Moore v Police

Case

[2025] NZHC 2038

23 July 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2025-409-114

[2025] NZHC 2038

BETWEEN

ADAM MOORE

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing: 17 July 2025

Appearances:

D B Iremonger for Appellant L Fiennes for Respondent

Judgment:

23 July 2025


JUDGMENT OF EATON J

(appeal against sentence)


This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

MOORE v POLICE [2025] NZHC 2038 [23 July 2025]

Introduction

[1]                 Adam Moore appeals a sentence of three years’ and 10 months’ imprisonment imposed by Judge Couch on 16 May 20251 following his guilty pleas to a charge of discharging a firearm with intent to intimidate,2 four charges of unlawful possession of two sawn off shotguns and ammunition,3 possession of an offensive weapon,4 cultivating cannabis5 and failing to provide a PIN code.6

Facts

[2]                 At approximately 8.41 pm on Monday 6 January 2025, Mr Moore was the passenger of a car in a North Canterbury residential area. It was school-holidays and still light outside. The car turned into the street of the victim’s home address. A member of the public called police to report erratic driving from a car described as driving in excess of the speed limit with the registration plates blacked out. The two occupants were said to be wearing balaclavas.

[3]                 The car stopped in front of the victim’s address. Mr Moore fired five shots from a 20-gauge shotgun at the victim’s house. The shots smashed a child’s bedroom window and impacted the garage door. The car drove off. At the time, Mr Moore was subject to electronic monitoring as part of his release conditions.

[4]                 On 14 January 2025, a search warrant was carried out at the address Mr Moore shared with his partner and her three-year-old daughter.

[5]                 In the garage, police located a hydroponic growing setup with 10 cannabis plants between 60 to 100 centimetres tall. Police located two semi-automatic shotguns (one 12-gauge and one 20-gauge) concealed in a luggage bag in the hallway next to the master bedroom. Each firearm was wrapped in a towel and had the barrel and stock cut down. In the same luggage bag, was a box of fourteen 20-gauge cartridges.


1      Police v Moore [2025] NZDC 10774.

2      Crimes Act 1961, s 308A—maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment.

3      Arms Act 1983, s 45(1)—maximum penalty four years’ imprisonment or $5,000 fine.

4      Crimes Act 1961, s 202A(4)(b)—maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment.

5      Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 9(1)—maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

6      Search and Surveillance Act 2012, ss 178 and 130(1)—maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.

The 20-gauge cartridge shells are a distinctive yellow colour of the same make as the ones left behind by Mr Moore after shooting at the address in North Canterbury. In the master bedroom, under a set of drawers, police found a single 12-gauge shotgun cartridge. In a separate bag in the hallway, an extendable baton was located.

[6]                 When interviewed by a police constable, Mr Moore was required to provide a PIN code to his phone.

District Court decision

[7]                 The Judge determined the discharge of the firearm with intent to intimidate was “serious to very serious” offending of its kind.7 He considered there was a “very real risk” of injuring people and that the shooting was “clearly premeditated and carefully planned”.8 A starting point of three years’ imprisonment was adopted.

[8]                 The Judge rejected the submission that the other firearm charges should not add to the starting point, finding that the cut down shotguns were patently illegal and could only have been possessed for an unlawful purpose. The Judge observed the guns and ammunition were not stored securely and could be used quickly by Mr Moore or easily stolen. The Judge applied a 12-month uplift for the four charges reflecting the firearms and ammunition possession offending.

[9]  The Judge applied a nine-month uplift for the possession of the extendable baton, noting it “has only one purpose which is to hurt people”.9 The Judge imposed a one-month uplift for Mr Moore’s failure to provide the PIN code for his cell phone.

[10]              A four-month uplift was applied for the cultivating cannabis charge, the Judge assessing the gravity  of the offending  to  be “relatively  low” and  in  band  one of  R v Terewi.10 The use of a hydroponic growing setup was described as an aggravating feature of the offence.


7      Police v Moore, above n 1, at [5].

8 At [6].

9 At [11].

10     At [13] citing R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA).

[11]              The global starting point of 62 months was reduced to 55 months to reflect totality. The Judge then applied uplifts of five and 10 per cent to reflect offending whilst on parole and Mr Moore’s criminal history respectively. A 25 per cent deduction was allowed for guilty pleas and a further five per cent to reflect matters raised in a s 27 cultural report which detailed Mr Moore’s upbringing involving gang influences.

