| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA400/2016 [2016] NZCA 492 |
| BETWEEN | PRAKASH SUDHIL KUMAR |
| AND | MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION |
| AND | IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL |
| Hearing: | 3 October 2016 |
Court: | Kós P, Harrison and Brown JJ |
Counsel: | R S Pidgeon and R K Nand for Appellant |
Judgment: | 11 October 2016 at 11 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to appeal and commence judicial review proceedings is declined.
BThe applicant must pay the first respondent costs as for a standard application on a band A basis together with usual disbursements.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Kós P)
Mr Kumar is a Fijian citizen. He obtained a New Zealand work permit in 2006 and residence permit in 2007. In part, on the basis of his marriage to a New Zealand citizen, his cousin. The marriage was dissolved after 18 months in 2009. Family members alleged it to be a marriage of convenience. Immigration New Zealand investigated and Mr Kumar was served with a deportation liability notice in October 2014. Mr Kumar appealed the notice to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, but was unsuccessful.
Mr Kumar then sought leave to appeal[1] and commence a judicial review proceeding[2] in the High Court in relation to the decision of the Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the notice. Woodhouse J dismissed that application.[3] Where leave is refused in the High Court, the applicant may reapply to this Court. Mr Kumar so applies.[4]
Grounds upon which leave is sought
[1]Immigration Act 2009, s 245.
[2]Section 249.
[4]Sections 245(1) and 249(3).
There is a degree of disjunct between the original grounds notified and those pursued in Mr Pidgeon’s written submissions. Those submissions advance four grounds:
(a)That the Tribunal erred in rejecting the applicant’s claim that he was the victim of a vendetta and in concluding that he had submitted false information to Immigration New Zealand to obtain a residence permit.
(b)He was not complicit in the misrepresentations associated with his residence permit and that should weigh in his favour on his humanitarian appeal.
(c)The interests of his child and unborn child (to his second wife) should render his humanitarian appeal successful; and
(d)That the scope of the “any other reason” limb of ss 245(3) and 249(6)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009 require this Court’s consideration.
Discussion
The effect of ss 245 (dealing with appeal) and 249(6) (dealing with judicial review) is that in each instance the applicant must establish that the appeal raises a question of law, or the judicial review proceeding raises issues that could not adequately be dealt with by appeal, and which ought to be decided by the High Court because of:
(a)their general or public importance; or
(b)“any other reason.”
As to the first two grounds, it is plain to us that the proposed appeal and judicial review are in substance an attempt…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kumar v Minister of Immigration and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] NZCA 492
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the Court of Appeal needed to decide were whether the Tribunal erred in rejecting Kumar's claims and whether there were grounds for judicial review. Kumar argued that the Tribunal had made errors in rejecting his claims, misconstruing evidence, and not adequately considering his family circumstances. He also contended that the Tribunal had failed to properly apply the "any other reason" provision in the Immigration Act 2009.
The Court of Appeal held that Kumar’s application for leave to appeal and for judicial review did not meet the stringent criteria set by the legislation. The Court found that the Tribunal's factual conclusions were well supported by the evidence and that there was no evidential basis or legal error warranting a de novo rehearing in the High Court. The Court also concluded that the interests of Kumar's children, while important, did not mandate a particular outcome and did not constitute a ground for judicial review. Furthermore, the Court did not find the cumulative impropriety argument persuasive, as the procedural issues raised did not reach the threshold for judicial review. Lastly, the Court declined to address whether the "any other reason" provision applied to Kumar's case, as he had not demonstrated a substantive ground of judicial review with a prospect of success.
In light of the above, the Court of Appeal declined Kumar's application for leave to appeal and to commence judicial review proceedings. Kumar was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as for a standard application on a band A basis, together with usual disbursements.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Kumar first appealed the deportation liability notice to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. He then sought leave to appeal and commence judicial review proceedings in the High Court. The High Court, in a decision dated 29 September 2016, dismissed his application. Dissatisfied with this decision, Mr Kumar applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal and commence judicial review proceedings. The Court of Appeal heard his application on 3 October 2016.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Tribunal err in rejecting the applicant's claim that he was the victim of a vendetta and in concluding that he had submitted false information to Immigration New Zealand to obtain a residence permit?
2. Was the applicant not complicit in the misrepresentations associated with his residence permit, and should this fact weigh in his favour on his humanitarian appeal?
3. Should the interests of the applicant's child and unborn child (to his second wife) render his humanitarian appeal successful?
4. Does the scope of the "any other reason" limb of sections 245(3) and 249(6)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009 require the Court's consideration?
Held
1. The Court declined the application for leave to appeal and commence judicial review proceedings.
2. The Court ruled that the Tribunal did not err in rejecting the applicant's claim that he was the victim of a vendetta and in concluding that he had submitted false information to Immigration New Zealand to obtain a residence permit.
3. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to rely on his lack of complicity in the misrepresentations associated with his residence permit as a factor in his humanitarian appeal.
4. The Court determined that the interests of the applicant's child and unborn child were considered by the Tribunal but did not warrant a reconsideration of the humanitarian consequences.
5. The Court found that there was no need to resolve the scope of the "any other reason" limb of sections 245(3) and 249(6)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009, as the applicant had not demonstrated a substantive ground of judicial review with a prospect of success.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal held that the application for leave to appeal and commence judicial review proceedings was declined, and the applicant was to pay the first respondent's costs. The Court found no error in the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's claim of being a victim of a vendetta and in concluding that he submitted false information to obtain a residence permit. The Tribunal's findings were based on a contested hearing with credible evidence from other witnesses, and the Court saw no evidential underpinning or evaluation error. The Court also noted that the applicant's lack of complicity in misrepresentations did not weigh in his favour on his humanitarian appeal, as the Tribunal had genuinely considered the interests of the applicant's son. Additionally, the interests of the applicant's child and unborn child were considered by the Tribunal but did not warrant a reconsideration of the humanitarian consequences. The Court did not need to resolve the scope of the "any other reason" limb of sections 245(3) and 249(6)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009, as the applicant had not demonstrated a substantive ground of judicial review with a prospect of success. The Court referenced Machida v Chief Executive, Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment and other authorities in its analysis of the appeal and judicial review grounds. The Court also followed Woodhouse J's analysis on the innominate ground for judicial review and "cumulative impropriety," finding that the matters relied on by Mr Kumar did not reach the requisite threshold to amount to a seriously arguable ground of judicial review.