Lee v Composite Cladding and Signage Manufacture and Installations Limited
[2013] NZHC 1652
•2 July 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-5491 [2013] NZHC 1652
UNDER s 72 of the District Courts Act 1947
IN THE MATTER OF an appeal from the decision of the District
Court dated 16 August 2012
BETWEEN OLIVIA LEE Appellant
ANDCOMPOSITE CLADDING AND SIGNAGE MANUFACTURE AND INSTALLATIONS LIMITED Respondent
Hearing: (on the papers)
Counsel: G J Beresford and A Gormack for the Appellant
D L Marriott and R G Espie for the Respondent
Judgment: 2 July 2013
JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J (Costs)
This judgment was delivered by me on 2 July 2013 at 4:00 p.m. pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 1985.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……………………………………
Counsel / Solicitors:
Mr G J Beresford and Mr A Gormack, Grimshaws, Solicitors, Auckland
Mr D L Marriott, Barrister, Auckland
Mr R G Espie, Solicitor, Whangaparaoa
LEE v COMPOSITE CLADDING AND SIGNAGE MANUFACTURE AND INSTALLATIONS LIMITED [2013] NZHC 1652 [2 July 2013]
[1] The appeal was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.[1] The parties have been unable to agree on quantum. There are two issues:
[1] Lee c Composite Cladding and Signage Manufacture and Installations Limited [2013] NZHC 354.
(a) The appellant submits that the respondent is not entitled to some items claimed, as they are not steps specified in schedule 3 of the High Court Rules or otherwise justified.
(b)The appellant requested copies of the invoices from the respondent’s counsel and solicitor to confirm that scale costs did not exceed actual costs. The respondent, notwithstanding a Court direction to produce copies of invoices, has not fully complied.
[2] The appellant has also sought an order that the costs judgment not be enforced for 9 months.
Schedule 3 steps
[3] The respondent has claimed some schedule 3 steps that apply to a civil proceeding initiated in the High Court in addition to matters specified for appeals (items 52-58). The respondent is not entitled to the following:
(a) Commence defence: schedule 3, step 2: $3,980. This does not apply to an appeal. However, the respondent is entitled to an allowance for step 53, “commencement of response to appeal”, in a sum of $995.
(b) Preparation for the first case management conference: step 10: $796.
This could apply, as specified in step 54 of schedule 3 (which is a cross-reference to step 10 in schedule 3). However, the appellant submits that this item should not be allowed because the memorandum for the first case management conference was prepared on behalf of the appellant. The respondent has not challenged this.
(c) There is a claim of $2,985 for submissions with reference to step 24 in schedule 3. This applies to a civil proceeding commenced in the High
Court, not to an appeal. This item is not allowed. In any event, it is covered by the respondent’s claim for $5,970 for preparation, which is not challenged. (The reference in the respondent’s claim is to step 33 which applies to a High Court civil proceeding, but there is the same allowance for an appeal in step 56.)
(d) There is a claim of $2,985 for second counsel at the appeal hearing.
This appeal does not justify an award for second counsel.
[4] Consequently, the scale costs allowed for the appeal are as follows:
$ Step 53: commencement of response 995.00
Step 54: appearance at callover 398.00
Step 56: preparation of written submissions 5,970.00
Step 57: appearance of principal counsel 5,970.00
$13,333.00
[5] There is also a claim for costs on the appellant’s unsuccessful interlocutory application to adduce further evidence on the appeal. I agree with Mr Beresford’s submission that there is no basis for the claim for $4,975 for an affidavit. There is also no justification for the costs for sealing an order.
[6] Costs on the interlocutory application are:
$ Step 23: opposition 1,194.00
Step 24: submissions 2,985.00
Step 25: appearance 497.50
$4,676.50
[7] The total is, therefore:
$ Interlocutory 4,676.50
Substantive appeal 13,333.00
$18,009.50
[8] The respondent has also claimed a disbursement of $184.80 for travelling expenses. This appears to be an expense for junior counsel and also includes cost in travelling to Whangarei in respect of a different proceeding between these parties. This disbursement claim is disallowed.
Respondent’s invoices for legal costs
[9] Mr Espie, for the respondent, has advised in the most recent memorandum that Mr Marriott’s fees have been paid, but an invoice for Mr Espie’s costs had not been rendered at the date of the memorandum. A copy of Mr Marriott’s invoice should be produced. As advised in my earlier minute, a party paying costs is entitled to see the invoices to confirm that scale costs do not exceed actual costs, unless there is some good reason for not producing a copy. Mr Espie has not advanced any reason for not producing a copy.
[10] The order that the appellant pay costs of $18,009.50 is conditional upon the respondent providing the appellant with copies of the invoices for the respondent’s costs on the appeal. To avoid any doubt, I confirm that there is no liability for the appellant to pay costs until copies of the invoices have been produced. Upon production of copies of the invoices the appellant is forthwith to notify the Court and the respondent, by memorandum, whether there is any further issue in respect of costs. If there is no further issue, then liability for costs will arise subject to deferral of execution dealt with in the next section of this judgment. If there is an issue the question of commencement of liability will be dealt with in a subsequent order.
Deferral of execution of costs judgment
[11] The appellant seeks an order pursuant to High Court r 17.3(3) that no enforcement process be issued in respect of the costs judgment for a period of 9 months. Reference is made to Hamilton v Papakura District Council.[2] The respondent has not challenged this application.
[2] Hamilton v Papakura District Council HC Auckland CP391/95, 22 March 1999.
[12] The grounds for the application are financial hardship. In addition, I consider that the appellant has been put to unnecessary cost in responding to the respondent’s application for costs. As will be apparent from the discussion of quantum some items should not have been claimed. On the other hand a delay of 9 months seems excessive. The period is based on the time allowed in Hamilton v Papakura District Council, but the costs award in that case was much higher. There has also been delay by the respondent in pursuing costs, with the most recent memorandum for the respondent having been filed on 6 June 2013 (with a response for the appellant in a memorandum dated 18 June 2013), so that the appellant has already had some 4 months since the judgment.
[13] Weighing these matters against the respondent’s entitlement to be paid its costs within a reasonable time, I order that no enforcement process may be issued for payment for 3 months after whichever of the following dates is later:
(a) The date on which the respondent sends to the appellant’s solicitors invoices for costs from the respondent’s counsel and solicitor if those costs exceed scale costs awarded in this judgment and are not otherwise queried by the appellant; or
(b)If those scale costs exceed actual costs, and any issue arises in that regard, the date on which the issue is resolved by further Court order.
Observation
[14] The Court should not have been drawn into determining the issues of quantum and production of invoices. They are straightforward matters which, on the
basis of the memoranda filed, have been unnecessarily complicated by the approach
adopted on behalf of the respondent.
Woodhouse J
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