Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc
[2019] NZHC 1447
•25 June 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2018-404-1900
[2019] NZHC 1447
UNDER Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 IN THE MATTER OF
an application for Judicial Review
BETWEEN
VINCENT JACOB MIDDELDORP
Applicant
AND
AVONDALE JOCKEY CLUB INCORPORATED
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
P David QC and C Boswell for the Applicant
G M Coumbe QC and D Bullock for the Respondent
Judgment:
25 June 2019
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
[As to costs]
This judgment was delivered by me on 25 June 2019 at 11 am, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
Solicitors: Wilson Harle, Auckland
Lee Salmon Long, Auckland
Counsel: P David QC, Auckland
G Coumbe QC, Auckland
MIDDELDORP v AVONDALE JOCKEY CLUB INC [2019] NZHC 1447 [25 June 2019]
Introduction
[1] On 26 April 2019, I gave judgment in favour of the respondent, the Avondale Jockey Club Inc (the Club), against the applicant, Mr Middeldorp.1
[2] Mr Middeldorp, a member of the Committee of the Club, applied for judicial review seeking declarations that decisions of the Committee were made without a legal basis under the Rules and Regulations of the Club (the Rules) and/or in breach of the Club’s legal obligations. Mr Middeldorp alleged that the Committee suspended him from office on two occasions when it had no power to do so under the Rules. He alleged alternatively that the Committee breached its legal obligations to act fairly, with a proper basis and in good faith when making the two decisions to suspend him and had no objectively supportable factual foundation for those decisions.
[3] Mr Middeldorp also alleged that the Committee did not act in good faith or for a proper purpose in the best interests of the Club in declining applications for membership by 14 applicants. Finally, he alleged that the Committee had operated since 2014 without the required number of members and had not followed the proper election process in breach of the requirements of the Rules.
[4] I gave a decision in favour of Mr Middeldorp only on the ground that there was no power in the Rules to suspend him from the Committee. But, I refused to make a declaration in my discretion as Mr Middeldorp had not suffered serious prejudice; there was no practical utility in making the declaration as the suspension decisions had been carried out and nothing further needed to be reconsidered as a consequence of the Court’s decision; the Club was in the process of developing new rules which would contain a power to suspend committee members; Mr Middeldorp had delayed; and his conduct disentitled him from relief. I found against Mr Middeldorp on all the other grounds of review.
1 Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc [2019] NZHC 901.
[5] In my judgment, I indicated a preliminary view that the Club was entitled to costs on a 2B basis.2 The parties have been unable to come to an agreement on costs. The Club seeks costs and disbursements as set out in Annexure A to this judgment.
The law
[6] Costs are at the discretion of the Court.3 The High Court Rules 2016 provide guidance as to how the discretion might be exercised.4
[7] The general principle is that the party who fails with respect to a proceeding should pay costs to the successful party.5 When applying the scale costs regime, the Court must consider each formal step individually for the purposes of assessing the appropriate time band. A blanket approach is not appropriate.6
[8] Ultimately, the overriding consideration when exercising the discretion to award costs is that any award ought to do justice between the parties.7
Costs claimed and opposition
[9] Ms Coumbe QC, for the Club, seeks scale costs in the amount of $25,422. The steps are all listed as 2B. The Club also seeks a 10 per cent uplift on the scale costs for each of the steps, with the exception of step 11 (memorandum for costs). This amounts to total costs of $27,875 (as set out in Annexure A).
[10] Additionally, Ms Coumbe submits that a total of $717.15 in disbursements should be awarded for court filing, photocopying and courier fees.
[11] In response, Mr David QC, for Mr Middeldorp, submits that costs should either lie where they fall or be awarded to the Club on a 2B basis with a 50 per cent reduction. In support of those two options he notes that Mr Middeldorp was successful on the
2 The proceeding had already been classified as category 2 for the purposes of costs: see Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc, above n 1, at [202], n 49.
3 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1(1).
4 Rules 14.2–14.7.
5 Rules 14.2(1)(a).
6 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZCA 544 at [35].
7 Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 869 (CA) at [5].
issues of amenability to judicial review and the illegality of the suspensions (although I did not ultimately grant relief on that latter issue).