[12]              The end sentence of three years and 10 months’ imprisonment was imposed on the charge of discharging a firearm with intent to intimidate.11

Principles on appeal

[13]              Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.12 As the Court of Appeal commented in Tutakangahau v R, referencing the lower court’s decision, a “court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.13 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.14

Submissions

Appellant’s submissions

[14]              Mr Iremonger, for the appellant, submits that no uplift should have been applied for the unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition charges. He submits the uplifts for cannabis cultivation15 and possession of an offensive weapon were excessive and that no uplift should have been imposed for refusing to provide his PIN code. Mr Iremonger submits the errors in setting the starting point gave rise to a


11 At [21].

12     Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).

13     Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].

14     Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].

15     Citing R v Terewi, above n 10; and Riches v Police [2017] 2035.

manifestly excessive end sentence and contends for an end sentence of three years’ imprisonment.

Respondent’s submissions

[15]              Ms Fiennes, for the respondent, with reference to authorities, submits the starting point  for discharging  a firearm charge  could  have been three  years and  six months to three years and nine months’ imprisonment.16 She submits the firearms and ammunition possession offending required an uplift, and that the 12 months applied by the Judge was within range. She accepts the uplifts imposed on the cannabis17 and offensive weapons charges18 were at the higher end but submits they were within range. She submits the low-end starting points adopted for the totality of the firearms and ammunition offending offset the stern starting points otherwise adopted. The adjusted global starting point of 55 months is submitted to be appropriate.

Analysis

Uplift for firearms and ammunition offending

[16]              Mr Iremonger’s primary submission challenges the uplift for the firearms and ammunition offending. Mr Iremonger refers to three cases he submits supports his submission that no uplift should have been applied.19 I disagree.

[17]              The two sawn-off shotguns and the  shotgun  ammunition  were  found  at  Mr Moore’s house a little over a week after the shooting in North Canterbury. I accept there is a connection between the shooting and the unlawful possession of the firearms and ammunition. That is because one of the firearms found at Mr Moore’s address is believed to be the firearm used in the shooting. Mr Moore not only continued to unlawfully possess that firearm after the shooting, he also had in his possession a second sawn-off shotgun and a not insignificant amount of ammunition. In those circumstances, an uplift was both inevitable and appropriate.


16     Citing Pouiva v R [2024] NZHC 2598 and McAllister v R [2023] NZHC 3705as analogous cases.

17     Citing Needham v Police [2012] NZHC 688.

18     Citing Daniels v Police [2017] NZHC 3070.

19     Pouiva v R, above n 16; R v Rihari DC Auckland CRI-2022-090-4271, 31 August 2023 (sentencing indication); R v Rihari [2024] NZDC 21608 (sentencing); and Rawiri v Police [2022] NZHC 2466.

[18]              In Pouiva v R, the sentencing Judge had adopted a four-year starting point on a charge of discharging a firearm with reckless disregard for safety (maximum of seven years’ imprisonment) and applied a six-month uplift for possession of the firearm used in the shooting. Mr Pouiva had been driving around Christchurch and unexpectedly encountered the victim. An argument ensued, resulting in Mr Pouiva discharging the firearm he had in the car at the victim, leaving him with a shotgun pellet lodged in his cheek.

[19]On appeal, I rejected the argument that the six-month uplift was excessive: 20

If Mr Pouiva and Mr Hurinui had set out on the afternoon of the offending in a vehicle with a loaded shotgun looking to frighten or otherwise harm the victim, the Judge might have considered it inappropriate to impose a discrete uplift for the possession charge. But, as Mr Nolan submits in mitigation, the use of the firearm was not premeditated. What that means is Mr Pouiva was driving the streets of Christchurch with a loaded sawn-off shotgun, committing the serious offence of unlawfully possessing a shotgun quite independently of the firing of that weapon when they came across the victim.

[20]              In neither R v Rihari or Rawiri v Police was the defendant found in possession of a second firearm, one that had not been used in the lead offence.

[21]              The courts must take a hard line when dealing with firearms offending, and particularly the unlawful possession of firearms that have been modified and either loaded or stored with easy access to ammunition. There is only one reason to cut down a shot gun and that is to commit serious and violent crimes. As the Court of Appeal said in R v Richardson:21

Loaded firearms are anathema within our community. Every Court has a clear obligation to impose sentences which in unequivocal terms express society's condemnation of their availability because of the potential for danger from their possession.

