Memelink v Official Assignee
[2019] NZHC 1357
•14 June 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2018-485-686
[2019] NZHC 1357
UNDER the Insolvency Act 2006 IN THE MATTER OF
an originating application for annulment
BETWEEN
HARRY MEMELINK
Applicant
AND
OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE
Respondent
Hearing: 5 and 6 June 2019 Appearances:
Mr H Memelink (in person) Applicant P Chisnall for Respondent
D G Dewar and A O’Connor for Supporting Creditors (Body Corporate 378945, Body Corporate 81012, Geoffrey Raymond Fawcet and Gambitsis Crombie Ltd)
Judgment:
14 June 2019
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
Introduction
[1] Mr Memelink was adjudicated bankrupt following a hearing before Associate Judge Johnston on 28 August 2018. At that hearing Mr Memelink represented himself. There were a number of supporting creditors represented.
[2] On 7 September 2018, Mr Memelink, then represented by counsel, filed an application seeking to annul the adjudication. An amended application was filed
MEMELINK v OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE [2019] NZHC 1357 [14 June 2019].
on 14 October 2018 referring to ss 309(1)(a) and (c) of the Insolvency Act 2006 as the basis of the application. An affidavit in support from Mr Memelink was also filed.
[3] Late on 4 June 2019, by way of a memorandum filed with the Court, Mr Memelink made a further application for adjournment of the hearing scheduled to start on 5 June 2019. A prior application for an adjournment on the grounds that Mr Memelink’s counsel had withdrawn was dismissed by me in a Minute dated 13 May 2019. A further application for adjournment made by memorandum dated 24 May 2019 relied (in part) on Mr Memelink not being represented. Churchman J in a Minute dated 27 May 2019 dismissed the further adjournment application.
[4] Given Mr Memelink’s application of 4 June 2019 for an adjournment was based on the same grounds previously raised by him, the application was declined by me. Mr Memelink said he had located another solicitor who was prepared to act but that solicitor was not able to appear on 5 June 2019. I advised Mr Memelink that his steps to obtain representation had come too late. This matter has been set down for a hearing on 6 March 2019. Other than accommodating Mr Memelink’s request to attend a medical appointment on the first day of the scheduled hearing, I directed that the matter was to proceed on 5 June 2019.
[5] Mr Memelink’s application was opposed by a number of creditors and by the Official Assignee (“the OA”) who has filed two reports.
Section 309(1)(a)
[6]This section provides:
309 Court may annul adjudication
(1)The court may, on the application of the Assignee or any person interested, annul the adjudication if—
(a)the court considers that the bankrupt should not have been adjudicated bankrupt; or …
[7]The power to annul under s 309(1)(a) is exercised sparingly:1
Generally, three categories of annulment applications have succeeded under s 309(1)(a). These are where there was some defect in procedure, abuse of process or where subsequent evidence shows that not all the true facts were before the court making the adjudication order, provided that this would have affected the outcome.
[8] Insolvency Law and Practice notes that the most commonly argued basis for an annulment under s 309(1)(a) is that there was a defect in form or procedure leading to the adjudication.
Mr Memelink’s submissions
[9]Mr Memelink developed three points in support of this part of his application:
(a)Associate Judge Johnston should not have presided at the adjudication hearing because of a conflict of interest (I treated this as an argument that there was a defect in form or procedure or an abuse of process).
(b)Mr Memelink received flawed legal advice against paying the judgment debts on which the adjudication proceedings were based.
(c)Because of wider issues and disputes between him and some of the supporting creditors, those supporting creditors were using the bankruptcy process for collateral purposes, to achieve his bankruptcy so that he would not pursue claims against the supporting creditors and/or their counsel – essentially a claim of abuse of process.
Ground (a): Associate Judge Johnston should not have presided at the adjudication hearing because of a conflict of interest
[10] The allegation by Mr Memelink is that Associate Judge Johnston had a conflict of interest meaning he should have recused himself. Mr Memelink did not appeal the adjudication order.
1 Stephen Revell and John Walsh (eds) Insolvency Law and Practice (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [IN309.06(1)].
[11] The petitioning creditor was a law firm which had been sued by Mr Memelink. While Mr Memelink was successful in the High Court, that judgment was reversed in the Court of Appeal. As a result, the law firm obtained two costs awards against Mr Memelink, one relating to the High Court and one relating to the Court of Appeal hearing.
