Morrison v First Mortgage Trust - [2025] NZHC 2972

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2025-485-691

[2025] NZHC 2972

BETWEEN
TAYLOR FORD MORRISON

Applicant

AND

FIRST MORTGAGE TRUST

Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

Applicant in person

Judgment:

8 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

Introduction

[1] On 7 October 2025, the applicant’s interlocutory application without notice was referred to me as duty Judge for consideration under r 7.42A of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR). The application relates to the vacant possession of a self-contained flat which is part of a commercial property situated at 86 Abel Smith St, Wellington (the Property) in which the applicant resides. The applicant seeks orders to:

(a)stay the execution or enforcement of any eviction or possession action;

(b)allow the applicant to continue accessing and residing at the Property on the same basis as prior to enforcement, pending further order of the Court or determination by the Tenancy Tribunal; and

(c)restrain the respondent from denying access, changing locks, or otherwise interfering with occupation.

MORRISON v FIRST MORTGAGE TRUST [2025] NZHC 2972 [8 October 2025]

Background

[2] In 2023, the respondent advanced a loan to Philip Moore & Co Ltd (PMCL). The loan was secured in various ways, including by way of a mortgage over the Property and guarantees. One of the guarantees was from the applicant’s mother, Marian Pearson who was, at that time, a director of PMCL. Ms Pearson has subsequently resigned as a director and has apparently been extradited to Australia to stand trial in respect of fraud proceedings. The applicant became a director of PMCL on 14 August 2025.

[3] In January 2024, PMCL defaulted on the loan. The respondent served notices under the Property Law Act 2007 and the debt was repaid in part (following the sale of other property). In March 2025, the respondent applied for summary judgment against PMCL and the guarantors. The parties then consented to judgment conditional on a payment of $1.65 million being made by 31 July. When PMCL failed to make the payment by that date, the respondent sought entry of judgment on the basis of the consent already provided by PMCL to judgment being given. On multiple occasions, the applicant sought to adjourn the proceedings and defer judgment to enable him to move between premises.

[4] On 19 August 2025, Associate Judge Skelton found that a conditional agreement had been entered into and that, the conditions having been satisfied, judgment must issue (the Consent Judgment).

[5] On 25 September 2025, the applicant applied for urgent injunctive relief in this Court seeking an order to restrain the respondent from enforcing vacant possession of the Property.

[6] In a judgment dated 29 September 2025, McQueen J declined the application on the basis that no order for an interim injunction could properly be made.1 She concluded that there was no serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience and overall interests of justice likely favoured the respondent.

1 Morrison v…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] NZHC 2972
Decision Date: 8 October 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Morrison v First Mortgage Trust, Taylor Ford Morrison applied for an interlocutory application without notice, seeking orders to stay the enforcement of eviction proceedings and to allow him to continue residing in a self-contained flat in a commercial property located at 86 Abel Smith St, Wellington. The application was struck out by Churchman J on the basis that it constituted an abuse of process due to the existence of an issue estoppel. The respondent, First Mortgage Trust, had previously advanced a loan secured by a mortgage over the property, which defaulted. A consent judgment was entered against Philip Moore & Co Ltd, a company of which the applicant had become a director, and guarantors, including the applicant's mother. The applicant had previously sought but failed to obtain interim relief to prevent enforcement of the judgment.

The legal issues involved whether the applicant's current application was an abuse of process due to issue estoppel. Churchman J found that the application was an abuse of process as it sought to relitigate issues already conclusively determined by McQueen J in a prior judgment. The applicant sought similar relief in two separate applications, and had not raised any new legal arguments or grounds for relief. Churchman J concluded that the applicant's application represented an attempt to relitigate issues that had already been conclusively determined, and therefore constituted an abuse of process warranting the application being struck out under r 7.42A of the High Court Rules.

The court struck out the application. The applicant is not permitted to pursue the relief sought in the application, and the respondent is not restrained from enforcing the prior judgment ordering vacant possession of the property. The decision reinforces the principle of finality in litigation and the rule against abuse of process.

Orders