[12] As far as scale costs are concerned, Mr David opposes the inclusion of step 32 (defendant’s preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle) in the scale costs calculation. Any scale costs calculation would therefore be $20,070 (but with a 50 per cent reduction if the Court does not order that costs should lie where they fall).
[13]Mr David also seeks costs for the preparation of a costs memorandum.
[14]Mr David’s submissions are silent as to disbursements.
Preliminary matters
[15] There are two preliminary matters. The first is the disclosure of the without prejudice correspondence between the solicitors for the parties on the issue of costs, attached to the Club’s costs memorandum. The second is the Club’s reply memorandum, which was filed without leave.
[16] First, as to the without prejudice correspondence: the correspondence between the parties is in fact marked “without prejudice save as to costs”. In relation to written offers made prior to trial regarding settlement of a claim, r 14.10 provides that the fact a written offer is made to another party without prejudice except as to costs must not be communicated to the court until the question of costs is to be decided. The same principle must apply to proposals to settle costs. The Club makes it clear that the correspondence is relied on for the purpose of the Court’s determination of the claim for the preparation of its costs memorandum. I consider that I am able to take the correspondence into consideration in determining that issue.
[17] Secondly, regarding the Club’s reply memorandum: in my substantive decision I did not make provision for a reply memorandum. The Club did not seek leave to file a further memorandum either before or at the time it was filed. Nor did the Club seek leave subsequent to the filing of its reply memorandum after Mr David raised the matter with the Registrar. Accordingly, I disregard the Club’s reply memorandum and do not take it into account in determining costs.
Issues
[18]The following are the issues for determination:
(a)Should costs lie where they fall?
(b)What are the scale costs?
(c)Should the Court award increased costs to the Club?
(d)Should the Court reduce any costs payable to the Club?
(e)What disbursements should be allowed?
Should costs lie where they fall?
[19] Mr David’s primary submission is that the outcome overall would support orders that costs should lie where they fall. I do not accept that submission.
[20] Overall, the Club was the successful party. Whilst Mr Middeldorp was successful on whether the Committee decisions were amenable to judicial review and his illegality argument, I did not ultimately grant any of the relief he sought. The Club was partially successful, “yet success on more limited terms is still success”.8 For this reason, the Club is entitled to costs.
Scale costs
[21]Rule 14.2(1)(c) of the High Court Rules provides that:
… costs should be assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate to the time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required in relation to the proceeding or interlocutory application …
[22] Presently, the proceedings are categorised as category 2, the appropriate daily recovery for which is $2,230.9 Rule 14.5 then provides:
8 Weaver v Auckland Council [2017] NZCA 330 at [26].
9 High Court Rules, r 14.3 and sch 2.
14.5 Determination of reasonable time
(1)For the purposes of rule 14.2(c), a reasonable time for a step is—
(a)the time specified for it in Schedule 3; or
(b)a time determined by analogy with that schedule, if Schedule 3 does not apply; or
(c)the time assessed as likely to be required for the particular step, if no analogy can usefully be made.
(2)A determination of what is a reasonable time for a step under subclause (1) must be made by reference—
(a)to band A, if a comparatively small amount of time is considered reasonable; or
(b)to band B, if a normal amount of time is considered reasonable; or
(c)to band C, if a comparatively large amount of time for the particular step is considered reasonable.
[23] There are two issues I must decide as to scale costs. First, whether step 32 (defendant’s preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle) should be included in the scale costs calculation on a 2B basis. Secondly, whether either party should be awarded costs for step 11 (memorandum for costs).
Step 32: Defendant’s preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle
[24] The parties agree that 2B is the appropriate classification. However, Mr Middeldorp does not agree to the inclusion of step 32 in scale costs.
[25] In the schedule to the Club’s memorandum for costs, the Club lists step 32 as “Defendant’s preparation of authorities bundle and chronology”. However, step 32 as it appears in sch 3 of the High Court Rules allocates two days for the “Defendant’s preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common bundle”. Mr Middeldorp says the Club did not prepare a list of issues nor did it provide any nominations for the common bundle (instead saying that it would rely on the exhibits to the affidavit of its main witness as the common bundle); therefore, it is not entitled to claim for this step. On the other hand, the Club submits that, whilst there was no common bundle, it produced a substantial bundle of authorities and a detailed chronology that was akin to a list of issues.