[12] The two bankruptcy applications brought by the law firm that were before Associate Judge Johnston related to the two costs awards.
[13] Immediately prior to the hearing, the Judge disclosed by way of a memorandum given to Mr Memelink and counsel that while he was in practise he had been approached to act for Mr Memelink in the claim against the law firm referred to above. The Judge recorded that for professional reasons he declined to accept instructions, but before doing so that he met with Mr Memelink to discuss the background to the case and reviewed documents that he was provided with.
[14] Mr Memelink did not take issue with the Judge dealing with the adjudication application. However, Mr Memelink now says that the Judge’s disclosure of his prior involvement with him was not complete. Mr Memelink has by memorandum produced emails between himself and the Judge when the Judge was in practice.
[15] The last email from the time when the Judge was being approached to act (20 August 2015) includes the following:
When Peter Gilbert’s firm confirms that it is prepared to instruct me, and is in a position to guarantee my fees as indicated, I will be able to focus more attention on the case.
No such arrangement as to fees were made and the Judge was not instructed. This is consistent with the disclosure made by the Judge.
[16] Mr Memelink then provided the Judge with a copy of the High Court judgment when it was released the following year (Mr Memelink represented himself in the hearing) and expressed his thanks to the Judge for the support given the year before. Receipt of the judgment was acknowledged by the Judge who congratulated Mr Memelink on the outcome. Mr Memelink’s reply referred to the possibility of
a further instruction and the Judge offered to look at the papers in relation to the further instruction but there was no suggestion that that went any further. While this further contact is not referred to by the Judge in his Minute, I see nothing in the contact such as it was, and I do not consider it warranted any change to the disclosure made by the Judge.
[17] By the time the costs awards came before the Judge on 28 August 2018 they were judgments of the Court which he could not look behind. Mr Memelink says that when the Judge referred to a prior professional association, Mr Memelink did not connect the disclosure with the claim involving the law firm.
[18] The Minute issued by the Judge names the law firm as being the matter he and Mr Memelink had discussed in 2015.
[19] In Mr Memelink’s complaint to the Judicial Conduct Authority about the incident, he says that while he received the Judge’s Minute, he was not given time to read it. Mr Memelink refers to the Judge saying at the time the Minute was distributed:
Mr Memelink, although I never acted for you, as you and I know, we sat for an hour or something and talked about this case some time ago.
[20] The Judge’s reference to “this case” in my view was a reference to the fact that the creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings then being dealt with was the same firm in the claim in which the Judge had been asked to accept instructions. Mr Memelink says he did not take the Judge’s comments in that way, however, as noted the Judge’s memorandum named the firm and the reference to “this case” when the firm was the petitioning creditor shows the Judge intended to be frank in his disclosure. I reject any suggestion the Judge misled Mr Memelink.
[21] Even on Mr Memelink’s account, the Judge disclosed his involvement with the case. Mr Memelink did not object. If Mr Memelink needed time to read the brief Minute in respect of the conflict he should have requested time. How that prior involvement created a conflict was not developed by Mr Memelink. The instructions the Judge was asked to accept while in practice were to act for Mr Memelink, not against him. The instructions were not accepted. The Judge had before him two costs
awards which, as with any judgment debts, a bankruptcy court Judge will not look behind.
[22] In the circumstances I have described and assuming without deciding that Mr Memelink’s complaint on this issue would amount to a “defect in form or procedure”,2 or an abuse of process, I do not accept that the complaint is made out.
[23] There were further suggested grounds for a conflict of interest, one being that the Judge felt some animosity towards a lawyer who had acted for Mr Memelink in relation to an insolvency proposal by Mr Memelink, which I will refer to in more detail below. This lawyer, a Mr Haines, did not appear on the bankruptcy hearing. I do not see any substance in this point, even if there had been some evidentiary basis for the claimed animosity. I discount the suggestion that the Judge would have somehow “taken out” any alleged ill feeling towards Mr Haines against Mr Memelink simply because he had been one of Mr Haines’ clients. The transcript of what occurred during the adjudication hearing shows the Judge giving Mr Memelink every chance to have his say. Also, as part of this complaint, Mr Memelink said that the Judge was involved as a go-between or mediator in a dispute between Mr Haines and another practitioner. I do not see this as adding anything to the assertion of animosity.
