co Ltd v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 All ER 567 at p 569. That must be all the more so in a mixed-member proportional representation environment in which coalition or minority governments are the norm.

[20]             In Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General, a Minister made a “preliminary decision”, in the context of a dispute as to the settlement of overlapping Treaty claims, to transfer some properties to a different iwi and later informed Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei that this transfer would be implemented only through settlement legislation.15 Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei sought declarations about their rights to the land. In the Supreme Court, Elias CJ observed:

[114] I consider that the Court of Appeal in the present case  mischaracterised the claim when it said that its effect was to declare the authorisation to be obtained through Parliament as “unlawful” and in breach of Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei’s rights “if made now in the course of a process already under way and with legislation intended to be introduced”. Parliament speaks to the courts only through enacted legislation. Whether the enactment proposed will proceed and, if so, the form it will take is uncertain because it is a matter for Parliament. Just as the executive cannot bind itself by contract to introduce and pass legislation, it cannot properly give any assurance to the court that the legislation it proposes will be passed.

(footnotes omitted).

15     Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 84, [2019] 1 NZLR 116.

[21]             After reviewing the respective rights and responsibilities of Parliament and the courts, the Chief Justice concluded:

[116] The constitutional functions of the courts are not enlarged by this approach. Rights in issue in the courts may always be changed by legislation. The prospect does not deflect the courts from carrying out their present responsibilities. Nor are they deflected by statements of government policy that legislative change will be sought. Such statements cannot mark out no-go areas for the courts.

[22]             In Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, the learned author observes that “[u]ntil an Act is in force it cannot create enforceable rights or duties. Thus prosecutions or actions based on it cannot succeed.”16 Two English cases are referred to in support of that proposition:17

That principle was also applied in R v Walsall Justices,18 where Justices had adjourned a case for one day to take advantage of the coming into force of a new Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) that abolished the requirement of corroboration of the evidence of a child witness. The Divisional Court granted an application for judicial review. The rule of law required that courts apply the law as it exists, and that they cannot choose or select the law they will apply. Here the only reason for the adjournment was that the Justices regarded the existing law as unjust; that is never enough.

Likewise in R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebeline19 it was held that an applicant for judicial review could not base a plea of “legitimate expectation” on an article of the European Convention on Human Rights; the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which would give the Convention status in UK law, was not yet in force. Lord Steyn said:20

There is a clear statutory intent to postpone the coming into effect of central provisions of the Act. A legitimate expectation, which treats inoperative statutory provisions as having immediate effect, is contradicted by the language of the statute. This argument must be rejected.

[23]             I have also given consideration to whether the approach taken by the Supreme Court in the recent decision of Fitzgerald v R gives pause to consider whether delaying Mr Morgan’s sentencing in order to await the outcome of the legislative process may properly be justified.21 In that case, the appellant had been convicted of indecent

16     Ross Carter Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2021) at 789.

17     At 789-790.

18     R v Walsall Justices [1990] 1 QB 253 (QB).

19     R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 327 (HL).

20     At 368.

21     Fitzgerald v R [2021] NZSC 131.

assault for trying to kiss a woman’s mouth. The sentencing Judge had accepted the kiss fell “at the bottom end of the range” for an indecent assault, but nevertheless counted as his third strike under s 86D of the Sentencing Act. As in this case, the appellant’s prior strike offences were also indecent assaults.

[24]             The Court was unanimous that the appellant’s sentence of seven years’ imprisonment breached s 9 of NZBORA, with the majority holding that it went well beyond excessive punishment and would shock the conscience of properly informed New Zealanders. It was therefore so disproportionately severe as to meet the high threshold for breach. The majority further held that Parliament did not intend, in enacting the three strikes regime, to require judges to impose sentences that breach s 9 and New Zealand’s international obligations.22 They considered it possible, and thus necessary, to interpret s 86D(2) of the Act in a way that does not require the imposition of sentences that would breach s 9.23 The appellant in that case also suffered from a longstanding and serious mental illness, which it was accepted was linked to his offending and rendered the deterrence rationale underpinning the three strikes regime largely inapplicable.24

[25]             It follows from Fitzgerald that a sentencing Court may assess whether the sentence to be imposed under s 86D(2) would go well beyond excessive punishment and consequently be so disproportionately severe as to breach s 9 of NZBORA. However, as noted by O’Regan and Arnold JJ, breach of s 9 carries a high threshold that would require the sentence to be “grossly disproportionate” or “inhuman”.25 A sentence which is simply severe, disproportionate or manifestly excessive is insufficient.26 Winkelmann CJ referred to phrases in Taunoa v Attorney-General which state that, in order to breach s 9, the sentence would need to be “so out of proportion to the particular circumstances as to cause shock and revulsion”, “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” or be a sentence that was “so severe as to shock the national conscience”.27 The Court held that in those rare cases where the

