Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1
[2025] NZHC 2793
•25 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-1011
[2025] NZHC 2793
UNDER the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 IN THE MATTER
of an appeal against a penalty decision of
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal
BETWEEN
TAE WOK KWON
Appellant
AND
AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1
Respondent
Hearing: 11 September 2025 Appearances:
Appellant in person
M J Hodge for respondent
Date of judgment:
25 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 25 September 2025 at 3.30pm.
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Counsel:
M J Hodge, Barrister, Auckland
Copy to:
Appellant
KWON v AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 [2025] NZHC 2793 [25 September 2025]
[1] Tae Wok Kwon appeals against the 22 April 2025 decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal),1 censuring Mr Kwon and suspending him from practice for two months for his wilful contravention of s 147 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act) (relevantly requiring him to provide information to the Auckland Standards Committee 1 (the Committee)).2
Background
[2]Mr Kwon practices as a barrister with an immigration practice.
[3] By order of 19 June 2023, the Committee required Mr Kwon to provide it particular information in relation to a specified client.3 Mr Kwon refused to produce the information as “protected by lawyer client privilege”.4 Even after the Committee suggested the information sought was “not generally of the type that are subject to legal professional privilege”,5 Mr Kwon persisted in his refusal until finally providing some information on 16 September 2024 for the Tribunal’s 22 November 2024 liability hearing.6
[4] The Tribunal found “Mr Kwon’s [obdurate] and repeated refusal to provide the information reasonably sought … a wilful breach”, constituting misconduct under the Act’s s 7(1)(a)(ii).7
Decision under appeal
[5] The Tribunal identified the question for determination on its subsequent penalty hearing was “whether any penalty, short of suspension, would properly fulfil the purposes of the [Act]”.8 It recorded, while Mr Kwon initially appealed against the liability decision:9
1 Auckland Standards Committee 1 v Kwon [2025] NZLCDT 23 [penalty decision].
2 Auckland Standards Committee 1 v Kwon [2024] NZLCDT 44 [liability decision]. Mr Kwon’s suspension was stayed pending determination of this appeal: Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1 HC Auckland CIV-2025-404-1011, 7 May 2025 (minute of Andrew J) at [5].
3 Liability decision, above n 2, at [13].
4 At [15].
5 At [22].
6 At [23].
7 At [56]–[57].
8 Penalty decision, above n 1, at [3].
9 At [6]–[7].
Subsequently he abandoned his appeal, and, through his counsel expressed his contrition. He then took significant steps to seek support and assistance in the management of his practice in future.
But the Tribunal considered:10
These “eleventh hour” steps cannot affect the level of seriousness of the conduct, which was accepted by his counsel to be serious, and which meant the starting point for consideration of penalty was most definitely a period of suspension.
The Committee referred to comparable impositions of short terms of suspension.11
[6] The Tribunal assessed Mr Kwon’s misconduct was aggravated by a previous finding of unsatisfactory conduct, characterised by “Mr Kwon’s lack of cooperation with the process”.12 It gave him “considerable credit” for his “relatively recent” change of approach demonstrated by discontinuance of his appeal against the liability decision,13 albeit with “some concerns about the level of his insight into his misconduct”.14 It also considered Mr Kwon’s eventual provision of the information sought was mitigatory, even if done “under a rather perverse interpretation of a Tribunal ruling”.15
[7] The Tribunal considered “the need for general and specific deterrence in this case to be significant”, by reference to “the importance of maintaining the integrity of the disciplinary process”16 and its need:17
… to ensure retention of the public’s confidence in the profession by the imposition of a meaningful penalty when a practitioner fails to respect and abide by the directions of his professional body’s disciplinary institutions.
10 At [8].
11 At [9]–[13], referring to Wellington Standards Committee 1 v Mason [2025] NZLCDT 19 (three months); Waikato Bay of Plenty Standards Committee v Bellamy [2024] NZLCDT 43 (four months); Auckland Standards Committee 2 v Burton [2023] NZLCDT 23 (two months); Auckland Standards Committee 4 v Kennelly [2022] NZLCDT 46 (two months); and Auckland Standards Committee 2 v Name Suppressed [2018] NZLCDT 19 (four months).