[26] In my view the Club is not entitled to the full two days’ allocation for step 32. A chronology is not akin to a list of issues, rather it is a document associated with submissions. As Mr David points out, costs for the preparation of a chronology is already claimed by the Club under step 33 (preparation for hearing/of submissions).
[27] However, I am prepared to allow some costs for the Club’s preparation of authorities (which Mr Middeldorp did not file with his submissions). But I do not consider that 2B is appropriate for this step. A step should be categorised as band B if a normal amount of time is considered reasonable and band A if a comparatively small amount of time is considered reasonable.10 Step 32 is more appropriately a 2A step ($2,230) in this case.
Step 11: Memorandum for costs
[28]Both parties seek costs for preparing a costs memorandum under step 11.
[29] Whilst there has been some divergence in the court’s approach to awarding costs on application for costs, it is well established that such costs may be awarded.11 For costs purposes, an application for costs is to be treated no differently from an ordinary interlocutory application. In Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that there is to be no order for costs made in respect of a costs application where neither side’s position as to costs is completely upheld.12
[30] The solicitors for the Club, in their correspondence with the solicitors for Mr Middeldorp, advised that they considered that the Club had a basis to claim an uplift but would be willing to resolve costs on a 2B basis, being costs of $24,530 plus disbursements of $717.15.
[31] Mr Middeldorp’s solicitors responded that there should be no claim under step 32, resulting in 2B scale costs in the sum of $20,070. With a 50 per cent reduction, an offer of payment of costs of $10,035 was made.
10 Rule 14.5(2).
11 Body Corporate Administration v Mehta (No 4) [2013] NZHC 213 at [85].
12 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd, above n 6, at [62].
[32] Up to this point in my judgment, I have not completely upheld either party’s submissions on costs. I have re-categorised step 32 to 2A (rejecting both the Club’s and Mr Middeldorp’s submissions on that point). Accordingly, I calculate scale costs in the amount of $22,300 as set out in Annexure B. This reflects the steps as sought by the Club, but step 32 is on a 2A (rather than 2B) basis.
[33] I therefore decline to award costs for the preparation of a costs memorandum to the Club as it has not been completely successful when compared to its proposal to settle (although the reduction is relatively small).
[34] For Mr Middeldorp, as well as not completely upholding his position on scale costs, for reasons expressed later in this judgment, I also decline to completely uphold his position regarding a reduction in costs. Therefore, Mr Middeldorp is not entitled to costs for preparing his costs memorandum.
Should the Court award increased costs?
[35] The Club seeks increased costs under r 14.6(3)(b) on the basis that the party opposing costs (Mr Middeldorp) contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense of the proceeding. Accordingly, the Club seeks a 10 per cent uplift on each step.13
[36]Ms Coumbe relies on three grounds for increased costs.
Mr Middeldorp’s alleged meritless bias/predetermination argument
[37] First, Ms Coumbe submits Mr Middeldorp’s claim of bias/predetermination (in the context of the claim of a failure of the Committee to meet its natural justice obligations in making its suspension decisions) was scantly pleaded and without merit. Mr Middeldorp elected not to cross-examine the two relevant witnesses for the Club. Ms Coumbe submits the Club was put to expense in preparing pleadings, submissions and affidavits for both witnesses in response to Mr Middeldorp’s claim of bias. She says, absent cross-examination, the factual dispute could not be resolved, and Mr Middeldorp could not discharge his onus.
13 With the exception of step 11 (memorandum for costs) which I have declined to award in any event.
[38] In response, Mr David submits that contemporaneous documentary evidence was provided in support of Mr Middeldorp’s position. Thus, Mr Middeldorp did not need to cross-examine the two witnesses to discharge his onus of proof (in theory). While I did not accept that the documentary evidence supported Mr Middeldorp’s position, I do not consider that in itself warrants an uplift in scale costs.
Mr Middeldorp’s omission of documents
[39] Secondly, Ms Coumbe submits that Mr Middeldorp’s initial affidavit omitted many relevant documents which ought to have been in his possession or control, such as his written apology. Other documents were exhibited in incomplete form. Also, Mr Middeldorp’s affidavit contained an incomplete narrative. Therefore, a full factual account in Mr Boyle’s affidavit on behalf of the Club and provision of more documents was necessary.
