Jones v Hawkins

[2022] NZHC 2327

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2020-419-329

[2022] NZHC 2327

BETWEEN

GREGORY JOHN JONES

Applicant

AND

JANET HAWKINS, AMANDA JANE VOSPER and DESMOND DAVID HAWKINS

Respondents

Hearing:	On the papers
Judgment:	12 September 2022

JUDGMENT OF WYLIE J

(Costs)

This judgment was delivered by Justice Wylie On 12 September 2022 at 3.00 pm

Pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date:…………………………

Solicitors/counsel:
Vosper Law, Cambridge/D M O’Neill, Hamilton

Copy to:
G J Jones

JONES v HAWKINS [2022] NZHC 2327 [12 September 2022]

[1]                  I refer to my judgment issued on 10 August 2022.1 I declined to grant leave to the applicant, Mr Jones, to issue third and subsequent party notices on the proposed additional parties out of time. I recorded that the respondents were the successful parties and that they were entitled to their reasonable costs and disbursements. I put in place a timetable for the filing of memoranda.

[2]                  Mr O’Neill, for the respondents, has sought costs on a 2B basis, in the total sum of $14,937.50. He has annexed a breakdown of the costs sought.

[3]                  Mr Jones has filed a memorandum querying the time allocations claimed by the respondents. He submits that costs should be set at $4,000.

Analysis

[4]                  All matters in relation to costs are at the discretion of the Court.2 The discretion is not however unfettered. It is qualified by the applicable costs rules found in rr 14.2 to 14.10 of the High Court Rules 2016. Any award of costs must be consistent with the principles there established. The costs regime is of a regulatory character and it is trite law that it is important that its integrity be maintained. There is accordingly a strong implication that the Court should apply the costs regime in the absence of some reason to the contrary. Any departure must be a considered and particularised exercise of the discretion.3

[5]                  An award of costs should generally reflect the complexity and significance of the proceeding. Costs are assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate to the time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required in relation to the proceeding. The appropriate daily recovery rate is normally two-thirds of the daily rate considered reasonable in relation to the proceeding.

[6]Here, the respondents have claimed costs on a 2B basis.

1      Jones v Hawkins [2022] NZHC 1965.

2      High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1.

3      Manukau Golf Club Inc v Shoye Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 109, [2013] 1 NZLR 305 at [7] and [16]; and Glaister v Amalgamated Dairies Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 606 (CA) at [21]–[24].

[7]                  Mr Jones does not take issue with this categorisation and I am satisfied that it is appropriate. Category 2 proceedings are proceedings of average complexity requiring counsel of skill and experience considered average in the High Court.4 These proceedings fall into this category. Band B costs are appropriate if a normal amount of time is considered reasonable.5

[8]                  The respondents have applied the schedules contained in the Rules to calculate costs on a 2B basis. As a result, they have claimed for 6.25 days at the scheduled rate

– $2,390 a day.

[9]                  Mr Jones does not deny the time allocations contained in the schedules to the Rules. Rather, he says that in his estimate, counsel for the respondents would have taken less than 10 hours to complete the various tasks undertaken and that in these circumstances, and because the work was “less than taxing”, time and therefore costs should be set at a lower rate than is recognised by the Rules.

[10]              Under r 14.7, the Court can reduce the costs otherwise payable under the Rules if, inter alia, the nature of the proceeding or the step in the proceeding claimed for is such that the time required by the party claiming costs would be substantially less than the time allocated under band A. The Court can also reduce costs if some other reason exists which justifies the Court reducing costs, despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.6

[11]              I am not persuaded that the time estimated by Mr Jones in his memorandum is reasonable. There is nothing to suggest that the time taken by the respondents’ counsel would have been substantially less than the time allocated for each step under band A. In my view, there is nothing to justify a departure from the costs regime established by the Rules.

4      High Court Rules, r 14.3.

5      Rule 14.5(2)(b).

6      Rule 14.7(g).

[12]              Accordingly, I fix costs against Mr Jones, and in favour of the respondents, in the sum of $14,937.50.

Wylie J