Athendale Property Limited v Western Bop District Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY

CIV-2012-470-36 [2014] NZHC 635

BETWEEN  ATHENDALE PROPERTY LIMITED Plaintiff

ANDWESTERN BOP DISTRICT COUNCIL Defendant

Hearing:                   23 September 2013

Appearances:           M D Branch for the Plaintiff

P J Crombie for the Defendant

Judgment:                2 April 2014

JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 2 April 2014 at 11:00 a.m. pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 1985.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

……………………………………

Solicitors / Counsel:

Mr M D Branch, Harkness Henry, Solicitors, Hamilton

Mr P J Crombie, Cooney Lees Morgan, Solicitors, Tauranga

ATHENDALE PROPERTY LTD v WESTERN BOP DISTRICT COUNCIL [2014] NZHC 635 [2 April 2014]

[1]      The plaintiff (Athendale) has applied for review of  an Associate Judge’s decision ordering the plaintiff to provide security for the defendant Council’s costs in a sum of $60,000.1

[2]      The threshold question under r 5.45 of the High Court Rules is whether there is reason to believe that the plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if there is an order for costs against the plaintiff.  Athendale accepts that this is the case.  The broad issue that arises on this application for review is whether there was error by the Judge in concluding that it was just in all the circumstances to make an order that Athendale provide security for costs.   In coming to this conclusion the Judge was exercising a discretion.   In consequence, for the plaintiff to succeed it must show that the Judge acted on a wrong principle, or failed to take into account some relevant matter, or took into account some irrelevant matter, or was plainly

wrong.2

The claim

[3]      Athendale is suing the Council for negligence, breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office.  The claims relate to actions taken by Council officers in preparing proposals for, and implementing decisions on, district plan changes which affected Athendale’s land in Athenree (the Athendale land).

[4]      The Athendale land abuts Tauranga Harbour.  Athendale alleges that certain Council officers had a plan to extend an existing coastal reserve further onto the Athendale land and that they put this forward in proposals for plan changes.   The Council made a number of formal decisions not to extend the reserve.  Athendale alleges that the Council officers nevertheless took or failed to take various steps in an attempt to circumvent or unjustifiably delay the implementation of the formal decisions declining to extend the reserve. Athendale claims this was done in order to restrict  Athendale’s  use  of  land  and  thereby  preserve  the  Council’s  ability  to

construct a viewing platform on it.

1      Athendale Property Ltd v Western Bay of Plenty District Council [2013] NZHC 965.

2      May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA) at 170. And see Alex Harvey Industries Ltd v CIR (2001)

15 PRNZ 361 (CA) at [12]-[15].

[5]      Broadly  speaking  the  actions  and  omissions  of  Council  staff  of  present relevance are said to be as follows:

(a)      They recommended the amendment of the District Plan by marking…

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Details
Case
[2014] NZHC 635
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Athendale Property Limited (Athendale) has applied for review of a decision by an Associate Judge (the Judge) that it provide security for Western Bop District Council’s (the Council) costs in a sum of $60,000. Athendale is impecunious and has indicated that it would be unable to pay the Council’s costs if ordered. The threshold question under r 5.45 of the High Court Rules is whether there is reason to believe that the plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if there is an order for costs against the plaintiff. Athendale accepts that this is the case. The broad issue that arises on this application for review is whether there was error by the Judge in concluding that it was just in all the circumstances to make an order that Athendale provide security for costs. In coming to this conclusion the Judge was exercising a discretion. In consequence, for the plaintiff to succeed it must show that the Judge acted on a wrong principle, or failed to take into account some relevant matter, or took into account some irrelevant matter, or was plainly wrong. In my respectful opinion the Judge was in error and an order for security for costs should not have been made. As the Judge recognised, the practical effect of the order was to bring the proceeding to an end. The claim has not been struck out in a technical sense, but the order for security has had the same effect. As the Court of Appeal said in A S McLachlan Ltd v MEL Network Ltd, this should not occur unless the claim has little chance of success. The Judge summed up his view of the merits in a statement that the “claim is unconvincing in many respects”. On a close reading of the Judge’s consideration of each of the causes of action it is not entirely clear that the Judge firmly concluded that all three of the causes of action had little chance of success. He certainly did not conclude that all three of the causes of action were untenable. In any event, I am satisfied that it cannot be said that all three of the causes of action have little chance of success. This conclusion arises from the presently unchallenged evidence for Athendale. Important parts of this evidence do not appear to have been taken into account by the Judge. And in my judgment his conclusions on some other matters of fact are not borne out by the evidence. I set this evidence out in some detail because it indicates a reasonably strong case at this stage of the proceeding. A reasonably strong case is well removed from a claim which has little chance of success. Those are my principal reasons for concluding that the application for review should be granted and the order set aside. However, because I have reached a different conclusion from the Judge, and on a matter involving exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate to go into a little more detail on some aspects. In doing this I have taken account of the submissions of both counsel, but it is unnecessary to address those in detail. The Judge was in error stating, in effect, that the location of the heritage sites, which he understood to have been done by Ngati Hako representatives, was only contradicted by advice obtained by Mr Yeoman from the Otawhiwhi Marae. This also implies a conflict between Otawhiwhi Marae and Ngati Hako. The Judge’s conclusions were repeated in his overall summary later in his judgment when he said: It would appear that the Council staff based their views about the location of the midden on a cultural report received from Ngati Hako, a local tribal organisation. In the absence of some indications that this report might have been flawed, it is difficult to accept that the Council staff were negligent in proceeding on the basis that it was accurate. The fact that a second report from the representatives of the Otawhiwhi marae came to a different conclusion which the Council ultimately came to accept as being the correct position does not prove negligence. The clear evidence is that Ngati Hako as well as Otawhiwhi Marae provided written confirmation that there were no culturally significant sites on the Athendale land. The written advice from Ngati Hako was in fact more emphatic than that from Otawhiwhi Marae. There was no conflict. I have addressed this particular point at relative length because, in my judgment, the evidence, which appears to have been overlooked, demonstrates a solid foundation for a claim of misfeasance as well as a foundation for a negligence claim. These are matters bearing on liability, rather than causation and loss, but they are of significance when considering an application for security for costs which will bring the claim to an end if granted. There is a good deal of additional and unchallenged evidence supporting the claim of misfeasance as well as the claim of negligence. The appeal is allowed, the order that the plaintiff provide security for the defendant’s costs is set aside and the defendant’s application for security for costs is dismissed. The preceding orders will lie in Court pending receipt of a written undertaking to the defendant from Mr and Mrs Yeoman that they will be personally liable to the Council for any costs awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the defendant up to a maximum of $60,000. Athendale is entitled to costs on a 2B basis on the original application and on this application for review. If the parties are unable to agree on the quantum this is to be fixed by the Registrar.

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