Malcolm Edward Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Incorporated

[2015] NZSC 121

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 51/2015
[2015] NZSC 121

BETWEEN	MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON Applicant
AND	TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED Respondent

Court:	Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person D R Kalderimis and K E Yesberg for the Respondent
Judgment:	4 August 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

1. Mr Rabson applies for recall of this Court’s decision in Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand.[1]  In that decision, this Court declined an application for leave to appeal against a decision of Randerson J upholding the decision of the Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal refusing to dispense with security for costs.[2]

   [1]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand [2015] NZSC 111.

   [2]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc [2015] NZCA 188.

2. Mr Rabson submits that this Court in its decision did not address his proposed ground of appeal which was that Randerson J erred when he said that this Court’s decision in Reekie v Attorney-General[3] required the Deputy Registrar to make an assessment of the merits of the proposed appeal.  Mr Rabson submits that this is contrary to the rule of law.

   [3]Reekie v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 63, [2014] 1 NZLR 737.

3. This Court dealt with the role of the Registrar in Reekie.  It noted that the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 give the dispensing power to the Registrar.[4]  The Court recognised that the Registrar will not always be well placed to perform this task, given that the test for dispensation can include an assessment of merit.[5]  The Court commented, however, that the Registrar “will simply have to do the best that he or she can”.[6]  The Court recommended that the Rules Committee reconsider the rules.[7]  In the meantime, however, the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules must be complied with.  In any event, Randerson J himself reviewed the prospects of success of the appeal, which he described as “low”.[8]  Randerson J’s approach was therefore correct.

   [4]At [17].

   [5]At [35].

   [6]At [21].

   [7]At [22].

   [8]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc, above n 2, at [7]. He was required to assess this: see at [23] and [28] of Reekie v Attorney-General, above n 3.

4. The application for recall is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Chapman Tripp, Wellington for Respondent