[40] In response, Mr David submits it was for Mr Middeldorp to decide how to run his case, including the factual material and documents he considered relevant. He was not obliged to include all the material the Club considered relevant. There is merit in Mr David’s reply. I decline an increase on this basis.
Mr Middeldorp’s untimetabled further affidavit
[41] Thirdly, Ms Coumbe submits that Mr Middeldorp’s untimetabled further affidavit presented an incomplete picture of the Club’s constitution reform project. She says this necessitated a further affidavit in response from Mr Boyle.
[42] In response, Mr David submits Mr Middeldorp’s further affidavit did not require a response from the Club. The further affidavit provided the Court with up- to-date information before the hearing. For example, Mr Boyle, in his affidavit, had stated his intention to propose a new constitution to the Club’s members. It was apparent that the Club would rely on this to say that the declarations sought by Mr Middeldorp would have no practical utility. However, Mr David says, no new rules had in fact been put to the membership nor had a timeframe for this been adopted. It was necessary for Mr Middeldorp to bring the Court up to date on this issue. Had he not done so it would have been necessary for the Club to file an updating affidavit.
[43] While I accept that, in his affidavit in response to Mr Middeldorp’s further affidavit, Mr Boyle did add some additional information to that which was contained in Mr Middeldorp’s further affidavit, I do not consider that Mr Middeldorp’s further affidavit contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense of the proceeding. The key word is unnecessarily.
[44]I decline to increase costs on any of the grounds submitted by Ms Coumbe.
Should there be a reduction in costs?
[45] Mr Middeldorp seeks a reduction in the Club’s scale costs pursuant to r 14.7 of the High Court Rules, which provides in relevant part:
14.7 Refusal of, or reduction in, costs
… the court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costs otherwise payable under those rules if—
…
(d)although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party has failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs; or
…
(f)the party claiming costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—
…
(ii)taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit; or
…
(g)some other reason exists which justifies the court refusing costs or reducing costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.
[46] Mr David submits a 50 per cent reduction in scale costs is warranted. He submits there are three grounds for this.
Mr Middeldorp’s success on amenability and illegality
[47] Mr David submits reduction is justified under r 14.7(d). He says that although the Club was successful overall, it failed on the issues of whether the decisions of the Committee were amenable to judicial review and illegality, both of which he submits significantly increased Mr Middeldorp’s costs.
[48] On the first issue, Mr David submits the Club’s amenability argument lacked merit so as to justify a reduction under r 14.7(f)(ii). He says the Club’s pleaded position in relation to amenability, namely that the decisions were not amenable to judicial review, was without merit. The pleaded position was advanced across all claims. However, the Club altered its position in its written and oral submissions. It approached the issue on the basis that the Court should be hesitant about intervening.
[49] I do not accept that the adjusted position of the Club “significantly” increased Mr Middeldorp’s costs (r 14.7(d)). The issue was one that involved legal submissions only and did not require the preparation of evidence. However, I do accept that by pleading a point that it did not pursue in full measure in its submissions, the Club contributed unnecessarily to the expense of the proceeding by taking an argument (a pleaded position) that lacked merit. Mr Middeldorp was required to prepare his written submissions, at least, on the basis of the pleaded position. But any reduction will be modest as submissions were advanced on reviewability (although on a different basis from the pleaded position).
[50] I next address whether costs should be reduced on the basis that Mr Middeldorp succeeded on his illegality argument, namely that the Rules did not contain a power to suspend a committee member. Mr David submits that the illegality argument was central to the case. If the Club had conceded this issue, the proceeding could have been limited to the issue of the membership applications, the composition/election of the Committee and the exercise of the Court’s discretion.
[51] As part of this issue, Mr David submits the Club’s refusal to obtain a legal opinion about the lawfulness of its actions after the first suspension led to the proceeding and resulting cost. This would justify a reduction under either r 14.7(g) or in the Court’s general discretion.
[52] In anticipation of Mr Middeldorp’s position that costs should be reduced, Ms Coumbe submits that the Club’s position whether it had power to suspend had merit, was reasonably based and clearly arguable, despite the Court’s ultimate decision. It did not contribute unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding.
