IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-692 [2015] NZHC 2627
UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 IN THE MATTER
of a decision made pursuant to the Parole
Act 2002BETWEEN
GARTH MCVICAR, PETER JENKINS AND GIL ELIOT
Plaintiffs
AND
THE NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD First Defendant
RODNEY MICHAEL PETRICEVIC Second Defendant
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
D A Garrett for Plaintiffs
F M Cooke QC and V Owen for First Defendant
No appearance for Second DefendantJudgment:
27 October 2015
JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J (Costs)
I direct that the delivery time of this judgment is
2 pm on the 27th day of October 2015
MCVICAR v THE NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD [2015] NZHC 2627 [27 October 2015]
[1] This judgment deals with costs, further to my decision of 4 September 2015 in which I declined the interim orders sought by the plaintiffs.1 Although not made explicit in my judgment the parties recognise that the necessary effect of that decision (in which I held that the plaintiffs had no standing judicially to review the impugned decision) is that their claim as a whole cannot succeed. As I understand it, the plaintiffs will discontinue their claim once the issues of costs have been resolved.
[2] The parties’ position on costs can simply be stated.
[3] The Board says that costs should follow the event in the usual way. But Mr Cooke QC also submitted that the speed with which the hearing was brought on, and the consequent conditions of urgency under which its submissions had to be prepared, together with the significant issues of principle at stake warrants a category 3 classification.
[4] For their part, the plaintiffs say that their charitable status and the public interest in the issue raised by the application favours permitting costs to lie where they fall.
Discussion
[5] In the course of my substantive judgment in this matter I said:2
As Mr Cooke submitted, the authorities indicate that questions of standing are intimately related to the type of challenge in question. If a challenge raises some very clear questions of legality of potentially wide public relevance, then the Courts will be little concerned with the identity of the person bringing the issue to Court. As Lord Diplock said, that is reflection of the operation of the rule of law. The high watermark of the operation of that principle was, perhaps, the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc.
I also agree that the present is not a challenge of that character. Notwithstanding Mr Garrett’s eloquent submissions to the contrary, the Trust’s application for judicial review does not raise any question of law of that broad or publicly relevant kind. Rather, it invites the High Court to reconsider the Parole Board’s decision on the evidential merits and, in particular, its view of the weight that could be placed on the psychological
1 McVicar v New Zealand Parole Board [2015] NZHC 2153.
2 At [46] –…
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- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2627
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the nature of the challenge, noting that while questions of standing are related to the type of challenge, this case did not raise broad or publicly relevant questions of law. Instead, it invited the court to reconsider the Parole Board's decision on evidential merits and risk assessment. The court emphasized that parole decisions about specific prisoners do not engage the public interest in a relevant and meaningful sense. The court also acknowledged the plaintiffs' charitable status but observed that their aims had a political aspect that set them apart from other charities. Thus, the court found no basis for exempting the plaintiffs from the usual costs’ burden.
The reasoning of the court led to the conclusion that there was no sufficient special aspect about either the Trust or the claim to warrant an exemption from the usual costs’ burden. However, the court was also not prepared to make a category 3 classification for costs purposes, considering the Board's preparedness and the nature of the arguments presented. The court determined that a category 2 classification was appropriate. Therefore, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the first defendant's costs in relation to the interim orders application on a 2B basis. No order was made in relation to the second defendant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi