Malcolm Edward Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Incorporated
[2015] NZSC 121
•4 August 2015
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 51/2015 [2015] NZSC 121 |
| BETWEEN | MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON |
| AND | TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 4 August 2015 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for recall is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Mr Rabson applies for recall of this Court’s decision in Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand.[1] In that decision, this Court declined an application for leave to appeal against a decision of Randerson J upholding the decision of the Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal refusing to dispense with security for costs.[2]
[1]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand [2015] NZSC 111.
[2]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc [2015] NZCA 188.
Mr Rabson submits that this Court in its decision did not address his proposed ground of appeal which was that Randerson J erred when he said that this Court’s decision in Reekie v Attorney-General[3] required the Deputy Registrar to make an assessment of the merits of the proposed appeal. Mr Rabson submits that this is contrary to the rule of law.
[3]Reekie v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 63, [2014] 1 NZLR 737.
This Court dealt with the role of the Registrar in Reekie. It noted that the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 give the dispensing power to the Registrar.[4] The Court recognised that the Registrar will not always be well placed to perform this task, given that the test for dispensation can include an assessment of merit.[5] The Court commented, however, that the Registrar “will simply have to do the best that he or she can”.[6] The Court recommended that the Rules Committee reconsider the rules.[7] In the meantime, however, the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules must be complied with. In any event, Randerson J himself reviewed the prospects of success of the appeal, which he described as “low”.[8] Randerson J’s approach was therefore correct.
[4]At [17].
[5]At [35].
[6]At [21].
[7]At [22].
[8]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc, above n 2, at [7]. He was required to assess this: see at [23] and [28] of Reekie v Attorney-General, above n 3.
The application for recall is dismissed.
Solicitors:
Chapman Tripp, Wellington for Respondent
3
3
0