Morrison v First Mortgage Custodians Ltd
[2025] NZHC 2844
•29 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2025-485-691
[2025] NZHC 2844
BETWEEN TAYLOR FORD MORRISON
Applicant
AND
FIRST MORTGAGE CUSTODIANS LTD AND FIRST MORTGAGE MANAGERS LTD
Respondents
Teleconference: 25 September 2025 Appearances:
Applicant in Person
T J Conder for Respondents
Judgment:
29 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[1] At about 3.30 pm on Thursday 25 September 2025, Taylor Morrison’s application for urgent injunctive relief was referred to me as Duty Judge.
[2] Mr Morrison sought an order restraining the respondents (together, First Mortgage) from enforcing vacant possession at a self-contained flat in Wellington (the Property). Mr Morrison filed a short affidavit in support of the application. First Mortgage was said to be intending to enforce vacant possession of the premises at 4 pm on Thursday 25 September 2025. This would leave Mr Morrison homeless as he has not yet secured any alternative accommodation. Mr Morrison had lived at the Property for two years. Mr Morrison said that First Mortgage had already given him one extension of the possession deadline and the further extension he was seeking, to say 9 October 2025, was narrow and temporary. He referred to a consent judgment entered on 19 August 2025 relating to Philip Moore & Co (PMCL), of which Mr Morrison only became a director on 14 August 2025. Mr Morrison said the
MORRISON v FIRST MORTGAGE CUSTODIANS LTD AND FIRST MORTGAGE MANAGERS LTD [2025] NZHC 2844 [29 September 2025]
judgment did not deal with his residential occupation of the Property, rather the obligations of PMCL to vacate the Property.
[3] The Registry urgently arranged a teleconference with Mr Morrison. Mr Morrison explained that PMCL had been trading at the Property but there was also a self-contained flat there, in which he had been living. I asked Mr Morrison what he expected to happen at 4.00 pm. He told me he was at the Property, and he expected First Mortgage’s agent to come and pick up the keys and ask him to leave. Mr Morrison said he has no family or friends to stay with in Wellington and no money to pay for short-term accommodation.
[4] I explained to Mr Morrison that on the material then available to me, I considered I did not have a proper basis for making the interim injunction he was seeking. I also explained that the usual practice of the Court would be to approach such an application on a Pickwick basis, giving notice to First Mortgage to allow its attendance at a judicial teleconference even though the application has been made on a without notice basis.
[5] Mr Morrison helpfully explained that he had been in contact with First Mortgage’s lawyer (Mr Conder) earlier in the day, who had indicated that he could be available for a teleconference if required. The Registry then arranged a further teleconference a short time later, at which Mr Conder attended for First Mortgage. Mr Conder also filed some papers, including a memorandum that set out the background to Mr Morrison’s application and First Mortgage’s opposition to any interim injunction being made, which I was able to partly read before the second teleconference.
[6] Having heard from Mr Morrison and Mr Conder on the second teleconference, I dismissed Mr Morrison’s application for an interim injunction because I was satisfied there is no serious question to be tried.
[7] I set out below a brief description of the background to this matter and the reasons for my decision.
Background
[8] In 2023, money was advanced by First Mortgage to PMCL under a term loan agreement. The loan was secured in various ways, including a mortgage over the Property and guarantees. In January 2024, PMCL defaulted on the loan. Notices under the Property Law Act 2007 were served on 12 April 2024. Those notices expired on 24 May 2024. The debt was repaid in part (following the sale of further property). In March 2025, First Mortgage applied for summary judgment against PMCL and the guarantors.1 Mr Conder acted for First Mortgage on this application.
[9] The application was opposed by PMCL (belatedly), in reliance on an allegation there was a residential tenancy over the Property that meant the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the orders sought. At a hearing in relation to the application on 17 June 2025, PMCL resiled from that position and indicated the only issue moving forward would be the calculation of quantum.2 On 21 July 2025, a joint memorandum was filed containing a consent to judgment conditional on whether a payment of
$1.65 million was made by 25 July 2025. By consent, the time for payment by PMCL was extended to 31 July 2025.
[10] Payment was not made by that date. First Mortgage sought entry of judgment on the basis of the consent already provided by PMCL to judgment being given. Despite the earlier consent, PMCL opposed judgment being entered on the basis a further month was required before it could be expected to give vacant possession of the Property.
[11] The application for summary judgment was called again on 19 August 2025. On that day, Mr Morrison filed an affidavit stating he had recently been made a director of PMCL and had not previously been aware of the proceeding. He sought to adjourn the proceeding or defer judgment being entered for 20 working days to enable him to sell the Property and avoid the need to move out. Mr Morrison attended the hearing in person.
1 One guarantee was from Marian Pearson. Ms Pearson is Mr Morrison’s mother. Ms Pearson was previously a director of PMCL. It appears Ms Pearson has been extradited to Australia.
2 As recorded in the Minute of Associate Judge Paulsen: First Mortgage Custodians Ltd v Philip Moore & Co Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2025-485-173, 17 June 2025.
