Marsman, Bleidistel and THK Trustees Limited v Nijrake

Link copied
Case Copied 7 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA267/2008
[2009] NZCA 30

BETWEENWILLEM ROBERT MARSMAN, UTA BLEIDISTEL AND THK TRUSTEES LIMITED


Appellants

ANDROLAND JOHANNES NIJKRAKE


Respondent

Hearing:3 February 2009

Court:Glazebrook, Hammond and O'Regan JJ

Counsel:D J King and C N King for Appellants


S A Barker and B R Balderstone for Respondent

Judgment:23 February 2009 at 4.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is dismissed.

BThe appellants must pay the respondent costs for a standard appeal on a Band A basis and usual disbursements.  We certify for second counsel.

CThe appellants must pay the respondent costs (with regard to each of our decisions in [2008] NZCA 104 and [2008] NZCA 249) for a standard application on a Band A basis and usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Glazebrook J)

Introduction

[1]       In 1994, Dr Marsman and Mr Nijkrake formed a company in British Columbia called Rowi Meat Packers Inc (Rowi), to operate a slaughterhouse in that province.  The venture failed and Dr Marsman left the operation around May 1995. Both Dr Marsman and Mr Nijkrake are Dutch, although Dr Marsman has been based in New Zealand since about 1997.

[2]       Mr Nijkrake alleges that Dr Marsman misappropriated funds from Rowi and claims to be able to trace those funds to a property near New Plymouth owned by Dr Marsman’s family trust.  The appellants are the trustees of that trust.  In January 2007, Mr Nijkrake commenced an action in the Netherlands against Dr Marsman seeking recovery of the funds allegedly misappropriated.  Shortly afterwards he lodged a caveat on the New Plymouth title.

[3]       The trustees initiated the procedure under s 145A of the Land Transfer Act 1952.  On 26 September 2007 Mr Nijkrake successfully obtained an order sustaining his caveat in the New Plymouth High Court from Associate Judge Gendall.  The trustees now appeal against that decision and seek to have the caveat lapse. 

The parties’ arguments

[4]       The parties agree that, in order to have the caveat lapse, the trustees must show that Mr Nijkrake does not have a reasonably arguable case in support of his caveat.  The parties also agree that the applicable law is the law of British Columbia. 

[5]       Against that background, the trustees argue that Mr Nijkrake’s caveat over the trust’s property near New Plymouth cannot stand because:

(a)Mr Nijkrake’s underlying claim to a constructive trust over monies alleged to have been misappropriated by Dr Marsman has effectively been statute-barred and extinguished under the governing law of British Columbia.

(b)There is little or no evidence of an assignment by Rowi of its misappropriation claims against Dr Marsman to Mr Nijkrake, which is necessary in order for Mr Nijkrake to proceed against Dr Marsman and to maintain the caveat over the trust’s property.

[6]       Mr Nijkrake argues that the caveat should be maintained pending the outcome of the substantive proceeding in the Netherlands because:

(a)It is arguable that Mr Nijkrake is not yet “fully aware” of the extent of the fraudulent…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Marsman, Bleidistel and THK Trustees Limited v Nijrake and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] NZCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Marsman, Bleidistel and THK Trustees Limited v Nijrake, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand dismissed the appeal brought by the appellants, the trustees of a family trust, against the decision of the New Plymouth High Court that sustained the caveat lodged by Mr Nijkrake on the trust's property. Mr Nijkrake alleges that Dr Marsman, one of the trustees, misappropriated funds from a company called Rowi Meat Packers Inc, and seeks to trace those funds to the property near New Plymouth. The trustees sought to have the caveat lapse, arguing that Mr Nijkrake's claim was statute-barred and that there was insufficient evidence of an assignment of claims from Rowi to Mr Nijkrake.

The central legal issue was whether Mr Nijkrake had a reasonably arguable case in support of his caveat. The Court found that the trustees could not successfully argue that Mr Nijkrake's position was not reasonably arguable, as there was conflicting expert evidence on the limitation period, and insufficient evidence to determine the validity of the assignment. The Court held that the trustees had not discharged the evidential burden to prove the invalidity of the assignment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs for the appeal and related applications.

Background

Background to the litigation

In 1994, Dr Willem Robert Marsman and Roland Johannes Nijkrake formed Rowi Meat Packers Inc, a company operating a slaughterhouse in British Columbia. The venture failed and Dr Marsman left the operation around May 1995. Nijkrake alleges that Dr Marsman misappropriated funds from Rowi and claims to be able to trace those funds to a property near New Plymouth owned by Dr Marsman’s family trust, THK Trustees Limited. In January 2007, Nijkrake commenced an action in the Netherlands against Dr Marsman seeking recovery of the funds allegedly misappropriated. Shortly afterwards he lodged a caveat on the New Plymouth title. The trustees initiated the procedure under s 145A of the Land Transfer Act 1952. On 26 September 2007 Nijkrake successfully obtained an order sustaining his caveat in the New Plymouth High Court from Associate Judge Gendall. The trustees now appeal against that decision and seek to have the caveat lapse.

The matter came before the Court of Appeal of New Zealand as an appeal from the decision of the New Plymouth High Court which sustained Nijkrake's caveat over the trust’s property. The appeal was heard on 3 February 2009 and the judgment was delivered on 23 February 2009. Prior to the final hearing, the Court had granted the trustees special leave to appeal out of time and allowed them to adduce further evidence. The costs for these applications were reserved pending the outcome of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. When did the limitation period begin to run under the Limitation Act 1996 of British Columbia?
2. Did certain payments made by Dr Marsman amount to "confirmation" of Nijkrake’s cause of action so as to start the limitation period running afresh?
3. Was the assignment of claims from Rowi to Nijkrake invalid under the law of British Columbia?

Held
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellants must pay the respondent costs for a standard appeal on a Band A basis and usual disbursements. Additionally, they must pay the respondent costs for a standard application on a Band A basis and usual disbursements for two prior applications.
3. The assignment of claims from Rowi to Nijkrake is considered valid under the law of British Columbia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal considered the arguments presented by both the appellants and the respondent regarding the caveat on the property in New Plymouth. The appellants argued that the respondent’s claim was statute-barred under the Limitation Act 1996 of British Columbia and that the assignment of claims from Rowi to the respondent was invalid. The respondent countered that the claim was arguable, that the limitation period had been refreshed by certain payments, and that the assignment was valid. The Court found that the appeal could not succeed unless the trustees proved that the respondent’s case was not reasonably arguable, a standard that was not met given the conflicting expert opinions on the limitation period and the lack of evidence on the invalidity of the assignment.

Regarding the limitation period, the Court held that it could not determine the precise moment when the respondent became fully aware of the alleged misconduct. The experts for both parties offered opposing views, and the Court was unable to resolve this conflict on the basis of the evidence presented. Consequently, the Court concluded that the respondent’s position was reasonably arguable.

On the issue of confirmation, the Court again noted the conflicting expert opinions. The appellants' expert argued that partial payments did not constitute confirmation, while the respondent’s expert contended that any payment could restart the limitation period. The Court found it impossible to hold the respondent’s claim as not reasonably arguable based on this disagreement.

Finally, concerning the validity of the assignment, the Court determined that the draft opinion provided by the appellants' solicitor was insufficient to establish invalidity. The Court emphasised that if the appellants wished to challenge the assignment's validity, they needed to provide evidence to support their claim, which they failed to do. Thus, the assignment was deemed valid.

In summary, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the maintenance of the caveat, ordering the appellants to pay the respondent’s costs for the appeal and the two prior applications.