12 At [14].
13 At [16].
14 At [17].
15 At [20].
16 At [26].
17 At [28].
[8] For those reasons, the Tribunal held “the seriousness of this conduct must demand a period of suspension”, which—taking account of “the ‘least restrictive intervention’ principle”—it determined to be for two months, to take effect from 6 May 2025 “in order to allow the practitioner time to make arrangements for his clients’ representation in that two-[week] period”.18 It also would censure Mr Kwon “to remind [him] of his professional responsibilities and to act as a marker for any future disciplinary processes that might arise”.19 Costs orders also would follow “particularly given [Mr Kwon’s] conduct at the proceedings”,20 but the Tribunal declined to impose any restriction on Mr Kwon’s practice as sought by the Committee on grounds “the intervention of … supervision and the narrow ambit of Mr Kwon’s practice mean that such an order is not necessary in this particular case”.21
[9] Mr Kwon argues against his suspension on grounds his suspension was unnecessary for public protection. He disputes the Tribunal was entitled to take his previous unsatisfactory conduct into account. He submits the cases relied on by the Tribunal are distinguishable and his suspension gave inadequate weight to his rehabilitation and was not the least restrictive penalty necessary.
[10] Mr Kwon also contended the penalty decision failed to recognise his misconduct, “[w]hile ultimately mistaken, … was not without reasonable basis in law”. In oral submission, he added he was misled by the Tribunal’s advice to him his failure to comply with its s 147 order may result in his being “fined up to $25,000”, as to which he “made choice of taking the risk of penalty [as] less damaging … to [his] reputation and the professional integrity”.22 He seeks the Tribunal’s order for suspension be quashed and substituted with “a fine”.
18 At [30].
19 At [30].
20 At [31].
21 At [32].
22 The Committee’s s 147 order initially was issued under cover of the New Zealand Law Society, Auckland Branch’s (the Society) letter dated 24 May 2023. The order required Mr Kwon’s provision of the sought information by 2 June 2023. On 7 June 2023, noting Mr Kwon had not responded at all, the Society advised:
Please note that the request for information under section 147 of the Act is a mandatory requirement and failure to comply constitutes a summary offence under section 262 of the Acr, for which a person found liable on summary conviction may be fined up to $25,000.00.
Approach on appeal
[11] This is a general appeal. It is conducted by way of rehearing.23 Mr Kwon must satisfy me the Tribunal was wrong; only if I consider the appealed decision is wrong may I interfere with it, but I must make my own assessment of the merits of the case.24 On hearing the appeal, I may confirm, reverse, or modify the Tribunal’s decision.25
Discussion
[12] Although Mr Kwon’s submissions on appeal sought to re-engage with the propriety of his conduct—as I then explained to him, his appeal against the liability decision having been abandoned—I must accept the liability decision as at least inferentially expressing the Tribunal’s satisfaction it was proved on the balance of probabilities Mr Kwon was guilty of misconduct in wilfully breaching the Committee’s order for provision of information.26
[13] The orders then available to the Tribunal do not extend to any “fine”,27 which is the penalty for the offence of obstructing execution of (among others) s 147 powers,28 obtained in criminal proceedings commenced in the District Court.29
[14] The Tribunal’s decisions are not such criminal proceedings. Rather, in addition to powers of a Standards Committee on final determination of a complaint (which include to “make an order censuring or reprimanding the person to whom a complaint relates”),30 the “full range” of penalties available to the Tribunal under s 242 applicable here, “rank[ed] in hierarchy”:31
… run from an order that the practitioner’s name be struck off the roll;32 an order the practitioner be suspended for such period not exceeding 36 months;33 an order the practitioner not practise on their own account until authorised to
23 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 253(3).
24 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [4]–[5].
25 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 253(4).
26 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 241.
27 Section 242.
28 Section 262
29 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 14.
30 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, ss 156 and 242(1)(a).
31 Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2025] NZHC 2106 at [20]–[21].
32 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 242(1)(c).
33 Section 242(1)(e).
do so;34 … and an order that the practitioner pay a penalty not exceeding
$30,000.35 The orders for striking off, cancelling the registration, or suspending a practitioner are subject to further conditions set out at s 244(2) of the Act.
