Kereama v Accident Compensation Corporation

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2016-485-464 [2017] NZHC 1466

UNDER

the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 and

the Declatory Judgments Act 1908

BETWEEN

MARGARET KEREAMA Applicant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

First Respondent

AND

VICKI THOMSON Second Respondent

CIV-2017-485-97

UNDER  the Accident Compensation Act 2001

BETWEEN  MARGARET KEREAMA Applicant

ANDACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

Hearing: 29 May 2017

Appearances:

A Beck for Applicant
PA McBride for First Respondent
M Richards for Second Respondent

Judgment:

29 June 2017

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

[1]      Ms  Kereama  suffered  an  injury  for  which  she  had  cover  and  specific entitlements under the Accident Compensation Act 1982.  The detail and timing of

the injury is not relevant to the applications before me.   She was found to have a

MARGARET KEREAMA v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2017] NZHC 1466 [29 June

2017]

15 per cent loss of bodily function and received a lump sum payment as was her entitlement under that Act.

[2]     On 19 May 1999, Ms Kereama was reassessed for the purposes of an independence allowance under the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992.  This was the relevant Act in force at the time and the allowance was a new entitlement.

[3]      The Corporation found that Ms Kereama was not entitled to an independence allowance.  The reassessment found her bodily function impairment had reduced to

10 per cent, and, since she had received (lump sum) compensation on the basis of

15 per cent impairment under the 1982 Act, she had no further entitlements under the new Act.

[4]      Nearly 16 years later, in 2015, Ms Kereama sought a review of that 1999 determination.  By then, the 1992 Act (under which, as I have said, the reassessment was done) had also been repealed.  The new Act in force in 2015 was the Accident Compensation Act 2001.   On receipt, the Corporation advised Ms Kereama that it could not accept her application for review because it had not been lodged within three months of the date of the reassessment as required by s 89 of the 1992 Act.

[5]      The Corporation was nonetheless bound to give the application to a reviewer despite considering that there was no jurisdiction, pursuant to s 137 of the 2001 Act. It duly arranged for the second respondent to decide whether she had jurisdiction to hear the review.   And on 3 September 2015, the second respondent affirmed the Corporation’s decision that there was no jurisdiction.   That decision in turn was appealed under s 149 of the 2001 Act to the District Court, and that Court again confirmed that there was no jurisdiction to entertain a review on the merits of the

1999 decision because of the time limits in s 89 of the 1992 Act.1

[6]      The matter has now come before me via two procedural pathways.  The first is an application by Ms Kereama for special leave to appeal on a question of law, the

decision of the District Court (leave having already been declined in that Court);2 and the second…

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Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 1466
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Margaret Kereama brought an action against the Accident Compensation Corporation and Vicki Thomson, the independent reviewer, seeking to overturn the denial of her application for review of the 1999 reassessment of her independence allowance under the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. The Corporation had determined that she was not entitled to the allowance, finding her bodily function impairment had reduced to 10 per cent, and that since she had received compensation on the basis of 15 per cent impairment under the Accident Compensation Act 1982, she had no further entitlements under the 1992 Act. Ms Kereama sought a review of that decision in 2015, but the Corporation declined to accept her application for review because it had not been lodged within three months of the date of the reassessment as required by section 89 of the 1992 Act. The Corporation was nonetheless bound to give the application to a reviewer, pursuant to section 137 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, who affirmed the Corporation’s decision that there was no jurisdiction. The District Court again confirmed that there was no jurisdiction to entertain a review on the merits of the 1999 decision because of the time limits in section 89 of the 1992 Act.

The legal issues before the court were whether the provision controlling time for lodging an application for review was section 89 of the 1992 Act, which permitted no extension of time, or section 135 of the 2001 Act, which allows an application for review to be filed after the three-month period if there are extenuating circumstances. The court held that section 135 did not apply to Ms Kereama’s case because the decision in question was made under the 1992 Act and her review application was not filed before 1 July 1999. Instead, the relevant provision was section 89 of the 1992 Act, and Ms Kereama was out of time. The court dismissed both the application for judicial review and the application for leave to appeal on a question of law.

The court's reasoning was that section 391 of the 2001 Act, which contains transitional provisions relating to entitlements provided by the Corporation where the original cover or entitlement decision was made under a prior Act, specifies the procedures for review and appeal of decisions made under former Acts. The court found that the Corporation's decision was made under the 1992 Act and not under Part 11 of the 2001 Act, which deals with decisions made after the 2001 Act came into force. Therefore, section 135 of the 2001 Act did not apply, and the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The court also dismissed the application for leave to appeal on a question of law, finding that the question raised was insufficiently arguable to warrant a grant of leave.

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