Jones v Llanhennock Trust Partnership

Link copied
Case Copied 11 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2020-419-329

[2023] NZHC 833

BETWEEN

GREGORY JOHN JONES

Applicant

AND

LLANHENNOCK TRUST PARTNERSHIP

Respondents

Hearing: 4 April 2023

Appearances:

G J Jones in person (by AVL) D M O’Neill for Respondents

Judgment:

19 April 2023


JUDGMENT OF WYLIE J

(Leave to appeal/stay/security for costs)


This judgment was delivered by Justice Wylie On 19 April 2023 at 2.00 pm

Pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date:…………………………

Solicitors/counsel:
Vosper Law, Cambridge, D O’Neill, Hamilton

Copy to:
Mr G J Jones

JONES v LLANHENNOCK TRUST PARTNERSHIP [2023] NZHC 833 [19 April 2023]

Introduction

[1]There are three applications before the Court:

(a)an application by the applicant, Gregory Jones, for leave to appeal my judgment of 10 August 2022;1

(b)an application by Mr Jones for a stay of my judgment (including my costs judgment)2 while the appeal is heard; and

(c)an application by the respondents for security for costs in respect of a counterclaim brought against them by Mr Jones.

[2]        Before dealing with the applications, I record that Mr Jones took umbrage with aspects of my judgment of 10 August 2022. He was particularly concerned that I referred to and in part relied on judgments given by other Judges which criticise actions he has taken. He was also concerned by my comment that he had breached the obligation imposed by r 13.8 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008. He demanded that I should “state my position”, advise him whether I had any personal knowledge, direct or indirect, of the issues referred to in the affidavits filed, whether I have a close personal relationship with any of the Judges who issued the judgments referred to in my judgment and whether I have had discussions with any Judges about him personally or about any aspects of the litigation in which he is involved.

[3]        I declined to respond to the demands made by Mr Jones. I indicated to him that if there had been anything that required me to recuse myself, I would have done so. I asked Mr Jones to proceed  and deal  with the  applications before  the Court. Mr Jones agreed to do so albeit reluctantly; he asked me to record that he did so under protest and that he was not waiving his entitlement to raise further the issue of my recusal.

[4]I now turn to deal with each of the applications before me.


1      Jones v Hawkins [2022] NZHC 1965.

2      Jones v Hawkins [2022] NZHC 2327.

Leave to appeal

Relevant law

[5]        My judgment of 10 August 2022 was given in relation to an interlocutory application in a civil proceeding—Mr Jones was seeking leave to issue third and subsequent party notices. Leave to appeal is required pursuant to s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016.

[6]        The leave requirement is a filtering mechanism intended to limit the cases which…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Jones v Llanhennock Trust Partnership and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] NZHC 833
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand dealt with three applications in the case of Jones v Llanhennock Trust Partnership. The primary applicant, Gregory Jones, sought leave to appeal the Court's previous judgment, a stay of the judgment pending the appeal, and the respondents were seeking security for costs in relation to a counterclaim brought by Mr Jones. The Court was required to determine whether the applications met the criteria for leave to appeal, whether a stay was warranted, and if the applicants for security for costs had established a credible basis for their request. Justice Wylie examined the arguments presented by Mr Jones and the respondents, and assessed whether the alleged errors were arguable and of sufficient importance to warrant an appeal, as well as evaluating the balance of convenience and public interest in granting a stay. Additionally, the Court considered whether there was credible evidence of Mr Jones' inability to pay the costs if he were to lose the counterclaim. The Court found that Mr Jones had not identified any arguable error of law or fact, and that the alleged errors were not of general or public importance. As such, the application for leave to appeal was declined. The Court also declined the application for a stay, as it found that the balance of convenience did not favour Mr Jones, and that the appeal did not seem to have significant prospects of success. Finally, the Court dismissed the application for security for costs, as it was not satisfied that there was good reason to believe that Mr Jones would be unable to pay the respondents' costs if he were to lose the counterclaim. The Court noted that the evidence presented primarily demonstrated Mr Jones' intransigence rather than an inability to pay.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.