Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1

[2025] NZHC 2901

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-1011

[2025] NZHC 2901

UNDER

the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006

IN THE MATTER

of an appeal against a penalty decision of

the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal

BETWEEN

TAE WOK KWON

Appellant

AND

AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1

Respondent

Hearing:

On the papers

Appearances:

Appellant in person

M J Hodge for respondent

Date of judgment:

2 October 2025

SUPPLEMENTARY JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

This supplementary judgment was delivered by me on 2 October 2025 at 3.30pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel:
M J Hodge, Barrister, Auckland

Copy to:
Appellant

KWON v AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 [2025] NZHC 2901 [2 October 2025]

[1]                 My 25 September 2025 judgment1 dismissed Mr Kwon’s appeal against the 22 April 2025 decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal),2 censuring Mr Kwon and suspending him from practice for two months for his wilful contravention of s 147 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (relevantly requiring him to provide information to the Auckland Standards Committee 1 (the Committee)).3 The Tribunal’s suspension of Mr Kwon from practice was stayed pending determination of his appeal.4

[2]My judgment also explained:5

The Committee’s original suspension would have taken effect two weeks after its penalty decision … . Referring to the two to three-month lifecycle of his immigration instructions, Mr Kwon sought any suspension be deferred for three months. For the Committee, Mr Hodge reluctantly would allow one month.

Suspension from practice is to have disciplinary substance. It is not for practitioners to seek to order their affairs to avoid discipline’s impact. If notice of suspension is required to be reasonable, then—comparatively with contractual notice—that should be no more than a period sufficient to make alternative arrangements for the legal services being suspended.

and, observing I had “no insight into the stages of Mr Kwon’s present instructions”, sought the parties’ “desirably joint” nomination of “an appropriate commencement date for Mr Kwon’s two month suspension”.6

[3]                 I then would “decide Mr Kwon’s suspension’s commencement date on the papers, to vacate the stay”.7 This is that decision.

[4]                 Mr Kwon continues to seek the commencement date for his two-month suspension from practice be deferred by a further three months, citing the need to complete instructions for clients on “around 10 moving files for clients who are applying for visas or related works”. He says such instructions typically require “a few weeks to a few months” of his “ongoing attendances”. Mr Kwon says “[i]t is not easy”

1      Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1 [2025] NZHC 2793.

2      Auckland Standards Committee 1 v Kwon [2025] NZLCDT 23 [penalty decision].

3      Auckland Standards Committee 1 v Kwon [2024] NZLCDT 44 [liability decision].

4      Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1 HC Auckland CIV-2025-404-1011, 7 May 2025 (minute of Andrew J) at [5].

5      Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1, above n 1, at [23]–[24].

6 At [25].

7 At [27].

for his existing clients “to find an alternative service provider in the middle of their application proceedings”. The Committee responds Mr Kwon has provided no evidence to “support such a long delay” and prefers to retain the Tribunal’s original two-week deferral, the Committee’s “reluctant” prior concession of a one-month deferral now demonstrably being “unnecessarily long”. It notes Mr Kwon’s clients have alternative sources of legal advice and representation, even in his specialised field of practice.

[5]                 Despite my judgment’s implicit invitation, I continue to lack any material insight into Mr Kwon’s present instructions. I infer, given their relatively short lifecycle as explained by Mr Kwon, all have arisen since the Tribunal’s decision in April 2025. His professional obligations to his clients—including to “reveal fully all circumstances that might affect their affairs”—thus required him promptly to disclose to these new and any continuing clients his prospective suspension, as being relevant to the matter in which he was engaged by them.8 Inconvenience to those clients then cannot be a substantial consideration for determination of the commencement date. As my judgment indicated,9 a two-week  deferral  is  orthodox,  already  signalled  to  Mr Kwon by the Tribunal, and I see no reason for its further extension (effectively extended in any event by the week elapsed since my judgment dismissing his appeal).

[6]I therefore vacate stay of Mr Kwon’s two-month suspension from practice

from Monday, 20 October 2025.

—Jagose J

8 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, ch 7, referring to McKaskell v Benseman [1989] 3 NZLR 75 (HC) at 87.

9      Kwon v Auckland Standards Committee 1, above n 1, at [23].