[22]              In my view, as standalone offending, the unlawful possession of the two sawn-off shotguns and the shotgun ammunition would have justified a starting point of at least two years’ imprisonment. I refer to the discussion in McLaren v Police.22


20     Pouiva v R, above n 16, at [36].

21     R v Richardson CA450/02, 25 March 2003 at [33].

22     McLaren v Police [2025] NZHC 518 at [18]–[27].

The cases discussed in McLaren confirm the uplift of 12 months imposed by the Judge was well within range and, if anything, lenient.

Uplift for cannabis cultivation

[23]              Mr Iremonger submits the four-month uplift imposed for cannabis cultivation offending was too high. In the District Court, and on appeal, he contends for a one- month uplift. Ms Fiennes submits the uplift was high but within range.

[24]              It is accepted the cannabis was being cultivated for personal use. Both counsel agree that as a standalone offence, the cannabis offending would not have justified a sentence of imprisonment. A fine or alternatively a term of community work would otherwise have been imposed.

[25]              Ms Fiennes refers to Needham v Police where a starting point of six months’ imprisonment for cultivating cannabis was not disturbed on appeal.23 Mr Needham was found in possession of 10 potted cannabis plants growing under heat lamps together with 236 grams of dried cannabis head, four plants drying in a hot water cupboard, 631 grams of frozen cannabis stalks and 47 grams of dried cannabis.     Mr Needham was described as a prolific offender with 20 prior, but historical drug convictions. The focus in that case was not on the uplift for the cultivation of cannabis but whether a sentence of home detention ought to have been imposed. I do not find that case to be a helpful comparator.

[26]              In Blandford v Police, Simon France J allowed an appeal where the sentencing Judge had applied a 10-month uplift for the cultivation of cannabis (14 mature plants and 16 seedlings accepted as being for personal use) to a lead charge of assault with a weapon and intimidation.24 The Judge found:25

I accept there is scope for debate as to what the nature of the sentence would be if standing alone. In the present circumstances, however, given the lead sentence is one of imprisonment, it merited a modest uplift of around one month taking into account the guilty plea.


23     Needham v Police [2013] NZHC 688.

24     Blandford v Police [2019] NZHC 3112.

25 At [16].

[27]              I consider the approach of Simon France J to be appropriate. An uplift of no more than one month’s imprisonment was appropriate for the cannabis cultivation offending.

Offensive weapon uplift

[28]              Ms Fiennes describes the nine-month uplift for the unlawful possession of the baton as being at the upper limit but within range. She refers to Daniels v Police where the appellant was charged with, inter alia, possession of an extendable baton.26 In that case the baton was found on the appellant’s person when he was arrested for unrelated dishonesty offending. A starting point of six months for that offending was not challenged on appeal.

[29]              As Mr Iremonger highlights, the baton in Mr Moore’s possession was found in a bag in his house. It was not on his person. It was not used. Although, as Ms Fiennes has submitted, the baton was located in close proximity to the bag containing the firearms and ammunition, I do consider that factor justifies the starting point adopted by the Judge.

[30]              I agree that a sentence of imprisonment was required for this offending in light of Mr Moore’s conviction on 7 June 2017 for an offensive weapon charge.27 I am satisfied that the nine-month uplift was too high. The appropriate uplift was one of no more than six months’ imprisonment.

Uplift of one month for failure to provide PIN code

[31]              Mr Iremonger submits Mr Moore should have been convicted and discharged for failing to provide his PIN code. As Ms Fiennes submits, the legislation would have no teeth if the Court were to adopt that submission. Offenders who refuse to provide a PIN code and are otherwise facing a sentence of imprisonment can anticipate that the Court will impose an uplift of one month’s imprisonment to reflect that failure.


26     Daniels v Police [2017] NZHC 3070.

27     Crimes Act 1961, s 202BA.

Was the end sentence manifestly excessive?

[32]As the Court of Appeal in R v Barker said:28

… in imposing a sentence which reflects the totality of the offending this Court will not declare a sentence manifestly excessive because of the particular way in which the sentencing Judge has chosen to construct the sentence, unless the method adopted results in a sentence which is overall clearly too high.