[24] The further matter said to give rise to a conflict of interest was that the Judge had a connection with a relative of a Mr Fawcett who was a creditor in support. The Judge in his Minute disclosing his prior involvement with Mr Memelink also disclosed that he had been involved in a proceeding for a plaintiff against a Mr Fawcett. This matter being disclosed, and no objection taken, it does not take Mr Memelink’s argument on this point any further.
[25] Further, for the reasons I will detail in relation to the insolvency proposal below, I do not consider that this point, even if it had substance, would have made any difference to the outcome of the application to adjudicate Mr Memelink.
2 Revell and Walsh, above n 1, at [IN309.06(1)].
Ground (b): That Mr Memelink received flawed legal advice against paying the judgment debts on which the adjudication proceedings were based.
[26] While Mr Memelink represented himself at the adjudication hearing, prior to the hearing he was represented by Mr Haines. Mr Haines prepared for Mr Memelink a proposal under the Insolvency Act 2006 which Mr Memelink signed on 23 August 2016, five days prior to the adjudication hearing. It was filed in the Court on 23 August 2016, along with an affidavit of Mr Memelink including, as one would expect, a statement of his assets and liabilities which was affirmed before a Registrar of the Court.
[27] Mr Memelink said at the hearing of the present application that he affirmed the affidavit without reading it. I note however that the jurat has been changed from a reference to the affidavit being “sworn” to “affirmed” as has another part of the affidavit. These changes are initialled by Mr Memelink.
[28] Mr Memelink has said that the proposal was advanced, in part, as a means of obtaining an adjournment of the bankruptcy hearing to be held on 28 August 2018.
[29]The statement of assets and liabilities in the proposal shows total debts of
$5.55 million including secured creditors of $2.6 million. It seems the secured debt relates to Trust property but that as Mr Memelink has given personal guarantees for that debt it was included in his proposal.
[30] The proposal disclosed assets of $6,000. On this basis, Mr Memelink was plainly insolvent.
[31] Mr Memelink has said that included in the schedule of his unsecured creditors is a debt of $1.15 million, said to be a debt to Mr Haines’ law firm, QH Law. Mr Memelink says this debt is not only not accepted by him, but that in effect Mr Haines improperly included this debt in the schedule before Mr Memelink affirmed the affidavit.
[32] Assuming this is correct, deducting this debt from the unsecured indebtedness and leaving the secured indebtedness to one side, Mr Memelink was still insolvent. However, I note in the transcript of the adjudication hearing, Mr Memelink said:
In regards to my newly stated debts, these have been invoiced by my former lawyer since his exit from practice in the Court of Appeal – in the Court of Appeal affidavit, - sorry. Apologies. I just want to [inaudible] your Honour. I’ve been presented with a very large but seriously discounted invoice which represents several years of work on a large number of cases from the Tribunal to three in the Court of Appeal.
Large amounts of these fees specifically relate to defending the vexatious proceedings of the clients of Mr Dewar and Mr O’Connor. Mr Dewar and Mr O’Connor claim that Fico does not support the proposal. However, no proof of this is provided and it is also unknown what impact that the support or otherwise of any creditors will have on the voting outcome of my proposal without the creditors’ meeting. The asset that has been provided as security for the proposal is an asset of Link Trust No. 1 and will not be available to my creditors when an order of bankruptcy be made. I reiterate my previous statement that I have the funds to settle the current petitioning creditors’ debt immediately. However, given the other unapproved debts which now claim substitution I have required the scrutiny of the trustee before they’re included under my proposal.
[33] The transcript of the adjudication hearing records Mr Memelink referring to the proposal a number of times. Mr Memelink sought an adjournment to allow his proposal to be put to his creditors. Mr Memelink’s statements to the Court show he understood what a proposal by an insolvent person was, and the role of his trustee under the proposal.
[34] Mr Memelink noted that the asset to fund the proposal, the sum of $600,000, was coming from a Trust and would not be available on his bankruptcy.
[35] The reference to the large lawyer’s invoice is suggestive of a “friendly” creditor’s claim to boost the voting in favour of the proposal, but again even excluding that claim, Mr Memelink was on his own proposal insolvent. The very fact that he was seeking an adjournment for his proposal to be circulated and to hold a creditors’ meeting, communicated to the Judge an acceptance by Mr Memelink that he was insolvent.
