| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA848/2011 [2012] NZCA 247 |
| BETWEEN DAVID LEE |
| AND CHUN HEE RYANG |
| AND AUCKLAND COUNCIL |
| Court: Glazebrook, Randerson and Wild JJ |
| Counsel: Applicant in person |
| Judgment: 14 June 2012 at 2.30 p.m. (On the papers) |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicant must pay costs to both the first and second respondents as for a standard application on a band A basis with usual disbursements.
___________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Randerson J)
Introduction
The applicant Mr Lee applied for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court delivered on 28 September 2011.[1] In that judgment, Fogarty J dismissed Mr Lee’s appeal against a determination by the Weathertight Homes Tribunal finding Mr Lee liable to the first respondent for $427,655.04 as damages for the first respondent’s leaky home. Mr Lee was found to be liable in tort as the project manager at the time of construction of the home. The second respondent was found to be jointly liable with Mr Lee to the first respondent.
[1] Lee v Ryang HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-2779, 28 September 2011.
Fogarty J subsequently declined leave to appeal to this Court.[2]
The jurisdiction issue
[2] Lee v Ryang HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-2779, 7 December 2011.
The respondents submit that there is no jurisdiction for this Court to entertain an appeal by virtue of s 95(2)(b) of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 which provides that the determination of the High Court on appeal from the Weathertight Homes Tribunal is a “final determination” of a claim under the Act. That submission is well-founded. This Court held in Osborne v Auckland Council[3] that there is no further right of appeal to this Court in such circumstances. On that basis alone, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.
Other grounds
If there were a right of appeal, s 67(2) of the Judicature Act 1908 would apply. Under that section, leave will not be granted unless the appeal raises some question of fact or law capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving some interest, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal.[4]
[4] Snee v Snee (1999) 13 PRNZ 609 (CA) and Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA).
Mr Lee has not identified any question of law or fact which would justify the grant of leave to appeal under s 67(2) of the Judicature Act. The thrust of his proposed appeal is that he should not have been found liable because he had no contractual agreement with the owner whereby he took responsibility for the quality of the building; other contractors who directly caused the loss were not found liable; and other people from whom…
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- Case
- [2012] NZCA 247
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The respondents argued that the Court's jurisdiction was limited by s 95(2)(b) of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006, which states that the determination of the High Court on appeal from the Weathertight Homes Tribunal is final. The Court of Appeal referred to Osborne v Auckland Council, which established that there is no further right of appeal to the Court of Appeal in such circumstances. Consequently, the Court held it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Furthermore, even if the Court had jurisdiction, the appeal did not meet the criteria set out in s 67(2) of the Judicature Act 1908. Mr Lee's proposed grounds for appeal did not identify any questions of law or fact of sufficient importance to warrant a further appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Lee's application for special leave to appeal, finding no grounds for the appeal. The Court held that Mr Lee had not identified any question of law or fact that could justify the grant of leave to appeal. The Court concluded that if it had jurisdiction, the application would have been dismissed on the basis of the settled principles applicable under s 67(2) of the Judicature Act. The Court further found that the issues were clear and narrowly defined, allowing it to decide the application on the papers. As a result, Mr Lee was ordered to pay costs to both respondents on a band A basis with usual disbursements.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered Mr Lee to pay costs to both respondents as for a standard application on a band A basis with usual disbursements.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter began with an appeal to the High Court against a Weathertight Homes Tribunal determination, which found Mr Lee liable for damages to the leaky home. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, and Mr Lee applied for special leave to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand. The Court of Appeal heard the application on the papers and subsequently dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the High Court's decision on the basis of section 95(2)(b) of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006?
2. Does the appeal raise any question of fact or law capable of bona fide and serious argument under section 67(2) of the Judicature Act 1908?
Held
1. The Court of Appeal does not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the High Court's decision on the basis of section 95(2)(b) of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The appeal does not raise any question of fact or law capable of bona fide and serious argument under section 67(2) of the Judicature Act 1908. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court. The High Court had dismissed Mr Lee's appeal against a determination by the Weathertight Homes Tribunal, which found Mr Lee liable for damages due to a leaky home. The respondents argued that there was no jurisdiction for the Court of Appeal to entertain the appeal, as the High Court's decision was a final determination under section 95(2)(b) of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006. The Court of Appeal agreed with this submission, as it had previously held in Osborne v Auckland Council that there is no further right of appeal in such circumstances. Additionally, even if there were jurisdiction, the application for leave to appeal would still be dismissed under section 67(2) of the Judicature Act 1908, as the appeal did not raise any question of fact or law capable of bona fide and serious argument. Mr Lee had not identified any legal principle that would justify the grant of leave to appeal, and the Court found that Mr Lee had a non-delegable duty of care, which was in line with settled law. The Court also noted that Mr Lee's liability as the project manager did not depend on contractual relationships and was unaffected by the liability (or lack of it) of others.