Pierce v Tripp Rolleston & Co - [2025] NZHC 971

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE TIHI-O-MARU ROHE

CIV-2023-476-011

[2025] NZHC 971

BETWEEN
KATHERINE ANN PIERCE and HILARY

JANE STUBBS as trustees of the BIDWILL STUBBS TRUST

Plaintiffs

AND

TRIPP ROLLESTON & CO

First Defendant

ALFRED JAMES HENRY WILLIAMSON
Second Defendant

continued over

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances:

S M Grieve KC and V P Kenworthy for Plaintiffs M E Parker for First Defendant

G K Riach and N M G Wilson for Second, Third and Fourth Defendants

Judgment:

24 April 2025

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN

This judgment was delivered by me on 24 April 2025 at 4.00 pm

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

PIERCE v TRIPP ROLLESTON & CO [2025] NZHC 971 [24 April 2025]

ALFRED JAMES HENRY WILLIAMSON, JAMES MATTHEW WILLIAMSON, DONNA LEE WILLIAMSON and
LEANNE MAREE WILLIAMSON as
trustees of the JM WILLIAMSON FAMILY TRUST
Third Defendants

JAMES MATTHEW WILLIAMSON and THEA ANNE WILLIAMSON
Fourth Defendants

[1] In a judgment of 18 March 2025 I granted the application of the first, third and fourth defendants for leave to apply for summary judgment.1 The application was opposed by the plaintiffs.

[2] In my judgment I said the first, third and fourth defendants would in the usual course be entitled to costs but if there was a disagreement about that memoranda were to be filed.2 It appears no agreement was reached and the first, third and fourth defendants have applied for costs on a 2B basis. The plaintiffs say costs should be reserved.

[3] All issues of costs are discretionary but the starting point here is that the defendants were successful on their leave application and costs should in the ordinary course follow the event.3

[4] Further, r 14.8(1) provides that costs on opposed interlocutory applications shall, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, be fixed at the time the application is determined and become payable when they are fixed.

[5] The plaintiffs consider special reasons exist why costs should not be determined now. They have referred to Mulholland v Mulholland where the plaintiff failed to obtain leave to apply for summary judgment and Associate Judge Sussock reserved costs.4 The Associate Judge said:
[18] … [H]owever, I consider that a special reason to the contrary might be where the application is similar to a summary judgment application in that if ultimately the plaintiff does succeed then it may be appropriate for the defendant to pay for both the unsuccessful application and the substantive proceedings, the Court paying particular attention to the reasons why the plaintiff was unsuccessful in the first case.

[6] The Associate Judge noted that the leave application failed not because of the delay in applying for summary judgment but upon its merits. She considered that an analogy could therefore be drawn between the case before her and the position that

1      Pierce v Tripp Rolleston & Co [2025] NZHC 557.
2 At [56].
3      High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1)(a).
4      Mulholland v Mulholland [2023]…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] NZHC 971
Decision Date: 24 April 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pierce v Tripp Rolleston & Co, the plaintiffs, Katherine Ann Pierce and Hilary Jane Stubbs as trustees of the Bidwill Stubbs Trust, sought to challenge the decision of the court to grant the defendants leave to apply for summary judgment. The defendants in the case were Tripp Rolleston & Co, Alfred James Henry Williamson, and others acting as trustees of various trusts. The plaintiffs had opposed the defendants' application for leave to apply for summary judgment, which was subsequently granted by the court. The primary issue before the court was whether the defendants were entitled to costs arising from the leave application, and if so, in what amount.

The court examined the principles governing the awarding of costs in interlocutory applications, particularly those related to summary judgment. The court noted that, in general, costs should follow the event unless there are special reasons to the contrary. The plaintiffs argued that special reasons existed to reserve the costs, drawing an analogy to the case of Mulholland v Mulholland. However, the court distinguished the present case from Mulholland, finding that the opposition to the leave application was not due to any fault on the part of the plaintiffs but rather a necessary step in the litigation process. The court also highlighted that the rules allow for the reversal of a costs order if it is found that the original order should not have been made.

After considering the arguments and the relevant legal principles, the court concluded that the defendants were entitled to costs arising from the leave application. The court awarded costs to the first defendant in the amount of $6,952 and to the third and fourth defendants in the amount of $7,342. The court rejected the plaintiffs' objections to specific claims for costs, finding them to be reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the litigation process.

In summary, the court held that the defendants were entitled to costs for the application for leave to apply for summary judgment, and it ordered the plaintiffs to pay the specified amounts to the respective defendants. The court's decision underscores the importance of adhering to the general rule that costs follow the event in interlocutory applications, while also recognizing the discretionary nature of such awards and the potential for special circumstances to warrant a different outcome.

Orders