[33]              In considering whether the end sentence of three years and 10 months was manifestly excessive, it is notable that the Judge elected to apply an uplift for each of the lesser offences to the starting point adopted for the lead offence of discharging the firearm with intent to intimidate,  and  then  made  a  totality  adjustment  of  about 10 per cent. To apply a totality deduction against the 12-month uplift applied for the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition was generous to the appellant.

[34]              Ms Fiennes submits the starting point for the shooting offence could and should have been between three years and six months, and three years and nine months. She refers to McAllister v R where the victim had underpaid the appellant during a cannabis deal.29 The appellant arranged to be driven to the victim’s address with a sawn-off shotgun. When the victim saw the firearm, he stepped back into the house and the appellant fired the shotgun towards the victim, shattering the kitchen/dining room window. The curtains were closed at the time, meaning the appellant could not have been aware whether there was anyone inside the room. A four-year starting point for the charge of reckless  discharging  of  a  firearm  was  not  disturbed  on  appeal.  Ms Fiennes also refers to Pouiva v R where a four-year starting point was adopted for the lead charge of discharging a firearm.30

[35]              Both of those cases involved the more serious offence of reckless discharge of a firearm but otherwise were broadly similar to the Mr Moore’s offending.

[36]              In my view, Mr Moore’s offence of discharging a firearm with intent to intimidate was a very serious case of its type. As Mr Iremonger acknowledged, the offending had gang undertones. The offending was planned and premeditated. Two


28     R v Barker CA57/01, 30 July 2001 at [12].

29     McAllister v R, above n 16.

30     Pouiva v R, above n 16.

vehicles travelled in convey. Their suspicious driving and appearance (number plates blacked out and occupants wearing balaclavas) drew their attention to the public. Five shots were fired at the residential address, damaging the property. The offending took place during school holidays and daylight hours. The risk of a person within the house or another member of the public being seriously injured or killed was high. This type of brazen offending requires strong condemnation by the Court.

[37]              I agree with Ms Fiennes, the starting point of three years adopted by the Judge was lenient.

[38]              Standing back and notwithstanding the excessive starting points adopted by the Judge in relation to the cannabis offending and the offensive weapon charges, I am not satisfied that either the final adjusted starting points or the end sentence were manifestly excessive.

[39]              Finally, although not raised by Mr Iremonger on appeal, I observe that the Judge in considering the level of deduction to be allowed to reflect matters set out in a s 27 report observed that the report was prepared in 2023 and had been taken into account when Mr Moore had been sentenced in July of that year. The Judge then said, “[r]ecent decisions of the senior courts have confirmed that the issues identified in such reports should not be repeatedly given the same weight in multiple sentencings.”31 With respect, that observation does not reflect the recent decisions of the senior courts. The Judge may have had in mind the decision of Palmer J in Carroll v Police32 where the appellant had received a 15 per cent reduction for his personal circumstances reflecting reduced agency in relation to earlier offending and for repeated offending. The Judge on appeal considered the deduction for the same factors was reduced to a range of zero to eight per cent, reflecting the heightened need to denounce the offender’s conduct, to protect the community and to recognise the lower likelihood of rehabilitation.


31     Police v Moore, above n 1, at [19].

32     Carroll v Police [2023] NZHC 3293.

[40]              In Cooper v R33 the Court of Appeal observed that the deduction range proposed in Carroll v Police for background factors when there is repeat offending must be read in the context of the facts of that case. The Court of Appeal agreed with and endorsed the observations made in other decisions that the deduction range proposed in Carroll v Police does not express a general legal sentencing principle.34 The Court of Appeal said in relation to Carroll v Police:35

That decision must be seen in a specific context and facts to which it relates; it does not fix a tariff for reduced agency deductions for repeat offenders.

Result

[41]The appeal is dismissed.

...................................................

Eaton J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch

Counsel:
D B Iremonger, Barrister, Rangiora


33     Cooper v R [2025] NZCA 272.

34     Edwards v R [2024] NZHC 1762 at [28]–[29] citing Smith v Police [2024] NZHC 858 at [21].

35     Cooper v R, above n 34, at [29].

Most Recent Citation

Cases Citing This Decision

1

Coster-Jury v The King [2025] NZHC 2866
Cases Cited

13

Statutory Material Cited

0

Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279
Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101
NIGEL POUIVA AND THE KING [2024] NZHC 2598