| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 59/2021 [2021] NZSC 122 |
| BETWEEN | PETER WILLIAM MAWHINNEY |
| AND | AUCKLAND COUNCIL |
| Court: | William Young, Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 21 September 2021 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
C The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.
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REASONS
Introduction
The applicant, Mr Mawhinney,[1] and companies associated with him, have been involved in litigation against the respondent, Auckland Council, or one of its predecessors, for some 25 years. The litigation largely arose in the context of endeavours to subdivide some 120 hectares of land in the Waitākere Ranges.
[1]In some cases, the proceedings have been brought by Mr Mawhinney in his personal capacity and, in others, in his capacity as trustee.
The Council sought an extended order under s 166(4) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 to restrain Mr Mawhinney (in his personal capacity and as trustee) from commencing or continuing civil proceedings against it in relation to the Waitākere land without the leave of the High Court. The High Court made an extended order for a five year period commencing in February 2019.[2] Mr Mawhinney appealed from that decision to the Court of Appeal. His appeal was allowed to the extent that the term of the order was reduced to three years.[3] The order accordingly expires in February 2022.
Background
[2]Auckland Council v Mawhinney [2019] NZHC 299 (Hinton J) [HC judgment].
[3]Mawhinney v Auckland Council [2021] NZCA 144 (Brown, Gilbert and Katz JJ) [CA judgment].
An extended order under s 166(4) may be made “if, in at least 2 proceedings about any matter in any court or tribunal, the Judge considers that the proceedings are or were totally without merit”.[4] As the Court of Appeal did, we refer to the two or more proceedings relied on by the Council as the “candidate” proceedings.
[4]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 167(2). See also ss 167(4)–(6).
The High Court Judge treated the application as applying to proceedings brought by Mr Mawhinney in his own right or in his capacity as trustee and so did not consider proceedings brought by companies associated with Mr Mawhinney. Three candidate proceedings were identified. The Judge concluded that all three were “totally without merit”.[5] The statutory threshold having been met, the Judge, in determining that an extended order should be made, identified a range of factors justifying that course. The Judge said these factors were all evident in each of the candidate proceedings and included the following: the fact that despite the history of his litigation, Mr Mawhinney has paid “no mind to forcing the Council to incur further costs” and has “largely failed to pay any costs orders and has been rendered bankrupt twice as a consequence”;[6] he “continually brings proceedings about…
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- Case
- [2021] NZSC 122
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether Mr Mawhinney had a reasonable prospect of success in appealing the Court of Appeal's decision. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether Mr Mawhinney's application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal should be allowed. The Court also considered whether the case involved questions of general or public importance or general commercial significance that warranted the Court’s consideration. The Court examined the nature of the proceedings and whether there was an appearance of a miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court held that there were no reasonable prospects of a successful appeal because the Court of Appeal's interpretation of "totally without merit" as meaning "bound to fail" was correct. The Supreme Court found that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the other matters raised did not involve questions of general or public importance or general commercial significance. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The Court also dismissed Mr Mawhinney's application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal, as it was unduly prolix and would still have insufficient prospects of success even if amended. The Court ordered Mr Mawhinney to pay the Council's costs of $2,500.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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