Police v Carr HC Gisborne CRI-2011-416-000006

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND GISBORNE REGISTRY

CRI-2011-416-000006

IN THE MATTER OF     AN APPEAL FROM A DETERMINATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AT GISBORNE

BETWEEN  NEW ZEALAND POLICE Appellant

ANDROSS LUKIS CARR Respondent

Hearing:         7 June 2011

Counsel:         C R Walker for the Appellant

J Mathieson for the Respondent

Judgment:      21 June 2011 at 3:30 PM

JUDGMENT OF POTTER J

In accordance with r 11.5 High Court Rules

I direct the Registrar to endorse this judgment with a delivery time of 3.30 p.m. on 21 June 2011.

Solicitors:           Crown Solicitor, P O Box 609, Napier 4140

Rishworth Wall & Mathieson, P O Box 55, Gisborne 4040

NEW ZEALAND POLICE V CARR HC GIS CRI-2011-416-000006 21 June 2011

Introduction

[1]      This is a prosecution appeal by way of case stated under s 107(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 from a judgment of Judge Spear in the District Court at Gisborne on 7 September 2010.

[2]      Judge Spear dismissed an information which alleged that the respondent Ross Lukis Carr on 6 December 2009 at Gisborne drove a motor vehicle on a road namely Rutene Road while the proportion of alcohol in his breath exceeded 400 micrograms of alcohol per litre of breath in that it was 959 micrograms of alcohol per litre of breath.  The Judge ruled evidence of the breath screening test inadmissible because no roadside breath screening test had been conducted.  He rejected the prosecution argument that a breath screening device was not readily available under s 69(1)(d) of the Land Transport Act 1998.

[3]      Judge Spear stated the following questions for the opinion of this Court:

(1)Does “readily available” for the purposes of s 69(1)(d) of the Land Transport Act 1998 mean readily available to the officer requiring the device?

(2)If the answer to question (a) is yes, was I correct in law to find that a breath screening device was readily available, when in order to have actually made it available to Constable Lexmond, it would have required another officer to deviate from and suspend, the lawful duty that he was currently undertaking?

Section 69(1)(d) of the Land Transport Act 1998

[4]      This section provides:

69       Who must undergo evidential breath test

(1)      An  enforcement  officer  may  require  a  person  to  accompany  an enforcement officer to a place where it is likely that the person can

undergo an evidential breath test or a blood test (or both) when required to do so by the officer, if –

. . .

(d)       The person could be required to undergo a breath screening test  without  delay under  section  68  but  cannot  be tested because either a breath screening device is not readily available or for any reason a breath screening test cannot then be carried out, and there is good cause to suspect that the person has consumed drink.

Relevant facts

[5]      I take the facts recorded in the case stated as correct.1    Those facts are as follows:

On6 December 2009 the fact of a car crashing into…

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Details
Case
[2011] NZHC 862
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand, Gisborne Registry, heard a case involving the New Zealand Police as the appellant and Ross Lukis Carr as the respondent. The case was an appeal from a determination of the District Court at Gisborne, which dismissed an information alleging that Carr drove a motor vehicle on a road while the proportion of alcohol in his breath exceeded the legal limit. The District Court ruled the evidence of the breath screening test inadmissible because no roadside breath screening test had been conducted, and rejected the prosecution's argument that a breath screening device was readily available under section 69(1)(d) of the Land Transport Act 1998. The High Court was required to determine two legal issues, namely: (1) whether "readily available" under section 69(1)(d) means readily available to the officer requiring the device, and (2) whether the District Court judge was correct in law to find that a breath screening device was readily available to Constable Lexmond when it would have required another officer to deviate from their lawful duty to make it available.

The High Court held that "readily available" must mean that the device is readily available to the officer requiring the device to carry out the roadside breath screening test. The enforcement officer must decide whether section 69(1)(d) applies to provide sufficient and proper grounds to require a person to accompany an enforcement officer. In this case, Constable Lexmond had exhausted all options reasonably available to him for getting a device delivered to the scene of the incident. He did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know, that Sergeant Lister could have delivered a device to him. Thus, a device was not "readily available" to Constable Lexmond, and a "common-sense and practical approach" meant that his only option in the circumstances was to require the respondent to accompany him to the police station.

The Court rejected the submission of counsel for the respondent that the answer to the second question could be found in the subjective view of Sergeant Lister that delivering the breath screening device to Constable Lexmond would be a trivial matter, involving only a slight deviation for one or two minutes. The Court found that there was no evidence to suggest that Sergeant Lister made any such assessment at the time or that he even knew of the requirement for a device to be delivered to Constable Lexmond. Constable Lexmond had no knowledge of Sergeant Lister's situation, so this was not information that could have informed the decision Constable Lexmond had to make about whether a device could be readily available to him. The scenario relied on by counsel was not the factual situation at the relevant time, as recorded in the case stated.

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