NOTE: REPORTING OF THIS JUDGMENT IS SUBJECT TO S 11B OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA77/2010
[2010] NZCA 169BETWEENNICOLA JANE KIDD
Applicant
ANDSTEPHEN ANTHONY VAN DEN BRINK
First RespondentANDA A P VAN DEN BRINK, K J VAN DEN BRINK, T C H FLEMING AND P FOSTER AS TRUSTEES OF THE HILVERSUM FAMILY TRUST NO. 2
Second Respondents
Hearing:20 April 2010
Court:William Young P, O'Regan and Arnold JJ
Counsel:J McCartney SC for Applicant
I T F Hikaka for First Respondent (appearance excused)
F J Thorp for Second Respondents
Judgment:6 May 2010 at 3 pm
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A We grant leave to appeal.
BCosts are reserved.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by William Young P)
[1] This case concerns a family trust established on 17 January 1990. This was at the instance of Mr Anthony van den Brink who is the father of the first respondent, Mr Stephen van den Brink. Anthony van den Brink’s children, Stephen van den Brink and his four siblings, are the primary beneficiaries but the discretionary beneficiaries include any spouse, widow or widower, child or remoter issue of Stephen van den Brink and his siblings.
[2] Ms Nicola Kidd and Stephen van den Brink started to live together in August 1998. They married in 2001. Their child was born in 2004. They eventually separated in 2006 and the marriage was dissolved in August 2008.
[3] This case concerns Ms Kidd’s attempt to obtain orders in relation to the trust under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. This section is in these terms:
182 Court may make orders as to settled property, etc.
(1)On, or within a reasonable time after, the making of an order under Part 4 of this Act or a final decree under Part 2 or Part 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963, a Family Court may inquire into the existence of any agreement between the parties to the marriage or civil union for the payment of maintenance or relating to the property of the parties or either of them, or any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement made on the parties, and may make such orders with reference to the application of the whole or any part of any property settled or the variation of the terms of any such agreement or settlement, either for the benefit of the children of the marriage or civil union or of the parties to the marriage [or civil union] or either of them, as the Court thinks fit.
...
(3) In the exercise of its discretion under this section, the Court may take into account the circumstances of the parties and any change in those circumstances since the date of the agreement or settlement and any other matters which the Court considers relevant.
(Emphasis added)
[4] Ms Kidd’s application for orders under this section was struck out in the Family Court by Judge Adams in a judgment delivered on 2 July 2009,[1]…
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- Kidd v Van Den Brink [2010] NZCA 169
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- [2010] NZCA 169
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the trust was an ante-nuptial settlement for the purposes of section 182, and if not, whether dispositions of property to the trust made during the currency of the marriage were relevantly post-nuptial settlements. The Court of Appeal noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Ward v Ward established that the section should be applied consistently with the English equivalent. The Court held that the trust was not an ante-nuptial settlement as it was not made in contemplation of, or because of, the particular marriage in question. However, the Court found that it was arguable that dispositions of property to the trust made during the currency of the marriage could be considered post-nuptial settlements for the purposes of section 182.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, considering the post-nuptial settlement argument to be arguable. The Court did not wish to formally restrict leave to this point, given the nature of the appeal provision and the possibility that the case may eventually be the subject of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. A narrow grant of leave at this stage might prove to be an awkward and artificial stricture on later consideration of the case.
The Court reserved costs.
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