Pierce v Tripp Rolleston & Co

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE TIHI-O-MARU ROHE

CIV-2023-476-011

[2025] NZHC 557

BETWEEN

KATHERINE ANN PIERCE and HILARY

JANE STUBBS as trustees of the BIDWILL STUBBS TRUST

Plaintiffs

AND

TRIPP ROLLESTON & CO

First Defendant

ALFRED JAMES HENRY WILLIAMSON
Second Defendant

continued over

Hearing: 3 March 2025

Appearances:

S M Grieve KC and V P Kenworthy for Plaintiffs M E Parker for First Defendant

G K Riach and N M G Wilson for Second, Third and Fourth Defendants

Judgment:

18 March 2025


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN


This judgment was delivered by me on 18 March 2025 at 3.30 pm

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

PIERCE v TRIPP ROLLESTON & CO [2025] NZHC 557 [18 March 2025]

ALFRED JAMES HENRY WILLIAMSON, JAMES MATTHEW WILLIAMSON, DONNA LEE WILLIAMSON and

LEANNE MAREE WILLIAMSON as
trustees of the JM WILLIAMSON FAMILY TRUST
Third Defendants

JAMES MATTHEW WILLIAMSON and THEA ANNE WILLIAMSON
Fourth Defendants

[1]                 The plaintiffs are the present trustees of the Bidwill Stubbs Trust (the Trust).1 The Trust held a second mortgage over a property securing advances made to the third defendants. As a result of transactions that occurred in 2012, the mortgage was extinguished and the advances secured by it have not been repaid.

[2]                 Related to those transactions, the Trust brings claims against the first defendant (Tripp Rolleston) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty. It also claims against the second and third defendants that they dishonestly assisted in and/or induced the breach of equitable and statutory duties owed to the Trust, and against the fourth defendants that they knowingly received property in breach of those duties.2

[3]                 The first, third and fourth defendants seek leave to apply for summary judgment pursuant to r 12.4 of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules). They say none of the causes of action against them in the statement of claim can succeed as they are time-barred under the Limitation Act 2010 (the Act).3

[4]                 The Trust opposes the application and says the defendants should not be granted leave to apply for summary judgment because:

(a)the defendants have no prospect of establishing the Trust’s claims cannot succeed; and

(b)granting the defendants leave to apply for summary judgment would risk a miscarriage of justice as the Trust intends to seek further discovery, make further interlocutory applications and amend its pleadings, and it should not have to answer a summary judgment application at this time.

[5]The primary issues arising are:

(a)What are the acts or omissions upon which the Trust’s claims are based for the purposes of ss 11 and 14 of the Act?


1      For convenience I refer throughout this judgment to the plaintiffs as “the Trust”.

2      A claim against the third defendants to recover the advances as a debt is not pursued.

3      Limitation Act 2010, ss 11 and 14.

(b)Did the Trust have late knowledge of its claims, and if so when did the Trust gain or ought reasonably to have gained knowledge of the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pierce v Tripp Rolleston & Co and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] NZHC 557
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Bidwill Stubbs Trust brought claims against Tripp Rolleston and others, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and dishonest assistance. The defendants sought leave to apply for summary judgment, claiming the Trust's causes of action were time-barred. The primary issues were whether the Trust had late knowledge of its claims, if so when it gained such knowledge, and whether the Trust filed the proceeding within three years of the late knowledge dates. The Trust opposed the application, arguing it had no prospect of establishing the claims were time-barred and that granting leave would risk a miscarriage of justice. The court found the Trust had knowledge of the acts or omissions upon which its claims were based by 7 September 2018, and that the proceeding was not filed within the required three years. The interests of justice favoured granting the defendants' application, as there was no prejudice to the Trust, merit in the defendants' position, and potential to save costs. The application was successful, and the defendants were granted leave to apply for summary judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.