[15] In Daniels v Complaints Committee 2 of the Wellington District Law Society, a full court of this Court confirmed:36
It is well known that the Disciplinary Tribunal’s penalty function does not have as its primary purpose punishment, although orders inevitably will have some such effect. The predominant purposes are to advance the public interest (which include “protection of the public”), to maintain professional standards, to impose sanctions on a practitioner for breach of his/her duties, and to provide scope for rehabilitation in appropriate cases. Tribunals are required to carefully consider alternatives to striking off a practitioner. If the purposes of imposing disciplinary sanctions can be achieved short of striking off then it is the lesser alternative that should be adopted as the proportionate response. That is ‘the least restrictive outcome’ principle applicable in criminal sentencing. In the end, however, the test is whether a practitioner is a fit and proper person to continue in practice. If not, striking off should follow. If striking off is not required but the misconduct is serious, then it may be that suspension from practising for a fixed period will be required.
…
A suspension is clearly punitive, but its purpose is more than simply punishment. Its primary purpose is to advance the public interest. That includes that of the community and the profession, by recognising that proper professional standards must be upheld, and ensuring there is deterrence, both specific for the practitioner, and in general for all practitioners. It is to ensure that only those who are fit, in the wider sense, to practise are given that privilege. Members of the public who entrust their personal affairs to legal practitioners are entitled to know that a professional disciplinary body will not treat lightly serious breaches of expected standards by a member of the profession.
… The consideration of whether to suspend or not requires wider consideration of all the circumstances. The real issue is whether this order for suspension was an appropriate and necessary response for the proven misconduct of the appellant having regard not only to the protection of the public from the practitioner but also to the other purposes of suspension.
[16]The full court continued:37
The starting point is fixed according to the gravity of the misconduct, and culpability of the practitioner for the particular breach of standards. Thereafter, a balancing exercise is required to factor in mitigating circumstances and
34 Section 242(1)(g).
35 Section 242(1)(i).
36 Daniels v Complaints Committee 2 of the Wellington District Law Society [2011] 3 NZLR 850 (HC) at [22] and [24]–[25].
37 At [28]–[29], [32] and [57].
considerations of a practitioner. Obviously, matters of good character, reputation and absence of prior transgressions count in favour of the practitioner. So, too would acknowledgement of error, wrongdoing and expressions of remorse and contrition. For example, immediate acknowledgement of wrongdoing, apology to a complainant, genuine remorse, contrition, and acceptance of responsibility as a proper response to the Law Society inquiry, can be seen to be substantial mitigating matters and justify lenient penalties … .
On the other side of the coin, absence of remorse, failure to accept responsibility, showing no insight into misbehaviour, are matters which, whilst not aggravating, nevertheless may touch upon issues such as a person's fitness to practise and good character or otherwise.
…
A Tribunal, when determining ultimate fitness to remain in practise, whether limited by suspension, or by striking off, is entitled to review the entire conduct of the practitioner and transgressions the subject of the disciplinary proceedings, and the general behaviour of the practitioner. It cannot regard poor behaviour as justifying more severe penalties, but it is the obvious absence of a mitigating factor and relevant to balancing matters of character.
…
Orders for striking off or suspension provide “public protection” because the practitioner cannot practise. But it must not to be overlooked that whilst protection of the public is of course a matter of “public interest”, the latter concept covers a far wider ambit than simply protection. It is in the interests of the profession that the public have confidence in the disciplinary process by which a profession deals with its members.
[17] Accordingly, in Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1), Venning J explained (in refusing the practitioner leave to appeal from his Honour’s substantive decision):38
Once it is accepted, as it must be, that suspension is an available penalty for wilful (or reckless) breach of a Standards Committee order, then ultimately the question becomes one of fact, whether in the particular circumstances of the case before the Court it was appropriate for the Tribunal (and the Court on appeal) to make an order for suspension, and if so the length of that suspension.
… Fundamentally the issue is a case specific inquiry. Was a period of suspension an appropriate penalty in all the circumstances of [the] case?
I adopt that approach here.
38 Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1), above n 31, at [23]–[24].
[18]Venning J’s substantive decision recorded:39
I consider deterrence, both individual and general, to be an important factor in this case. As noted, for the above reasons, I agree with the Tribunal’s conclusion that [the practitioner’s] wilful failure to comply with the orders was relatively serious misconduct. It showed disrespect for her professional institutions.
Practitioners must respect disciplinary orders. The disciplinary process and authority of Standards Committees must not be undermined. In Hart v Auckland Standards Committee 1 of New Zealand Law Society, this Court held:40
… Any deliberate refusal by a practitioner to comply with a lawful requirement made by a Standards Committee tasked with investigating a complaint must be regarded as serious. It indicates a lack of candour that may be significant when considering the fitness of a practitioner to remain in the legal profession.