[36] Mr Memelink in his affidavit of 7 September 2018 said of the proposal that while he did not take in its contents, he realised he must take responsibility for his actions which included advancing the proposal before the Judge.
[37] Mr Memelink’s point at its most basic was that he was denied an opportunity to avoid bankruptcy as he says he was wrongly advised not to pay the two costs judgments, but to advance the proposal.
[38] As I have said, Mr Memelink understood what an insolvent creditor’s proposal was. He adopted the proposal in submissions to the Judge and sought an adjournment for the purposes of allowing the proposal to be advanced. That adjournment application was declined, and Mr Memelink was adjudicated bankrupt.
[39] In my view, this means that the position that Mr Memelink conveyed to the Court was that he was insolvent. That position was not altered by deleting from his unsecured debt what he says is the disputed invoice from QH Law. Having positively adopted the proposal, Mr Memelink cannot now be heard to say that not all the true facts were before the Court. Mr Memelink cannot ask the Court to give him an adjournment on the basis that he wished to advance the proposal but disavow the proposal when the adjournment was declined. He cannot “appropriate and reappropriate”.
[40] In other words, I do not consider that Mr Memelink’s complaints about the advice he says he received about the proposal fall within s 309(1)(a). Mr Memelink is a commercially experienced individual who has represented himself a number of times. He knew what the proposal was, and he sought to advance the proposal. Mr Memelink’s complaint was that he was not given the adjournment he sought.
[41] Associate Judge Osborne (as he then was), in Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton, said:3
I am not entitled to interfere with an adjudication by an order of annulment simply because I might have decided matters differently on [date of the order of adjudication].
3 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton [2013] NZHC 2434 at [34].
[42] This is not to say that had I heard Mr Memelink’s application for an adjournment I would have granted it. The point is that even if I had been of the view that an adjournment should have been granted, that view would not justify an annulment.
Ground (c): Because of wider issues and disputes between him and some of the supporting creditors, those supporting creditors were using the bankruptcy process for collateral purposes to achieve his bankruptcy so that he would not pursue claims against the supporting creditors and/or their counsel.
[43] The assertion is that some of the creditors who appeared in support of the adjudication application were misusing the bankruptcy process as it suited them to in effect silence Mr Memelink through securing his bankruptcy. The short answer to this claim is that bankruptcy does not alter any claims Mr Memelink may have against his supporting creditors. If they are of merit the OA can pursue them.
[44] It is clear that Mr Memelink holds strong feelings about counsel for some of the supporting creditors. That there were supporting creditors was to some extent taken into account by the Judge in the adjudication hearing as referred to in the transcript. However, there were further significant and uncontested supporting creditors also represented. Mr Fawcett is owed (uncontested) at least $190,000 and Body Corporate 81012 had a judgment of just over $93,000.
[45] The situation with the unsecured creditors was also complicated by the creditors’ proposal. Creditors that Mr Memelink now says are disputed are included in the creditors’ proposal. In a practical sense that is to be expected as, disputed or not, if an insolvent considers he or she has the votes to pass a proposal then disputed creditors will be included in order to deal with all an insolvent’s debts, accepted or otherwise, at the same time.
[46] However, with the Judge presented with an insolvent debtors’ proposal, even assuming that there was some merit to the submission that some of the supporting creditors were motivated in the manner suggested by Mr Memelink this, in my view, is not enough to say that the adjudication order should not have been made. Again, uncontested creditors of nearly $300,000 were standing behind the creditor seeking adjudication. Even if the Judge was to have treated the other creditors as motivated
by some improper purpose and discounted their support it is hard to say that would have made a difference given Mr Memelink’s acceptance he was insolvent.
[47] Mr Memelink referred to being let down by his previous solicitors and by the justice system generally. He considers the situation he finds himself in now is through no fault of his own and is unfair. However, nothing in respect of those matters entitles Mr Memelink to an annulment under s 309(1)(a). Mr Memelink does not get in effect to re-run the adjudication application because the approach he adopted at the hearing was a result of what he now considers to be poor advice.
[48] The Judge was faced with unpaid judgment debts in excess of $120,000 and a debtor who wished to advance an insolvency proposal with all that implies.
[49]Mr Memelink’s application under s 309(1)(a) is dismissed.
