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Morrison v Morrison

Morrison v Morrison

Case [2016] NZHC 1575 12 July 2016

Property (Relationships) Act 1976

Separate Property

Family Court

Family Law

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV-2014-409-000701 [2016] NZHC 1575

BETWEEN
JANE MORRISON

Appellant

AND

IVAN DONALD MORRISON Respondent

Hearing: 3 June 2016

Appearances:

RJB Fowler QC for Appellant
S J Shamy for Respondent

Judgment:

12 July 2016

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

Note: The names of the parties in this judgment are fictitious to preserve the

parties’ anonymity.

[1] On 6 November 2015, I allowed Mr Morrison’s appeal,1 in part, from a Family Court decision2 determining the status of the property that he and his wife owned, under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (“the Act”).

[2] In summary, I accepted that a further tranche of 5,523 of the 16,000 shares that Mr Morrison held in Grazing Farm Company Limited (GFCL) was Mr Morrison’s separate property, not relationship property.3 I also allowed his appeal in respect of whether the application of relationship property in the sum of
$10,835 to the debt owed on the farm contributed to an increase in the value of the

separate property shares for the purpose of s 9A.

1      M v M [2015] NZHC 2758.
2      M v M [2014] NZFC 5119.
3      The Family Court decision having already determined that 3,600 of these shares were separate property and the balance of 12,400 was relationship property.

MORRISON v MORRISON [2016] NZHC 1575 [12 July 2016]

[3] However, I upheld the Family Court Judge’s decision to recognise Mrs Morrison’s contribution under s 17, and his decision to award her a 20 per cent share in the increase in value of the separate property. As more property was now categorised as separate property, that 20 per cent share translated to a larger net figure. However, overall, the value of Mrs Morrison’s entitlement reduced, because of my decision to re-categorise some further GFCL shares as separate property.

[4] Mrs Morrison now seeks leave to appeal my decision pursuant to s 39B of the

Act and s 67 of the Judicature Act 1908.

[5] Specifically, Mrs Morrison applies to appeal the decision that the 5,523 B shares were the separate property of Mr Morrison. In the alternative, if the 5,523 B shares are held to be separate property, then Mrs Morrison applies to appeal the decision declining to make an award under s 9A, in respect of the increase in value of the shares, and to appeal the extent of the award made pursuant to s 17.

Legal principles governing applications for leave to appeal

[6] Section 67 of the Judicature Act 1908 provides:

(1) The decision of the High Court on appeal from an inferior court is final, unless a party, on application, obtains leave to appeal against that decision—

(a) to the Court of Appeal …

[7] The relevant principles applicable to applications under s 67 are summarised in Snee v Snee:4

[22] … for leave to be granted pursuant to s 67, the appeal must raise some question of law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Morrison v Morrison

Details

AGLC: Morrison v Morrison [2016] NZHC 1575
Case: [2016] NZHC 1575
Decision Date: 12 July 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Morrison v Morrison involved an appeal by Jane Morrison against a Family Court decision concerning the status of property owned by her and her husband, Ivan Donald Morrison. The appeal was partially allowed, particularly concerning the classification of certain shares in Grazing Farm Company Limited (GFCL) as the separate property of Mr Morrison. Mrs Morrison sought leave to appeal the High Court's decision, specifically questioning the classification of certain shares as separate property, the application of relationship property under section 9A of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, and the extent of the award made under section 17.

The legal issues before the court were whether the High Court erred in its findings concerning the classification of certain shares as separate property, the application of relationship property, and the extent of the award made under section 17. Mrs Morrison argued that the classification of shares as separate property was incorrect and that the court should have considered the application of relationship property in increasing the value of those shares. Additionally, she argued that the award under section 17 should be revisited given the reclassification of shares as separate property.

The court found that the proposed grounds for appeal were based on factual issues rather than questions of law or fact capable of serious and bona fide argument. The court held that the issues raised were challenges to factual findings and did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal. The court declined to grant leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds did not raise issues of sufficient importance to justify further appeal. The court also noted that while the impact of the decision was significant to Mrs Morrison, it did not warrant the costs and delay of further litigation.

In conclusion, the court found that the proposed grounds for appeal did not involve issues of fact or law of sufficient importance to warrant a further appeal and declined leave to appeal. Costs were reserved for later determination.

Orders