R v Baker - [2019] NZHC 1499

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CRI-2018-096-3977

[2019] NZHC 1499

THE QUEEN

v

EUGENE DANIEL BAKER

Hearing: 28 June 2019

Counsel:

G J Burston for Crown

B A Crowley and C O Thorburn for defendant

Sentence:

28 June 2019

SENTENCING NOTES OF DOBSON J

[1] Mr Baker, you have pleaded guilty to murder and that means that the mandatory sentence is one of life imprisonment. The issue I have to decide is the minimum period of imprisonment, that the lawyers call MPI. That is, the length of time that you have to serve before you would be eligible for parole. This is to be decided by considering the circumstances of the offending and, to an extent, your circumstances as the offender.

[2] You will have heard both counsel this morning referring to s 104. That is a reference to s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 (the Act) which provides for the higher MPI of 17 years where certain features of the most serious cases of murder are present. In this case, the Crown argues that a number of the factors of s 104 are present to an

R v BAKER [2019] NZHC 1499 [28 June 2019]

extent that, by comparison with other serious murder sentences, I should adopt a starting point for the MPI of 19 years.

[3] On your behalf, Mr Crowley accepts, quite realistically, that this is a murder to which s 104 applies, so that the starting point is appropriately 17 years. However, he argues that there are circumstances justifying a reduction and says that an MPI of around 15 years is appropriate.

[4] You, Mr Baker, may only be interested in the answer as to how long it will be before you are eligible for parole. However, I cannot just think of a number and I have to set out the steps in my analysis that are required by the law to explain what that decision is.

[5] I do so first by assessing the nature of the offending, including the impact it has had on the victims, to assess it against the s 104 factors that may be relevant. I do that to set a starting point for the appropriate MPI, in part by relating the relative seriousness of the features of this murder against those present in other sentencings, particularly sentencings that have been reconsidered by the Court of Appeal, which is obviously concerned to ensure that there is a measure of consistency between the MPIs that are imposed.

[6] After that, I will reflect on your circumstances as the offender, drawing on all the information that is available to me and also take into account your guilty plea.

The offending

[7] As to the offending, in November last year you and your victim, Mr Frank Tyson, were both small-scale synthetic cannabis dealers operating from blocks of Housing New Zealand flats in Petone. A testy relationship between you got worse when…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Baker

Details

AGLC: R v Baker [2019] NZHC 1499
Case: [2019] NZHC 1499
Decision Date: 28 June 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, the case of R v Baker was heard on 28 June 2019, with sentencing notes by Justice Dobson. Eugene Daniel Baker pleaded guilty to the murder of Frank Tyson, and the court was required to determine the minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) before parole eligibility. The Crown argued for an MPI of 19 years, citing features outlined in section 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002, while Baker's counsel sought a reduction to around 15 years, considering the offender's circumstances and guilty plea.

The court first assessed the nature of the offending, which involved a protracted series of threats and culminated in a brutal murder. Baker had a prior dispute with Tyson over an eviction, which escalated into violent threats and ultimately the murder. The court accepted that the murder involved unlawful entry into a dwelling, the commission of another serious offence, and a high level of brutality, thus satisfying the criteria of section 104. While Baker's planning was not deemed sufficiently calculated, the callousness and brutality of the crime warranted a higher starting point for the MPI. The court set the starting point at 18 years, acknowledging the gravity of the murder but considering Baker's troubled background and recent remorse.

Reflecting on Baker's personal circumstances, including his troubled upbringing, drug use, and employment history, the court acknowledged these factors but emphasised the need for consistency in sentencing. Despite Baker's guilty plea and recent remorse, the court determined that these factors warranted only a modest reduction in the MPI. Ultimately, the court sentenced Baker to life imprisonment with a minimum period of 17 years before parole eligibility, balancing the need for punishment with the mitigating factors presented.

The final orders reflect the court's decision, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with an MPI of 17 years, acknowledging the severity of the crime while considering the offender's background and recent change of heart.

Orders