Quinlan v The Queen - [2013] NZCA 168

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA270/2013
[2013] NZCA 168

BETWEEN MICHAEL MAURICE QUINLAN
Applicant

AND THE QUEEN
Respondent

Counsel: P J Davison QC for Applicant
J Bond for Respondent

Judgment: 22 May 2013 at 10.00 am

(On the papers)

JUDGMENT OF STEVENS J

The application for bail is declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

The applicant was convicted (jointly with a Mr Bennett) after a jury trial of 16 representative counts of supplying equipment capable of being used for the cultivation of cannabis contrary to s 12A(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. He was sentenced by the trial judge, Judge Wiltens, on 30 April 2013 to a term of imprisonment of four years and three months.[1] All sentences are to be served concurrently. The applicant appeals against his conviction and sentence. He applies for bail pending the determination of his appeal under s 70 of the Bail Act 2000. I have considered the application under s 393(2)(d) of the Crimes Act 1961.

The application for bail

[1] R v Quinlan DC Auckland CRI-2010-004-202624 [sentencing notes].

The application is brought on several grounds. First, it is said that the applicant will be prejudiced in his appeal if he is required to serve time in custody pending appeal because, to the extent that the appeal is upheld either as to conviction or sentence, the appeal will be rendered nugatory and ineffective to the extent of time served.
The applicant also raises a number of personal factors. He says that he was remanded on bail prior to his trial and “complied faithfully” with all conditions. Further, he has an established residence and being bailed to a family situation would remove any flight risk.
The Crown opposes bail on the basis that the applicant has not discharged the onus set out in s 14(2) of the Bail Act. The respondent has referred to the observations of this Court in Ellis v R:[2]
Admission to bail pending appeal is unusual and only to be granted in exceptional circumstances. The concern is for the overall interests of justice. The starting point is that the applicant has been found guilty and sentenced. Two further factors for special consideration are the apparent strength of the appeal and the element of delay causing injustice.

Statutory test

[2]Ellis v R [1998] 3 NZLR 555 (CA) at 560, observations that were affirmed in Iti v R [2012] NZCA 307 at [7].

The test to be applied in relation to an application for bail is set out in s 14 of the Bail Act. Under s 14(1) bail is not to be granted unless the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it would be in the interests of justice in the particular case to do so. Section 14(2) provides that the onus is on the applicant to show cause why bail should be granted.

Strength of the appeal

The grounds of appeal are similar to those raised by Mr Quinlan’s co‑accused, Mr Bennett.[3] As…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Quinlan v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Quinlan v The Queen [2013] NZCA 168
Case: [2013] NZCA 168
Decision Date: 22 May 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal of New Zealand considered an application for bail by Michael Maurice Quinlan, who was convicted of 16 counts of supplying equipment for cannabis cultivation and sentenced to four years and three months in prison. Quinlan appeals his conviction and sentence and seeks bail pending the appeal. The Crown opposes bail, arguing that Quinlan has not met the onus of showing cause why bail should be granted. The court applied the statutory test from the Bail Act, requiring satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that it would be in the interests of justice to grant bail. Quinlan argued that he would be prejudiced if he serves time pending appeal, and that he complied with bail conditions previously. However, the court found that the grounds of appeal were not sufficiently particularised to assess their strength, and that Quinlan's history of compliance with bail conditions did not weigh heavily in favour of bail. The court declined the bail application.

The court considered the statutory test for granting bail under section 14 of the Bail Act, which requires satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that it would be in the interests of justice to grant bail. The onus is on the applicant to show cause why bail should be granted. The court considered the strength of the grounds of appeal, but found that they were not sufficiently particularised to assess their strength at this stage. The court also considered Quinlan's personal circumstances, but found that they did not weigh heavily in favour of bail. The court concluded that Quinlan had not discharged the onus to show that it is in the interests of justice to grant bail.

Orders