[53] In support of his submission that had the Club obtained a legal opinion, the proceeding and resulting costs might have been avoided, Mr David refers to the Minutes of the Committee meeting of 13 February 2017. They record the resolution “That the Committee confirms the advice given V Middeldorp that the club will not obtain a legal opinion about his suspension and he is to serve out his penalty”.
[54] Mr David also relies on an email from one of the committee members to Mr Boyle dated 11 September 2017 (prior to the second suspension) in which the committee member said:
Whatever the approach taken, the entire Committee needs to have an ability to force a Committee member to stand down or resign with a majority decision of Committee. We don’t have that at present, even if there is a conflict of interest arising out of any Club matter.
[55] However, this overlooks the evidence of Mr Boyle. As the President of the Club, he consulted the Club’s lawyer, Mr Coltman, as to the legality of suspending Mr Middeldorp. In his affidavit, Mr Boyle stated that:
98. Mr Middeldorp couriered a note to me dated 9 January 2017 enclosing two letter [sic] of the same date. One was a letter from Mr Middeldorp to the Club’s solicitor, John Coltman of Wynyard Wood, seeking a legal opinion as to whether the Rules permitted the Committee to suspend a member. The other was a letter to me …
[56] Mr Boyle then referred to his consultation with Mr Coltman that followed, and he annexed to his affidavit an email of 23 January 2017 to Mr Middeldorp which said:
I have now conferred with John Coltman and can report the outcome of your correspondence dated 9 January.
The club’s lawyers, having looked at your materials, the suspension resolution of 28 November 2016 and heard an outline of my version of how the investigation into the complaint against you was handled by the Committee, see no reason why the club would obtain a legal opinion about the power of the Committee to suspend a Committee member.
Informally John Coltman has indicated to me that in his opinion there is no apparent lack of power to suspend a Committee person as a sanction in connection with a serious complaint that has been upheld, under the AJC Constitution.
Accordingly the club will not be seeking a legal opinion at this stage.
[57] Having regard to the informal legal advice, I do not consider it can necessarily be said, as Mr David argues, that had the Club obtained a legal opinion the proceeding and resulting costs might have been avoided. Further, in relation to the later email of the committee member to Mr Boyle, the expressed view needs to be seen in the context of the informal legal advice to the contrary.
[58] However, the Club did fail in its case opposing Mr Middeldorp’s claim that the Club had suspended him without a legal basis on two occasions. The question is whether the Club’s failure “significantly increased” Mr Middeldorp’s costs (r 14.7(d)) or whether a reduction is justified under 14.7(g) or in the Court’s discretion.
Calculating the reduction
[59] It is difficult to be absolutely precise as to how much preparation and court time related to the two issues on which the Club was unsuccessful.14 As I have already noted, the reduction for the amenability argument should be modest.
[60] As to the illegality argument, much of the evidence filed in relation to this cause of action would, in any event, have required consideration for the purposes of the Court deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought15 (in the event the Club had conceded the suspensions were unlawful).
[61] This was one of five causes of action advanced over a one-day hearing. In my view, the 50 per cent reduction sought by Mr Middeldorp is excessive.
14 See Semple v Wilson [2018] NZHC 1703 at [45].
15 Refer Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Inc, above n 1, at [201] which sets out the reasons for declining to grant relief.
[62] Overall, a total reduction of 15 per cent is appropriate for both the arguments (amenability and illegality) on which the Club failed. This results in total costs of
$18,955 (calculated by $22,300 x 0.85).
Disbursements
[63] The Club seeks a total of $717.15 (GST-exclusive) in disbursements for court filing fees, courier and photocopying as set out in Annexure A.
[64] The costs memorandum for Mr Middeldorp is silent as to disbursements. In any event, absent express agreement, I consider the reasonableness and necessity of the items and amount claimed in disbursements.
