IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-004906 [2013] NZHC 159
IN THE MATTER OF the Resource Management Act 1991
BETWEEN PETER WILLIAM MAWHINNEY, TRUSTEE OF AUCKLAND, AS TRUSTEE IN THE WAITAKERE FOREST LAND TRUST
First Plaintiff
ANDPETER WILLIAM MAWHINNEY, TRUSTEE OF AUCKLAND, AS TRUSTEE IN THE FOREST TRUST Second Plaintiff
ANDPETER WILLIAM MAWHINNEY, TRUSTEE OF AUCKLAND, AS TRUSTEE IN THE SIXTY-SIX AUCKLAND TRUST
Third Plaintiff
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL, AS LOCAL AUTHORITY AND CONSENT AUTHORITY
Defendant
Hearing: 4 February 2013
Appearances: P W Mawhinney (Self-represented for First, Second and
Third Plaintiffs) in Person
P A Robertson for the Defendant
Judgment: 11 February 2013
JUDGMENT OF DUFFY J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Duffy on 11 February 2013 at 5.30 pm, pursuant to
r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
MAWHINNEY and ORS v AUCKLAND COUNCILHC AK CIV-2012-404-004906 [11 February 2013]
[1] The plaintiffs apply for summary judgment against the defendant in this proceeding. The defendant applies to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim: for summary judgment against the plaintiffs; and for security for costs. Each side opposes the other’s application/s.
[2] There was insufficient time in the allocated one day hearing to deal with all the applications. However, it was possible to proceed with hearing the plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment against the defendant and part of the defendant’s application for strike-out of the plaintiffs’ claim. The remainder of the applications will be adjourned and the manner of their disposal determined at a telephone conference following the delivery of this judgment.
The plaintiffs’ claim
[3] The plaintiffs are concerned about what they consider to be an egregious delay on the part of the defendant in approving applications for, or relating to the proposed subdivision of land. This involves the defendant exercising statutory authority under the Resource Management Act 1991. They claim that the defendant’s conduct is in breach of an actionable statutory duty. They claim for breach of statutory duty simpliciter and contend that their claim is so strong that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favour.
[4] The defendant opposes the summary judgment application. It could have done so on a number of bases but ultimately, due to the constrained hearing time available, it has focused its opposition to arguing that in law, there is no sustainable claim for breach of statutory duty in the present circumstances.
Analysis
[5] I have given careful consideration to the plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment. For the reasons set out below, I find that the application must be dismissed.
[6] There is a difference between claims for breach of statutory duty where the statute gives rise to a statutory cause of action, and claims where the statute concerned does not provide a statutory cause of action, but instead leaves the common law to operate as well: see South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA) at
297–298. The later type of claim is based on…
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- Case
- [2013] NZHC 159
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether a statutory cause of action for breach of statutory duty existed under the Resource Management Act. It found that the Act provided alternative remedies, such as statutory rights of appeal and judicial review, and did not contain a statutory duty that could give rise to a damages claim. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had not brought a common law negligence claim, which would have required establishing a duty of care. Given the availability of other remedies, the court held that there was no tenable cause of action for damages for breach of statutory duty. The court further found that there were factual disputes between the parties that could not be resolved on a summary judgment application.
As a result of this analysis, the plaintiffs' application for summary judgment was dismissed. The court struck out those parts of the plaintiffs' claim that related to their claim for damages for actionable breach of statutory duty. The court declined to strike out the claims for other remedies, as it had not heard full arguments on those claims and it was procedurally fair to allow the parties an opportunity to be heard on those aspects. The court reserved leave to file memoranda on costs and scheduled a telephone conference to determine the manner of disposal of the remaining applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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