Opus International Consultants Ltd v Colac Bay Vision Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2014-404-002959 [2015] NZHC 1782

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Act 1993

BETWEEN

OPUS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS LIMITED Plaintiff

AND

COLAC BAY VISION LIMITED First Defendant

IAN ANDREWS Second Defendant

Hearing:

3 July 2015

(on papers submissions)

Appearances:

D S Lester for Plaintiff
G A D Neil for Defendants

Judgment:

30 July 2015

COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J P DOOGUE

This judgment was delivered by me on

30.07.15 at 5 pm, pursuant to

Rule 11.5  of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

OPUS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS LIMITED v COLAC BAY VISION LIMITED & ANOR [2015] NZHC 1782 [30 July 2015]

Introduction

[1]      Opus   International   Consultants   Ltd   (the   plaintiff)   filed   liquidation proceedings seeking a liquidation of Colac Bay Vision Ltd (the first defendant).  The plaintiff has now elected not to proceed with the application for liquidation order. The parties are in dispute concerning the issue of costs.

Background

[2]      The argument over costs has turned into a considerable contest in its own right.  The defendants have filed an affidavit of some 20 pages and a memorandum totalling 25 pages on the subject.   The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of five pages and would have filed more material but for a direction of the Court limiting the extent of the papers to be filed.

[3]      The defendants have invoked r 15.23 of the High Court Rules (Rules), which applies in the case of a discontinuance of a proceeding.  The rule provides:

15.23    Costs

Unless the defendant otherwise agrees or the court otherwise orders, a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including the discontinuance

[4]      The first defendant seeks indemnity costs or an uplift in costs.  If neither of those two alternatives succeeds, the first defendant seeks costs on a 2B basis.  The second defendant seeks an award of scale costs.

[5]      The plaintiff seeks costs or that costs should lie where they fall.

[6]      The way in which the costs dispute has developed and the amount of Court time that has to be allocated to this and other costs determinations does not seem to be consistent with the principle that is expressed in r 14.2 of the Rules that the determination of costs should:

(g)      So far as possible… be predictable and expeditious.

Law

[7]      The principles concerning the award of costs on a discontinuance were stated by the Court of Appeal in Kroma Colour Prints Ltd v Tridonicato NZ Ltd (Kroma) as follows:1

[12]     The Judge correctly stated the law on r 476C. She referred to North Shore City Council v Local Government Commission (1995) 9 PRNZ 182, noting that the presumption in favour of awarding costs to a defendant against whom a proceeding had been  discontinued  may be displaced  if  there  were just  and equitable circumstances  not to apply it. A court would not speculate  on  respective  strengths  and  weaknesses  of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Opus International Consultants Ltd v Colac Bay Vision Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 1782
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Opus International Consultants Limited, the plaintiff, had filed liquidation proceedings against Colac Bay Vision Limited, the first defendant, which were subsequently discontinued. The parties now dispute the issue of costs. The defendants have invoked rule 15.23 of the High Court Rules, which provides that unless the defendant otherwise agrees or the court otherwise orders, a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including the discontinuance. The first defendant seeks indemnity costs or an uplift in costs. If neither of those two alternatives succeeds, the first defendant seeks costs on a 2B basis. The second defendant seeks an award of scale costs. The plaintiff seeks costs or that costs should lie where they fall.

The court found that there was no ground for not permitting the presumption in r 15.23 to have effect and that the defendants are entitled to costs. The court also found that the plaintiff had not acted improperly, frivolously, or unnecessarily in commencing the proceedings. Any assessment of whether the plaintiff acted improperly, frivolously or unnecessarily in commencing the proceedings required the Court to review the circumstances in which the plaintiff found itself when issuing the liquidation proceedings. The plaintiff was required to make a judgment as to whether there were reasonable grounds for supposing that the Court would make a liquidation order. There was no doubt that, having provided professional services to it, the plaintiff had grounds for supposing that it was a creditor of the first defendant. The plaintiff needed to prove that the first defendant was insolvent. For this element of the case, the plaintiff thought it was able to rely upon the unsatisfied statutory demand which it had served upon the first defendant. As it turned out, a dispute later emerged as to whether the plaintiff had served the statutory demand correctly. While the Court has not heard evidence on the point, I understand that a brief outline of the argument is as follows. The plaintiff served the statutory demand by placing it in the letterbox at what it considered was the registered address of the first defendant. The first defendant said that that did not amount to acceptable service because the letterbox in which the statutory demand was left was not on the property of the first defendant, but located in an area owned in common by several parties. It is not possible to resolve the question of whether service, in the way described, would be adequate service of a statutory demand. However, it certainly could not be stated with confidence that the plaintiff had failed to carry out the first stage of bringing an insolvency proceeding, which relies upon an undischarged statutory demand. An unsuccessful attempt was later made to set aside the statutory demand. Apparently, the application was not filed appropriately and therefore the attempt to set aside the demand was admittedly defective. It would have reasonably been conveyed to the plaintiff that the statutory demand had been served (or at least brought to the attention of the first defendant) and that because the attempted application to set aside the demand had failed, the first defendant would seem to be impliedly admitting that it had been served with a demand which it needed to have set aside. In any event, even if the statutory demand had not been available, the plaintiff may well have had other grounds for expecting it would be able to establish insolvency, including the non-payment of the invoice itself. However, where there is a substantial ground for not doing so, non-payment of the debt will not be evidence of insolvency. It is difficult to know, from the information that the plaintiff had available to it, whether that was the case. I do not consider that the first defendant is able to demonstrate that any of the grounds for ordering indemnity costs that are set out in r 14.6(4) of the Rules are applicable in the circumstances of this case.

The court found that an order for increased costs is not justified. The circumstances in which the plaintiff commenced the liquidation proceedings were no different from those in many other cases where a debtor has failed to pay an invoice and the creditor is driven to taking steps for recovery by means of a statutory demand and consequent liquidation proceedings. It is apparent that, at some point, the plaintiff appreciated that there could be difficulties in establishing the elements of its claim which the first defendant had disputed. Those elements were, broadly described, the status of the plaintiff as a creditor and whether the first defendant was actually insolvent. The only grounds which would justify an increased costs order in this case would appear to be that the plaintiff persisted with the claim for an unreasonable period after the fact that the first defendant had brought to its attention the difficulties that it would have in establishing the core elements of its claim. Because liquidation proceedings, even when defended, are disposed of after a short duration of time, it may be difficult to measure whether a plaintiff acted with sufficient promptness in abandoning the proceeding once it became aware of the stumbling blocks that lay in its path. Some factor of that kind would have to be present before the Court could fairly conclude that the circumstance of this case is one that comes within r 14.6(3)(b)(ii) that being the sub rule which most naturally would fit the circumstances of the case.

In conclusion, the appropriate costs order should be that the plaintiff is to pay costs on a 2B basis to the first defendant together with disbursements fixed by the Registrar and I order that accordingly.