| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 33/2024 [2024] NZSC 68 |
| BETWEEN | LISA ROCHELLE LEWIS |
| AND | HAMILTON COSMOPOLITAN CLUB INCORPORATED |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Ellen France and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 18 June 2024 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.
___________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Introduction
Ms Lewis brought proceedings in the District Court for nuisance against her neighbour, the Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Incorporated (the Club). She succeeded in part and was awarded damages of $10,000.[1]
[1]Lewis v Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Inc [2022] NZDC 1569 (Judge Cameron) at [23].
The Club’s appeal to the High Court was allowed. The judgment in favour of Ms Lewis was quashed and the Club’s counterclaim against Ms Lewis for trespass was granted.[2] The High Court dismissed Ms Lewis’ subsequent application for leave to appeal against its decision.[3]
[2]Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Inc v Lewis [2022] NZHC 2555 (Brewer J) at [84]–[86].
[3]Lewis vHamilton Cosmopolitan Club Inc [2023] NZHC 154 (Brewer J) at [11].
The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Lewis’ application to bring a second appeal.[4] It declined an application for recall of that decision.[5]
[4]Lewis v Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Inc [2023] NZCA 484 (French and Brown JJ) at [27].
[5]Lewis v Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Inc [2024] NZCA 82 (French and Ellis JJ) at [6].
Ms Lewis then filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court. This was accepted by the Registry as an application for leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court.
Background
Ms Lewis rents a property next to the Club’s car park.[6] Vehicular access to her property is only possible through that car park. Until 2017 the Club allowed Ms Lewis to access the property, but the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Various incidents and complaints followed.
[6]The Hamilton Cosmopolitan Club Incorporated used to own the property Ms Lewis rents but it was subdivided and sold. Ms Lewis has occupied the rental property since 2013.
The Club served a trespass notice on Ms Lewis in September 2020 and in November 2020 erected a large metal fence preventing her from accessing her property. The Police brokered an agreement so that Ms Lewis could access her property through a slightly different route to before but still involving the car park.
Relations between the parties continued to deteriorate, however, resulting in the District Court proceedings.
Our assessment
Under s 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, this Court must not give leave to appeal directly to it against a decision made by a court other than the Court of Appeal unless the leave criteria in s 74 are met and there are exceptional circumstances that justify taking the proposed appeal directly.[7]
[7]See also the comments of this Court in Burke v Western Bay of Plenty District Council [2005] NZSC 46 at [4]; Clarke v…
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- Case
- [2024] NZSC 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether Ms Lewis should be granted leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision, bypassing the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court noted that under section 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, it must not grant leave to appeal directly unless the leave criteria in section 74 are met and there are exceptional circumstances justifying a leapfrog appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the leave criteria were not satisfied, as the appeal did not raise issues of general or public importance nor was there a risk of a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, nothing raised by Ms Lewis met the exceptional circumstances threshold required for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed Ms Lewis' application for leave to appeal and ordered her to pay the Club's costs of $2,500. This decision effectively upholds the previous rulings that favoured the Club, affirming the dismissal of Ms Lewis’ claims for nuisance and the grant of the Club’s counterclaim for trespass.
Background
Background to the litigation
The proceedings began when Ms Lewis filed a claim for nuisance against the Club in the District Court, where she was awarded damages. The Club appealed the District Court's decision to the High Court, which allowed the appeal, quashed the District Court's judgment, and granted the Club's counterclaim for trespass. Ms Lewis then applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but this application was dismissed. Subsequently, Ms Lewis filed an application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The Supreme Court accepted the application but ultimately dismissed it.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether leave to appeal should be granted to the Supreme Court directly from the High Court decision, bypassing the Court of Appeal.
2. Whether the leave criteria in section 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 are met, and if so, whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying a leapfrog appeal.
3. Whether the proposed appeal raises issues of general or public importance or presents a risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Held
1. The application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the High Court decision was dismissed.
2. The leave criteria in section 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 were not met, and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying a leapfrog appeal.
3. The proposed appeal did not raise issues of general or public importance or present a risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court, in assessing Ms Lewis' application for leave to appeal directly from the High Court's decision, relied on section 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016. This section stipulates that leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a decision of another court, other than the Court of Appeal, is not granted unless the leave criteria in section 74 are met and there are exceptional circumstances justifying the leapfrog appeal. The Court considered the leave criteria in section 74, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria as it pertained to the specific and unusual circumstances of the case, which did not raise broader issues of general or public importance nor did it present a risk of a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the Court concluded that nothing raised by Ms Lewis met the exceptional circumstances threshold needed for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court referred to previous decisions, such as Burke v Western Bay of Plenty District Council, Clarke v R, White v Auckland District Health Board, and Cook v Housing New Zealand Corp, which emphasized the need for exceptional circumstances for leapfrog appeals. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Ms Lewis was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500.