[65]Rule 14.12 of the High Court Rules provides:
14.12 Disbursements
(1)In this rule,—
disbursement, in relation to a proceeding,—
(a)means an expense paid or incurred for the purposes of the proceeding that would ordinarily be charged for separately from legal professional services in a solicitor’s bill of costs; and
(b)includes—
(i)fees of court for the proceeding:
(ii)expenses of serving documents for the purposes of the proceeding:
(iii)expenses of photocopying documents required by these rules or by a direction of the court:
(iv)expenses of conducting a conference by telephone or video link; but
(c)does not include counsel’s fee.
relevant issue, in relation to a disbursement, means the issue in respect of which the disbursement was paid or incurred.
(2)A disbursement must, if claimed and verified, be included in the costs awarded for a proceeding to the extent that it is—
(a)of a class that is either—
(i)approved by the court for the purposes of the proceeding; or
(ii)specified in paragraph (b) of subclause (1); and
(b)specific to the conduct of the proceeding; and
(c)reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding; and
(d)reasonable in amount.
(3)Despite subclause (2), a disbursement may be disallowed or reduced if it is disproportionate in the circumstances of the proceeding.
…
[66] For expenses to be recoverable, they must fall within the r 14.12(1) definition of “disbursement” and satisfy the requirements under r 14.12(2)–(3).
[67] First, the expenses for which disbursements are sought fall within the definition of “disbursements” under r 14.12(1)(b)(i) and (iii). I am also satisfied that courier fees fall within the r 14.12(1)(a) definition and are generally recoverable.16
[68] Secondly, I am satisfied that the disbursements sought were specific to the proceeding, reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount. As to the photocopying and printing expenses, Ms Coumbe says the Club produced a substantial bundle of authorities and Mr Boyle’s affidavit ran into the hundreds of pages and included a number of colour copy exhibits. She adds that the courier costs primarily related to the sending of documents from the Club to its solicitors in connection with the preparation of its evidence. Whilst no receipts have been provided for the expenses, I am satisfied that the amount claimed is reasonable and not disproportionate in the circumstances of the proceeding.
[69]Accordingly, I award disbursements for the GST-exclusive amount of $717.15.
16 See Mawhinney v Waitakere City Council HC Auckland CIV-1999-404-1850, 26 September 2007 at [12] as cited in Sutton v Canterbury Regional Council [2015] NZHC 1000 at [39].
Result
[70]The Club is entitled to costs of $18,955 (15 per cent reduction in scale costs of
$22,300) and disbursements of $717.15. I make an order for costs and disbursements in the total sum of $19,672.15 as set out in Annexure B to this judgment.
Gordon J
Annexure A — Costs as claimed by the Avondale Jockey Club Inc
Scale costs
Step Description Category 2 Band B Sum Plus 10 per cent uplift 2 Commencement of
defence by defendant
$2,230 2 $4,460 $4,906.00 30 Defendant’s preparation of affidavits $2,230 2.5 $5,575 $6,132.50 32 Defendant’s preparation
of authorities bundle and chronology
$2,230 2 $4,460 $4,906.00 33 Preparation for hearing $2,230 3 $6,690 $7,359.00 34 Appearance at hearing $2,230 1 $2,230 $2,453.00 35 Second counsel $2,230 0.5 $1,115 $1,226.50 11 Memorandum for costs17 $2,230 0.4 $892 $892.00 $25,422 $27,875.00
Disbursements (GST-exclusive)
Description Sum (GST-exclusive) Court-filing fees $95.65 Photocopying $475.50 Couriers $146.00 $717.15
Total (claimed): $28,592.15
17 An uplift is not sought in respect of step 11 (memorandum on costs).
Annexure B — Costs as awarded
Scale costs
Step Description Category 2 Band B Sum 15 per cent reduction 2 Commencement of
defence by defendant
$2,230 2 $4,460 30 Defendant’s preparation of affidavits $2,230 2.5 $5,575 32 Defendant’s preparation
of authorities bundle and chronology18
$2,230 1 (Band A) $2,230 33 Preparation for hearing $2,230 3 $6,690 34 Appearance at hearing $2,230 1 $2,230 35 Second counsel $2,230 0.5 $1,115 $22,300 $18,955
Disbursements (GST-exclusive)
Description Sum (GST-exclusive) Court-filing fees $95.65 Photocopying $475.50 Couriers $146.00 $717.15
Total (awarded): $19,672.15
18 Step 32 is awarded on a 2A basis for the reasons outlined above at [24]–[27].
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