McGuire v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV 2014-485-3007 [2015] NZHC 448

UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972

AND

Part 30 of the High Court Rules

BETWEEN

JEREMY JAMES McGUIRE Applicant

AND

WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE (No 1)

First Respondent

THE LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

On the papers

Judgment:

12 March 2015

JUDGMENT OF MALLON J (Costs)

[1]      I refer to my judgment on Mr McGuire’s application for judicial review of disciplinary proceedings that were brought against him.1    That application was brought on a number of grounds.  Mr McGuire succeeded in having the decision to censure him quashed on only one of them.  He failed in his claim for damages and in having the costs order of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) set aside.

[2]      As to costs in respect of his judicial review application, I said:

1      McGuire v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2014] NZHC 3042.

McGUIRE v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE (No 1) [2015] NZHC 448 [12 March 2015]

[93]      My preliminary view is that Mr McGuire should be entitled to costs because he has succeeded in having the censure quashed.  Any such costs order should be reduced to some extent (perhaps by around 25 per cent) to reflect the significant number of other issues that Mr McGuire raised, on which he did not succeed.   It would be preferable if the parties reach an agreement on costs in light of this indication.  If that is not possible, they may file brief submissions (no more than five pages each) confined solely to the particular aspects of costs that are in dispute.  Such submissions are to be filed by 30 January 2015.

[3]      The parties have been unable to agree.  Mr McGuire seeks indemnity costs in respect of both the disciplinary proceedings ($141,033.60 GST inclusive) and his subsequent application for judicial review ($89,527.50 GST inclusive).2    The first respondent seeks that no order be made in Mr McGuire’s favour.  In the alternative it seeks that costs be reduced by an amount greater than that indicated in my preliminary view set out above.

[4]      Mr McGuire’s claim for any costs in respect of the disciplinary proceedings in misconceived.  I have already upheld the Tribunal’s order for costs against him.3

That also answers Mr McGuire’s alternative submission that he should have costs against the Tribunal in respect of what he says was an “unnecessary hearing” on “penalty and costs”.

[5]      Mr McGuire’s claim for indemnity costs in respect of the application for judicial review is an unrealistic one.   I had indicated a preliminary view that any costs  order  in  his  favour  should  be  reduced.      Mr  McGuire  submits  that  such reduction would be “unprecedented”.   However a reduction where a party has succeeded overall but has “failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs” is provided for in the

High Court Rules4 and is an orthodox approach to the costs discretion.5   All but one

of…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 448
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand was tasked with deciding the costs associated with a judicial review application brought by Jeremy James McGuire against the Wellington Standards Committee and the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal. The primary issue before the Court was whether McGuire was entitled to indemnity costs for the disciplinary proceedings and his subsequent application for judicial review. The Court had previously indicated that McGuire should be entitled to some costs, but that these should be reduced by around 25% due to the number of unsuccessful issues raised. The Court needed to determine the extent of the reduction and whether it should be further reduced, as suggested by the Wellington Standards Committee. The Wellington Standards Committee argued for a more significant reduction than the initial 25%, claiming that McGuire's additional unsuccessful issues and the costs of an interlocutory application significantly increased their costs.

The Court considered the submissions from both parties and the principles of costs in judicial review cases. It noted that while McGuire had succeeded in having the decision to censure him quashed, he had also raised numerous unsuccessful issues that increased the costs for the Wellington Standards Committee. The Court determined that the reduction should be slightly more than the initial 25%, but not as drastic as the 50% reduction proposed by the Wellington Standards Committee. The Court arrived at a reduction of approximately 31%, resulting in an award of $14,700 in costs to McGuire. The Court found that this approach was appropriate and in line with the principles of costs in judicial review cases, where a party who has succeeded overall but failed on certain issues may still be entitled to some costs, albeit reduced. The Court ordered that the Wellington Standards Committee pay $14,700 to McGuire as costs for the judicial review application.