IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2011-404-7662 [2012] NZHC 1574
IN THE MATTER OF A Caveat No. 8876496.2 North Auckland
Land Registry
BETWEEN LAWRENCE PONNIAH AND JOHN PERA KAHUKIWA
Applicants
ANDNORMAN PALMER AND NICOLAS VAN DIJK
Respondents
Hearing: 3 July 2012
Appearances: Mr P Revell for Applicants
Mr E J Werry for Respondents
Judgment: 5 July 2012
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE DOOGUE [Caveat not lapse]
This judgment was delivered by me on
05.07.12 at 4 pm, pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
Counsel:
Corban Revell, P O Box 21-180, Waitakere City – prevell@corbanrevell.co.nz
E J Werry, Barrister, P O Box 105-270, Auckland – ejwerry@gmail.com
PONNIAH AND Anor V PALMER AND Anor HC AK CIV-2011-404-7662 [5 July 2012]
[1] The applicants in this case are partners in a law firm, Corban Revell, which provided legal services to a group of persons in an apartment complex which was subject to weather tightness problems.
[2] Units 5, 7, and 8 in the complex were owned by a trust called the Livi Trust. A Mr Ivil was the settlor of the Livi Trust. The trustees of the trust were Mr Van Dijk and Mr Norman Palmer (“the trustees”).
[3] On 7 May the trustees executed a document entitled “Authority for representation and assessment”. The purpose of that document was to authorise the Weathertight Services assessor under the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 to enter the properties and carry out invasive testing. In the document which they signed, the trustees also nominated Mr B Ivil, as their representative “to bring and resolve a claim for the above complex”. The “above” complex was
15 Clearwater Cove, West Park Marina, Hobsonville.
[4] Proceedings were heard by the Weathertight Homes Tribunal commencing on
28 February 2011. Both of the trustees attended and gave evidence. The solicitors assisted the trustees to prepare their briefs of evidence and provided legal representation at the hearing. As far back as June 2008 the trustees had signed a Weathertight Homes Tribunal document which provided for owners to execute if they wished to appoint an agent, lawyer or representative to conduct the claim on their behalf. It was essentially an authority to act and it nominated, in the case of the trust, Mr Ponniah as the lawyer who would be acting.
[5] In general terms the evidence included statements by the trustees that Mr Ivil was the person who had negotiated terms of agreements with service providers for the remediation of the apartments and he was the person who interacted with the council and other involved parties on behalf of the trust. Mr Van Dijk who was asked about having signed certain documents described himself as being a “figure head” for the “principal Mr Ivil”. Mr Ivil who was the settlor of the trust also gave evidence.
[6] On the eve of the Weathertight Homes Tribunal proceeding, the applicants were concerned about the large amount of unpaid accounts already owing in respect of…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the trustees had expressly or implicitly authorised Mr Ivil to execute the security documents. The applicants argued that the trustees had implicitly authorised Mr Ivil by allowing him to control the litigation process and instruct the law firm. The court rejected this argument, stating that even if Mr Ivil had been implicitly authorised to initiate legal proceedings, this did not extend to authorising him to execute a mortgage over the trust properties. The court also considered whether the trustees could validly delegate their powers to Mr Ivil, but found that there was no evidence of such a delegation, and that the trust deed did not permit the trustees to delegate their decision-making powers to an agent.
The court concluded that the applicants had no entitlement to lodge caveats against the trust properties, and dismissed the application. The parties were directed to confer on the costs and, if unable to agree, to file memorandums not exceeding four pages on each side within three weeks of the date of the judgment.
Orders
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