| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA377/2010 [2011] NZCA 15 |
| BETWEEN JEREMY JAMES MCGUIRE |
| AND LEE GRACE SHERIDAN |
| Hearing: 15 November 2010 |
| Court: Chambers, MacKenzie and Simon France JJ |
| Counsel: J G Rowan QC for Appellant |
| Judgment: 17 February 2011 at 9 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is dismissed.
BThe appellant must pay the respondent costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis, increased by 50 per cent, and usual disbursements.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Chambers J)
Legal aid top-ups
It is rather difficult to define the issues on this appeal as the courts, and Lee Sheridan, the respondent, have been taken on a rollercoaster ride by Jeremy McGuire, the appellant and Ms Sheridan’s former lawyer. The case we have now to resolve is quite different from the case Ronald Young J faced in the High Court; indeed, the case evolved considerably from that advanced in the notice of appeal. Essentially, however, the case is about whether Mr McGuire could sue his former client for top-up fees over and above his entitlement to funds from the Legal Services Agency.
The factual background to the dispute is convoluted. For present purposes, the following slimmed-down chronology will do.
In 2007, Ms Sheridan retained Mr McGuire to act for her on a claim she wished to bring under the Family Protection Act 1955 with respect to her late grandmother’s estate. Ms Sheridan applied for and was granted legal aid with respect to that proceeding. Sometime later, at Mr McGuire’s behest, she signed two contingency fee arrangements and one fixed fee arrangement with Mr McGuire. Mr McGuire did not tell Ms Sheridan about the need to get the Agency’s approval for such an agreement; nor did Mr McGuire tell the Agency at that time about what had been agreed.
Ms Sheridan’s family protection claim settled at a settlement conference in the High Court. The settlement was at such a level that Mr McGuire considered a fee of $30,000 justified. When he gave Ms Sheridan a bill for that amount, she complained to the New Zealand Law Society. It was then she learned for the first time of the restriction imposed by s 66 of the Legal Services Act 2000. That section prevents lawyers from taking top-up fees from legally-aided clients without the Agency’s permission.
Mr McGuire then issued summary judgment proceedings in the District Court seeking to recover his fee. Ms Sheridan opposed the application on two grounds: the proceeding should be stayed until her Law Society complaint about Mr McGuire’s fee was resolved; and, in any event, s 66 prohibited Mr McGuire from collecting his claimed fee. Judge Susan Thomas stayed the claim.[1] Mr McGuire appealed. Wild J allowed the appeal to the extent that Mr McGuire was permitted to litigate the s 66 issue.[2] His Honour also transferred the proceeding to the High Court pursuant to s 43 of the District Courts Act 1947.
[1] McGuire…
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- Case
- [2011] NZCA 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal considered whether McGuire was entitled to the declaratory relief he sought, namely a declaration that a lawyer is not in breach of section 66 unless and until he or she receives a payment without proper authority. The Court held that this argument was unsustainable, as courts cannot deliver judgments conditional on decisions of the Agency as to whether to give permission for top-ups. Furthermore, the Agency had already refused consent to a top-up or its equivalent prior to the commencement of proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay increased costs to the respondent.
The Court of Appeal held that McGuire was not entitled to the declaratory relief sought, as the Agency had already refused consent to a top-up or its equivalent prior to the commencement of proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay increased costs to the respondent. The Court held that a 50 per cent uplift in costs was warranted due to the lack of merit in the appeal, both factually and legally.
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