Section 309(1)(c): Substantial change in the bankrupt’s financial circumstances
[50] Brookers Insolvency Law & Practice states that this ground overlaps with s 309(1)(b) but notes that subsection requires that all debts have been fully paid or satisfied, whereas subs (c) only requires a change in the bankrupt’s financial circumstances which means the bankrupt can pay his or her debts.
[51] A substantial change in circumstances does not entitle a bankrupt to an annulment as the Court must also be satisfied that the liability of the bankrupt to pay his debts should be revised because of that change. The need to change must have occurred since the adjudication.4
[52] I took Mr Memelink through the unsecured creditors who appeared in support of his adjudication and the unsecured creditors listed in the OA’s report.
[53] In relation to the 14 unsecured creditors listed in the OA’s report, as personal creditors, Mr Memelink accepted liability for one.
4 Revell and Walsh, above n 1, at [IN309.06(3)].
[54] In respect of the debtors who appeared in support, he accepted liability to Mr Fawcett and he in effect had no choice but to accept the claim by Body Corporate 81012 as it has a judgment debt.
[55] While Mr Memelink has made arrangements for funds to be put into trust to pay the judgment creditors who brought the adjudication application, and he has paid various small costs awards made as a result of the adjudication application, he did not advise the Court of any concrete plans to pay the creditors he did accept, or explain how the creditors he did not accept were going to be dealt with.
[56] Nor did Mr Memelink identify the change in circumstances since the date of adjudication that would support his application under this ground. The closest he came to this was to refer to the outcome of separate bankruptcy proceedings against him in which he had been successful in the High Court, which the petitioning creditor appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, whose decision was released on 19 November 2018. Mr Memelink said he had been handicapped in his commercial activities by this earlier bankruptcy proceeding and it being cleared away by the Court of Appeal meant there had been a change of circumstances. I cannot accept that submission, as the present bankruptcy occurred about three months before the release of the Court of Appeal decision, removing any commercial advantage the Court of Appeal decision may otherwise have had. That an earlier application to bankrupt Mr Memelink by another creditor failed is not a change in Mr Memelink’s circumstances that means his liability to pay his debts should be restored.
[57] The application under this head may have gained traction if the Trust had put up sufficient funds to cover all debt, accepted or otherwise. This would be similar to the situation dealt with by Associate Judge Sargisson in Re Green ex parte BNZ,5 where since adjudication all known debts had been paid save for a judgment debt owed to a creditor but where sufficient moneys were held in Court to cover that judgment debt and where annulment would allow the proceeding subject to the judgment debt to be revived and the debt challenged. The bankrupt in Re Green committed that if the challenge of the disputed debt was unsuccessful, the debt would be paid from the
5 Re Green ex parte BNZ HC Auckland, CIV-2006-404-6480, CIV-2006-404-1159, 11 February 2008.
funds held by the Registrar. While not all creditors had been paid, arrangements to deal with a disputed debt were made and the Court made an order annulling the bankruptcy. Nothing along those lines is advanced by Mr Memelink.
[58] Whether the same approach could be adopted in relation to more than a dozen disputed creditors, I need not decide.
[59] It will be recalled that under the creditors’ proposal, $600,000 was to be provided by a Trust associated with Mr Memelink to fund the proposal.
[60] Mr Memelink did not appear to draw a distinction between his personal assets and the assets of the Trust of which he is a trustee. The Trust Deed is not before the Court. From the titles to the Trust properties that have been produced by Mr Memelink, the trustees are Mr Memelink and Lynx Trustees Ltd. Mr Memelink’s brother-in-law is the sole director and shareholder of the trustee company.
[61] In a memorandum to the Court dated 3 October 2018, counsel then instructed for Mr Memelink said circumstances had changed by way of assistance for Mr Memelink’s family. However, nothing concrete is put forward to deal with all creditors.
[62] In reply, Mr Memelink made a passing reference to paying all the debt disputed or otherwise. This is not a commitment he is able to make given the payment would have to come from the Trust. Mr Memelink confirmed to me that his assets that he spoke of during the hearing were in the Trust.