22     At [123] and [128]–[130] per Winkelmann CJ, [247] per Glazebrook J, and [203] per O’Regan and Arnold JJ.

23     At [139] per Winkelmann CJ, [250] per Glazebrook J, and [219] per O’Regan and Arnold JJ.

24     At [15], [30] and [79]–[80] per Winkelmann CJ.

25     At [159]–[166], referring to Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429.

26     At [161] per O’Regan and Arnold JJ.

27     At [79] per Winkelmann CJ, citing Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 25.

test is met an offender should be sentenced in accordance with ordinary sentencing principles.28

[26]             It is not appropriate at this stage to make any preliminary assessment as to whether imposing a third strike sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment (with or without parole) on Mr Morgan would amount to a sentence that is so disproportionately severe as to breach s 9 NZBORA. However, I observe that notwithstanding the recognition that may otherwise have to be given to Mr Morgan’s background of socioeconomic and cultural deprivation, which may have impaired his choice and causally contributed to his current offending, it is not immediately apparent, as it was in Fitzgerald, that a third strike sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to a sentence that is so disproportionately severe as to breach s 9 NZBORA.29 In any event, having regard to the approach taken by the Supreme Court, it is clear that Mr Morgan’s sentencing need not be adjourned in order to avoid such an outcome as the sentencing court has the means to avoid a breach of s 9.

Decision

[27]             I accept that the interests of justice may extend to granting an adjournment where a legislative change is imminent or could otherwise be categorised as “inevitable” and that the Court may have regard to the parliamentary process. However, because of the courts’ obligation to apply the law as it currently exists, those circumstances must necessarily be rare and limited. In the present case, the Bill has only recently been introduced and, while the Executive has announced its determination to repeal the three strikes regime, any legislative change is the sole preserve of Parliament. Despite the Government’s majority, it cannot be presumed the law will ultimately take a particular form, or that by the time of its proposed enactment on 1 July 2022 the present terms of the Bill will not have changed.

28 At [252] per Glazebrook J and [231] per O’Regan and Arnold JJ; Winkelmann CJ agreed that the ordinary sentencing principles will apply, but considered that s 86D(2) adds a sentencing principle of recidivism by those caught by the regime is to be viewed as very serious and worthy of a stern sentencing response: at [137]–[138].

29 See Phillips v R [2021] NZCA 651 for a discussion of the approach to the sentencing of a third- strike offender in the wake of Fitzgerald.

[28]             In that regard, I note the Minister of Justice’s advice that Cabinet has agreed to invite the Select Committee to consider whether (and, if so, how) the Bill should include provisions for those who have already been sentenced under the three strikes regime.30 As submitted by Mr Donnelly, it follows that whether a person in Mr Morgan’s position will remain subject to the consequences of the present law is an issue that is likely to be examined by Parliament and be a matter of deliberate legislative design. To adjourn sentencing until after the passage of the Bill would arguably therefore be to illegitimately circumvent Parliament’s will.

[29]             The Court is obliged to apply the law. The necessary reports have now been prepared to allow Mr Morgan’s sentencing to proceed. There is currently no impediment to sentencing taking place in the ordinary way. Mr Young has been candid about his reason for seeking to have sentencing adjourned, but in the circumstances, in particular the nature and length of the parliamentary process that is yet to run, I do not consider the Court can effectively choose to suspend the existing law on the basis it will likely, if not probably, be different in seven months’ time.

[30]             If Mr Morgan has grounds to argue that the application of s 86D will, in the circumstances of his case, give rise to disproportionately severe treatment in breach of s 9 of NZBORA, he is entitled to make that argument. However, as already observed, I do not presently consider that to be so obviously apparent that it would support the postponement of his sentencing to allow Parliament to remedy any such non- compliance. In any event, the Court has the means to assess and, if necessary, address that issue for itself.

Result

[31]             The application to adjourn sentencing until the enactment of the Bill is declined. Mr Morgan is remanded to a call at 9.15 am on 8 February 2022. In the interim, the registry will contact counsel to arrange a suitable sentencing date.

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Invercargill Hugo T Young, Invercargill

30     Hon Kris Faafoi MP “Government Moves on ‘three strikes’ Law”, 11 November 2021.