[12] Associate Judge Skelton found that a conditional agreement had already been given and that, the conditions having been satisfied, judgment must issue (Consent Judgment).3 The judgment included an order that vacant possession of the Property be provided ten working days after service of the sealed order on PMCL. That order took effect on 11 September 2025.
[13] Mr Morrison asked First Mortgage to delay taking possession as he had obtained a lease that would not be available until 23 September 2025. While First Mortgage was not prepared to formally extend the time for vacant possession, it indicated that if certain conditions were met it would defer enforcing the judgment until 5 pm on 25 September 2025.
[14] On 21 September 2025, Mr Morrison sought an extension of time to allow him to move between the two premises. First Mortgage agreed to grant Mr Morrison a short licence to enable him to continue removing items after they had taken possession of the Property. Mr Morrison sought to expand the licence to enable him to continue to trade from the Property. First Mortgage refused this request and confirmed the original licence.
[15] On 23 September 2025 Mr Morrison asked First Mortgage if he could also live at the Property. First Mortgage refused this request on 24 September 2025. Mr Morrison then filed the present application on 25 September 2025.
Discussion
[16]In assessing whether to grant an interim injunction, the test is well-established.
The Court will consider three questions:4
(a)is there a seriously arguable question to be tried;
(b)where does the balance of convenience lie; and
3 See Minute of Associate Judge Skelton: First Mortgage Custodians Ltd v Philip Moore & Co Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2025-485-173, 19 August 2025; and sealed order for summary judgment dated 21 August 2025.
4 NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90, (2013) 13 TCLR 531 at [12]; and
Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129.
(c)an assessment of the overall interests of justice.
[17] Mr Morrison’s objective in making the application was to gain time before enforcement of the Consent Judgment, specifically as to providing vacant possession of the Property in terms of the self-contained flat he has been residing in. Mr Morrison says that he filed the application as soon as he realised that no further agreement for a time extension could be reached with First Mortgage. Essentially, he seeks an additional short period because he says he has nowhere to live for the next several days. While he has successfully relocated the PMCL business to new premises over the last five weeks, the new personal accommodation he has arranged is not yet available.
[18] Mr Morrison initially reiterated before me that the Consent Judgment dealt only with company obligations and vacant possession of the premises generally. He said that his personal residential occupation was never raised or determined as part of that process.
[19] Mr Conder submitted this is not the position. He outlined the background to this matter, as set out above. He relies on the notice of opposition from PMCL that referred to the residential tenancy at the Property. Mr Conder confirms this ground of opposition was abandoned and PMCL accepted that it had no defence to First Mortgage’s application for summary judgment. Mr Conder also submitted that the correct course of action for Mr Morrison, as a director of PMCL at the time the Consent Judgment was obtained, would have been to raise this concern, either as a matter of recalling the judgment or filing an appeal, and that neither of these steps were taken. Mr Conder submits that the application is rather a collateral challenge to the Consent Judgment and therefore is an abuse of process. Mr Conder submits that Mr Morrison has no arguable case against First Mortgage and the application should be dismissed.
[20] Mr Morrison then confirmed to me that he is not attempting to relitigate the Consent Judgment issued against PMCL. In essence, he seeks to have a few more days in the flat at the Property on compassionate grounds. He emphasises the challenges of
relocating the PMCL business to a new location and finding new personal accommodation over the last several weeks.
[21] Mr Morrison is unable to articulate any legal foundation for a claim against First Mortgage that would support an application for interim relief. An application based on the premise it is unfair that he must comply with the order for vacant possession is insufficient. Accordingly, I conclude that there is no serious question to be tried and Mr Morrison’s application for an interim injunction must fail at the first hurdle.
[22] Although I therefore do not need to reach any view on the remaining elements of the test, it seems to me that the balance of convenience and overall interests of justice likely favour First Mortgage. Mr Morrison has had over five weeks to relocate the business (which he has done) and to find personal accommodation (which he appears to have also done but only with effect from several days’ time hence the present application). While I am not unsympathetic to the broader circumstances where Mr Morrison has only relatively recently taken on the role as director of PMCL where his mother, previously the director of PMCL, has been subject to extradition proceedings, it seems to me that First Mortgage has allowed Mr Morrison considerable leeway in enforcement of its entitlement to vacant possession. The fact Mr Morrison will now have to find temporary accommodation for several days is not a matter of significant inconvenience or injustice, in all the circumstances.
[23] Although satisfied no order for an interim injunction could properly be made, I suggested to Mr Morrison that following the teleconference he should take the opportunity to speak with Mr Conder once again to ascertain whether First Mortgage would contemplate any further informal short extension of time for the grant of vacant possession.
Result
[24]Mr Morrison’s without notice application for an interim injunction is declined.
Costs
[25] Mr Conder sought leave to file a memorandum, if necessary, in relation to costs on this application. Such leave is granted.
[26] If agreement between the parties as to costs cannot be reached, First Mortgage is to file and serve a memorandum within fifteen working days. Mr Morrison may file a memorandum in response within a further ten working days. Costs will then be determined on the papers.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
Holland Beckett, Tauranga for Respondents
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