[63] The value of Mr Memelink’s debts is substantial. The amount owed to Body Corporate 81012 with further levies added to the judgment debt is now just over $105,000. The amount claimed by Body Corporate 68792 (disputed) is over
$304,000. Mr Fawcett is owed over $190,000 and again, this is not disputed. Leaving out the invoices of Mr Haines, the remaining disputed debt to personal unsecured creditors referred to in the OA’s report is approximately $95,000, bringing the total to debt accepted and disputed nearly $600,000. This is without having regard to the debts recorded in the OA’s report as being potential creditors of the bankrupt.
[64] In the absence of certainty as to who Mr Memelink’s creditors are and in the absence of clear confirmation of the Trust’s willingness and ability to pay creditors, Mr Memelink’s reference to paying all his debt cannot take his present application further. That was not the basis upon which the application was made. Dismissal of this application does not prevent Mr Memelink advancing annulment in a new application on a basis that addresses the creditors that have been accepted by the OA.
[65] Mr Memelink has not established the pre-conditions for the Court to exercise its discretion under either subsection of s 309 relied on in his amended application. This application is accordingly dismissed.
[66] I record that during his reply submissions, Mr Memelink repeatedly said that he had been hamstrung in advancing his application. Mr Memelink had filed two affidavits in support of his application while he was represented by counsel. The original affidavit in support did not of itself, in my view, justify the making of the orders sought. At the time of the affidavit not all creditors accepted by Mr Memelink had not been paid and there is reference in respect of some creditors to Mr Memelink working on a proposal to meet his indebtedness. It did not set out how he proposed to deal with disputed creditors.
[67] In what was expressed to be a supplementary affidavit in October 2018, Mr Memelink gave a little more detail about his reasons for not accepting some creditors.
[68] I allowed Mr Memelink during the hearing to present his submissions without holding him to the bounds of the material of his affidavits.
[69] I explained to Mr Memelink that in reply he was only to deal with matters raised by counsel and that it was not an opportunity to repeat his submissions from the first day of the hearing. Mr Memelink returned numerous times to his dispute with the Body Corporates. I said to him that I would approach the application on the basis that he believed he had a reasonably arguable basis for not accepting the creditors he disputed, and that in this hearing I would not be determining whether the creditors’
claims against him were valid or not. Notwithstanding this, Mr Memelink returned to his disputes with the Body Corporates numerous times.
[70] Whether or not Mr Memelink has proper grounds for disputing the validity of some of the creditor claims, those claims cannot be ignored in an annulment application. Whether a debt is provable in a bankruptcy is a decision for the OA.6 An annulment application that does not address disputed debts will have little prospect of success.
[71] In Mr Memelink’s first affidavit at para 15, he acknowledged that his concerns about the way the respective Body Corporates are run may have clouded his judgment. It is clearly still a matter of concern to him because as I have said, he returned to the issues with the Body Corporates numerous times during the hearing.
[72] During Mr Memelink’s reply, I urged him to focus on the key points made by counsel. Mr Memelink referred to the general background to his affairs and what he said was a failure of his past lawyers and the hidden agenda of some of the supporting creditors, and his personal issues with counsel for those creditors. He again referred to the Judge’s alleged conflict of interest and that if there had been an adjournment granted by the Judge, Mr Memelink would have paid the petitioning creditors.
[73] The history Mr Memelink recounted of his disputes with various Body Corporates, going back in one case as long ago as 2007, the instances he describes where he considers he has been let down by different solicitors or other professionals over time, and instances where Mr Memelink said he had been taken commercial advantage of, were all ultimately beside the point when it came to the Court’s decision to adjudicate him bankrupt on 28 August 2018 and have little, if any, bearing on the present application.
[74] Once the Court was presented with unpaid judgment debts, unpaid and undisputed supporting creditors and an insolvent debtor’s proposal, an order for adjudication was at the very least an outcome reasonably open to the Court.
6 Insolvency Act 2006, s 231.
[75] I pressed Mr Memelink in reply as to whether he had anything further to add, and he did not. None of the matters raised by Mr Memelink established the grounds for annulment relied on in his application. Despite the OA in her report of 29 April 2019 setting out at [25] the OA’s ground for objecting to the application, Mr Memelink did not focus on addressing that objection.
[76] I have made these further observations to confirm that I have considered the matters Mr Memelink raised but at the end of the day much of what he had to say did not engage with the grounds upon which his application was based.
Associate Judge Lester
Solicitors:
Port Nicholson Chambers, Wellington Thomas Dewar Sziranyi Letts, Lower Hutt Copy to:
Mr Harry Memelink
6