Further, as the Tribunal noted in Auckland Standards Committee 2 v Burton: “without respect and observance of the mechanisms to maintain professional standards, the system falls down”.41 There must be an appropriate response to a wilful non-compliance with an order such as the Training Order in this case.
[19]The Judge upheld the practitioner’s suspension as:42
but:43
… necessary to emphasise that practitioners must comply with orders of the Standards Committee and that it is not open for the practitioner to effectively seek to negotiate a different or, from their point of view, more appropriate outcome.
Ultimately, I consider that while suspension was necessary, three months was an excessive penalty having regard to the gravity of [the practitioner’s] conduct overall, her personal history and her professional obligations. I consider the need to reinforce the importance of complying with orders of the Standards Committee can be met by a short term of suspension of one month. A one-month suspension makes the point that practitioners must comply with such orders, but will reduce the impact on [the practitioner] personally, and on her clients generally. To assist [the practitioner] to organise her commitments, the order for suspension is deferred to commence 1 August 2025.
39 Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2025] NZHC 1978 at [126]–[128].
40 Hart v Auckland Standards Committee 1 of New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZHC 83, [2013] 3 NZLR 103 at [208].
41 Auckland Standards Committee 2 v Burton [2023] NZLCDT 23 at [25].
42 Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1), above n 39, at [138].
43 At [139].
[20] Mr Kwon’s established misconduct plainly engages penalties’ ‘predominant purposes’ identified in Daniels.44 I consider those can be met here with a penalty short of striking his name off the roll of barristers and solicitors of the High Court. In Mr Kwon’s specialised and independent circumstances, prohibition of practice on his own account (pending the Tribunal’s authorisation) is inapposite. But I do not consider he is a fit and proper person simply to continue in practice at some financial price, effectively buying his way out of misconduct. Such would be to undermine the public interest in due regulation of the profession.45 That accordingly leaves only suspension.
[21] Lawyers’ compliance with Standards Committee orders is not negotiable. Mr Kwon’s refusal to provide the sought information deprived the Committee of the information it required for its investigation. In that sense, his misconduct is more grave than of the practitioner in Mason, who sought to negotiate the content of that Standards Committee’s ordered “practical training or education”.46
[22] Mr Kwon’s general behaviour in response to the Committee’s order and the Tribunal’s proceeding, including on appeal, strongly suggests he rejects the legitimacy of the Committee’s regulatory role in relation to his practice. Such limited insight is substantially aggravating, and may have lifted the available period of suspension above the lenient two months imposed by the Committee. But there is no cross-appeal. I therefore confirm the Committee’s decision and will vacate stay of the Committee’s ordered suspension and dismiss the appeal.
[23] The Committee’s original suspension would have taken effect two weeks after its penalty decision,47 (as did Venning J’s decision, two weeks after upholding that appeal).48 Referring to the two to three-month lifecycle of his immigration instructions, Mr Kwon sought any suspension be deferred for three months. For the Committee, Mr Hodge reluctantly would allow one month.
44 At [15] above.
45 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 242(1)(g).
46 Section 156(1)(m).
47 Penalty decision, above n 1, at [30].
48 At [19].
[24] Suspension from practice is to have disciplinary substance. It is not for practitioners to seek to order their affairs to avoid discipline’s impact. If notice of suspension is required to be reasonable, then—comparatively with contractual notice—that should be no more than a period sufficient to make alternative arrangements for the legal services being suspended.49
[25] I have no insight into the stages of Mr Kwon’s present instructions. I expect the Committee may already have or be able to obtain such information. I will direct the parties file (desirably joint) memoranda contending for an appropriate commencement date for Mr Kwon’s two-month suspension.
Result
[26]The appeal is dismissed.
[27] Within three working days of the date of this judgment, Mr Kwon is to file and serve a memorandum stipulating suspension’s proposed commencement date, for any response by the Committee within two working days of service. I then will decide Mr Kwon’s suspension’s commencement date on the papers, to vacate the stay.
Costs
[28]Mr Kwon is to pay the Committee 2B costs and reasonable disbursements.
—Jagose J
49 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZSC 26, [2007] 3 NZLR 169 at [4], citing Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1963] AC 74 (PC) at 99.
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