Lewis v Mason and Meltzer

Case [2009] NZSC 103


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 71/2009
[2009] NZSC 103

BETWEENCONWAY LEWIS


First Applicant

ANDJOHANNA LEWIS


Second Applicant

ANDKAREN BETTY MASON AND JEFFREY PHILIP MELTZER AS LIQUIDATORS OF GLOBAL PRINT STRATEGIES LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)


Respondents

Court:Blanchard, Tipping and Wilson JJ

Counsel:P J Davey for Applicants


C A Murphy for Respondents

Judgment:14 October 2009 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500 to the respondents.

REASONS

[1]        This is a proposed appeal against orders made under ss 300 and 301 of the Companies Act 1993 requiring the appellants to contribute the sum of $560,000 to the assets of a company in liquidation, they having been directors of the company and having been found to have breached their duty to it under s 135 of the Act (reckless trading).  The applicants have benefited from an earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal in this proceeding[1] in which, as the Court of Appeal has now confirmed, the maximum liability of the applicants was capped at $560,000.  That was because the liquidators at the earlier time sought no more than that amount.  That ruling did not, however, prevent the liquidators from establishing that the level of the company’s indebtedness to which the liquidators’ claim related was higher than $560,000.

[1]      Mason v Lewis [2006] 3 NZLR 225.

[2]        Three issues are sought to be raised by the appeal to this Court.  The first concerns the size of the relevant indebtedness.  The Court of Appeal has said that this was approximately $1.7m in the case of Mr Lewis and $1.3m in the case of Mrs Lewis, she having resigned as a director earlier than him.  It is said that the Court of Appeal erred in including a secured creditor’s claim for post-liquidation interest.  However, it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was entirely correct on this point.  There would be no logic in excluding such ongoing interest which is part of the loss suffered by creditors.  It is beside the point that because of the liability cap of $560,000 the unsecured creditors will not benefit.  In principle, the post-liquidation interest should form part of the creditors' pool for the purpose of assessing the liability of an errant director.  The proposed argument for the applicant has no merit.

[3]        The second issue raised for the applicants is whether the Court of Appeal erred in considering that the conduct of the applicants contributed to causing the creditors’ losses.  The argument appears to be precluded by a finding concerning causation made in the first appeal.  But, in any event, it is plain that if the applicants had properly performed their directors’ duties the losses very probably would not have occurred.  If they had given proper attention to the affairs of the company they would surely have appreciated that it was incurring unsustainable losses.  We agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeal[2]  that the applicants could then have taken steps to ensure that further debts were not incurred.

[2] [2009] NZCA 306 at para [82].

[4]        The third complaint by the applicants is that their culpability was less than that of the director who committed frauds and should not have been assessed as a

60% responsibility for the additional indebtedness.  But whilst that argument might possibly have some substance, the existence of the cap on liability has the result that the quantum of the award is, in the case of both applicants, already a great deal less than 60% of the relevant indebtedness and we are not persuaded that, given the total neglect of their duties by the applicants, this Court would or should make the substantial adjustment which would be needed in order to alter the result reached in the Court of Appeal.

[5]        No arguable point of public or general importance is raised nor is there any appearance of a miscarriage of justice.

Solicitors:

Gill, Coutts & Co, Auckland for Applicants

Shieff Angland, Auckland for Respondents


Details
AGLC
Lewis v Mason and Meltzer [2009] NZSC 103
Case
[2009] NZSC 103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lewis v Mason and Meltzer was heard in the Supreme Court of New Zealand, with Conway Lewis and Johanna Lewis being the applicants and Karen Betty Mason and Jeffrey Philip Meltzer acting as liquidators of Global Print Strategies Limited. The applicants sought to appeal against the orders made under sections 300 and 301 of the Companies Act 1993, which required them to contribute $560,000 to the company's assets due to their breaches of duty as directors under section 135 of the Act. The applicants had previously benefited from a Court of Appeal judgment that capped their maximum liability at $560,000. The primary issues for the Supreme Court to determine were the size of the relevant indebtedness, whether the applicants' conduct contributed to the creditors' losses, and the applicants' culpability in comparison to the other director who committed frauds.

In addressing the first issue, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's determination that the post-liquidation interest should be included in the creditors' pool for assessing the liability of the errant directors. The Court found that excluding such interest, which forms part of the loss suffered by creditors, would be illogical, even though the liability cap of $560,000 meant that unsecured creditors would not benefit from it. The second issue, concerning the applicants' conduct and its contribution to the creditors' losses, was considered in light of the finding made in the first appeal. The Court of Appeal had already established that if the applicants had properly performed their duties, the losses likely would not have occurred. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the applicants could have taken steps to prevent further debts if they had paid proper attention to the company's affairs. Lastly, regarding the applicants' culpability in comparison to the other director, the Supreme Court observed that even though the applicants' argument might have some merit, the existing cap on liability meant that their quantum of the award was significantly less than 60% of the relevant indebtedness. Given the applicants' total neglect of their duties, the Court was not persuaded that it should make substantial adjustments to the result reached by the Court of Appeal.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that no arguable point of public or general importance was raised and that there was no appearance of a miscarriage of justice. The Court ordered the applicants to pay $2,500 in costs to the respondents.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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