Hawke v Accident Compensation Corporation

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA395/2014
[2015] NZCA 189

BETWEEN

DIANE HAWKE
Appellant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent

Hearing:

30 April 2015

Court:

Harrison, Keane and Wylie JJ

Counsel:

P Schmidt and H Peart for Appellant
C J Hlavac for Respondent

Judgment:

22 May 2015 at 10.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is dismissed. 

BThe answer to the question of law for this Court is as follows:

The District Court, not the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority, has jurisdiction to determine an appeal against a decision of the Accident Compensation Corporation made pursuant to s 53(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001.

C        There is no order for costs.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Wylie J)

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Diane Hawke, appeals a decision given by Woolford J in the High Court.[1]  The Court allowed an appeal against a decision of the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority (the Authority)[2] and held that an appeal from a decision made under s 53(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (2001 Act) lies to the District Court and not to the Authority.

    [2]Hawke v Accident Compensation Corp [2012] NZACA 10.

  2. Mrs Hawke obtained leave from Woolford J to appeal to this Court.  The question of law for this Court was refined in discussions with counsel.  It is as follows:  

    Does the District Court or the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority have jurisdiction to determine an appeal against a decision of the Accident Compensation Corporation made pursuant to s 53(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001?

Factual background

  1. In February 1978 Mrs Hawke suffered multiple injuries in a motor vehicle accident.  Her injuries were covered under the Accident Compensation Act 1972 and this was accepted by the Accident Compensation Corporation (the “Corporation”).  At the time of the accident Mrs Hawke was employed as a pilot.  She was initially unable to continue in employment and she received what was then known as earnings related compensation until late 1978 when she returned to work. 

  2. Mrs Hawke had various jobs thereafter, although she had ongoing difficulties maintaining employment because of the effects of the injuries she had suffered.  In 1982 she became self-employed as an interior designer, initially as a sole trader, and then later through a limited liability company. 

  3. On 9 May 2003 Mrs Hawke applied for what had become known as weekly compensation, backdated to the date when she had returned to work in late 1978 and ceased receiving earnings related compensation.  In support of her application she provided the Corporation with all of the medical documentation that she held.

  4. On 7 December 2004 the Corporation issued a decision confirming payment to Mrs Hawke of weekly compensation for the period 1991 to 1998, where the medical documentation established that Mrs Hawke had taken time off work due to her injuries.  Mrs Hawke subsequently applied to review the Corporation’s decision. Her review was unsuccessful and she did not seek to…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZCA 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hawke v Accident Compensation Corporation involves the interpretation of legislative provisions governing the review of claims made to the Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation). The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the Court was tasked with determining the correct legal framework for the review of a claim declined by the Corporation on the basis of lateness. The appeal in question was brought by Mrs Hawke, who sought to have her claim for weekly compensation backdated, against the Corporation’s decision to decline her claim as being lodged outside the statutory time limit.

The legal issues before the Court revolved around the applicability of sections 145 and 149 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, and how they interact with section 354 of the Workers Compensation (Historic Claims) Act 2001. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a decision made by the Corporation under section 53(2) of the 2001 Act, which declines a claim due to lateness, should be reviewed under the 2001 Act or the earlier legislation. The Court also had to determine the jurisdiction of the relevant reviewing body in this context.

In resolving these issues, the Court noted that section 354 of the 2001 Act applies to all claims for cover or entitlements received after 1 April 2002, and that this section removes such decisions from part 11 of the Act. The Court found that the Corporation’s decision under section 53(2) is a decision made under the 2001 Act, and that any appeal from a reviewer’s decision must be to the District Court, as provided for in part 5 of the 2001 Act. The Court concluded that the Authority lacks jurisdiction to consider the application of section 53(2) and that the review and appeal process outlined in the 2001 Act must be followed. This interpretation was consistent with the statutory framework and the purpose of the 2001 Act.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales ultimately dismissed Mrs Hawke's appeal, affirming the decision of the District Court. The Court held that the Authority had no jurisdiction to review the Corporation’s decision under section 53(2) of the 2001 Act, and that the appeal process set out in part 5 of the 2001 Act must apply. The Court further held that the District Court has jurisdiction to review the Corporation's decision, and that the earlier legislation does not apply in this context.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, s 149, in pt 5 of the Act, materially provides as follows:149 Who may appeal against review decision(1) A claimant may appeal to a District Court against—(a) a review decision; or(b)a decision as to an award of costs and expenses under section 148.(2) The Corporation may appeal to a District Court against—(a) a review decision; or(b)a decision as to an award of costs and expenses under section 148.… The key findings made by Woolford J relevant to the appeal before this Court were as follows:(a)Section 354 of the 2001 Act applies to all claims for cover, or entitlements, or both, received after 1 April 2002.[11](b)Pursuant to s 354, pt 3 of the 2001 Act applies. Part 3 includes s 48. Mrs Hawke’s application to backdate the weekly compensation falls under s 48(c) as it is a claim for an entitlement.[12](c)Part 3 includes s 53 which allows the Corporation to decline a claim on the grounds of lateness if this prejudices the Corporation’s ability to make a decision on the claim.[13](d)The effect of s 354 is to remove a decision to which s 354 applies from pt 11 of the Act.[14] (e)Where the Corporation’s decision is made under s 53, any appeal from a reviewer’s decision is to the District Court.[15] Counsel’s arguments can be put succinctly. Mr Schmidt for Mrs Hawke submitted that this Court needs to focus on the purpose and nature of the review process under s 145. He argued that all decisions that decline claims for whatever reason are reviewable on their merits under that section. He submitted that such reviews are substantive, investigative and merits based; the reviewer must be able to consider the earlier legislation, where it is relevant to a claim, and any appeal from the reviewer has to be to a body which also has jurisdiction to take into account the earlier legislation. He submitted that the District Court has no jurisdiction to consider the earlier legislation, and that the only body vested with that jurisdiction is the Authority. He then submitted that review and appeal decisions made under the 2001 Act that require the application of earlier legislation must be conducted under the review or appeal procedure set out in the earlier legislation. In his submission, declining an historic claim for cover or entitlements on the basis of prejudice under s 53(2) of the 2001 Act does not alter which review and appeal process applies. Mr Hlavac for the Corporation argued that s 354 of the 2001 Act applies, and that Mrs Hawkes’ claim falls squarely within the ambit of that section. He argued that a decision made by the Corporation under s 53(2), declining a claim because it is lodged late, is a decision under the 2001 Act, and not a decision made under any of the earlier Acts, because s 53 was not included in any of the earlier Acts. On his argument, the Authority has no jurisdiction to consider and apply the provisions of the 2001 Act, because it is a creature of statute and it only has the powers conferred on it by the 1972 and 1982 Acts. He argued that where the Corporation has made a decision under s 53(2) of the 2001 Act, the Authority has no jurisdiction to consider the application of that section, and the appeal process set out in pt 5 of the 2001 Act must apply.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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