IAG New Zealand Limited v Moore

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

 SC 71/2020
 [2020] NZSC 122
BETWEEN

IAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Applicant

AND

GRAEME JOHN MOORE
Respondent

Court:

Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ

Counsel:

C T Walker QC, C M Laband and S K Swinerd for Applicant
C R Carruthers QC, P A Cowey and A J Summerlee for Respondent

Judgment:

13 November 2020

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

B        The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

  1. Mr Moore, the respondent, owns a house in Christchurch, which suffered extensive damage in the 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes.  The estimated reinstatement cost is said to be approximately $2.08 million for the damage caused by the February earthquake and $2.77 million for the damage caused by the June earthquake.  Mr Moore’s house was insured with IAG New Zealand Ltd, the applicant, for accidental loss over the relevant period.  Under the insurance policy, the sum insured is $2.5 million (excluding GST). 

  2. Mr Moore’s claim is that he is entitled to be paid up to $2.5 million for each earthquake event.  That claim turns on the interpretation of the aggregation clause in the insurance policy which, it is common ground, requires that in certain circumstances, losses arising from separate events are aggregated together for the purpose of applying the policy limit.

  3. The parties sought a ruling from the High Court on the preliminary question as to whether it could be said that under the aggregation clause the maximum sum payable was the sum insured.  In the High Court, that question was resolved in favour of IAG.[1]  Mr Moore successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal.[2]  IAG now seeks leave to appeal to this Court.

Background

[1]Moore v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 1549 (Dunningham J) [HC judgment].

[2]Moore v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2020] NZCA 319 (Cooper, Gilbert and Courtney JJ) [CA judgment].

  1. IAG’s limit of liability for accidental loss, the sum insured, generally applies to each successive insured loss occurring during the cover period.  But this general rule is subject to the aggregation clause, cl C2, which relevantly provides that the maximum amount paid is as follows:

    The most that we pay for any loss (or any series of losses caused by one event) is the sum insured shown in the schedule.

  2. “One event” is defined as “a single event or a series of events which have the same cause”. 

  3. In the High Court and Court of Appeal, the parties agreed that aggregation clauses are to be interpreted according to settled principles of contractual interpretation.  The Courts differed in the application of those principles to three issues, namely, whether there was a “series of losses”; if so, whether those losses were caused by a “series of events”; and, if so, whether the series of events had “the same cause”.

  4. In summary, the High Court found that the term “series” did…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZSC 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In IAG New Zealand Limited v Moore, the Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed IAG's application for leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal which held that Mr Moore was entitled to recover the policy limit of $2.5 million for each earthquake that damaged his property in Christchurch. The Court held that the application did not raise a matter of general or public importance or commercial significance. The appeal hinged on the interpretation of the aggregation clause in Mr Moore’s insurance policy with IAG, which sets out the circumstances in which losses arising from separate events are to be aggregated together for the purpose of applying the policy limit. The High Court had found in favour of IAG, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. IAG sought leave to appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of the aggregation clause and its application to the facts of the case. IAG argued that the Court of Appeal had incorrectly interpreted the aggregation clause to require temporal proximity and a common cause, which was not supported by the authorities. IAG also submitted that the Court of Appeal had effectively doubled up on the “same cause” requirement in the policy. However, the Supreme Court found that even if the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the aggregation clause was incorrect, the outcome of the appeal would not change unless this Court were to overturn the factual finding as to causation. As a further factual inquiry into the expert evidence would be necessary to resolve the appeal, the Court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of $2,500.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Graeme John Moore owns a house in Christchurch that suffered extensive damage in the earthquakes on 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011. The estimated reinstatement costs are approximately $2.08 million for the damage caused by the February earthquake and $2.77 million for the damage caused by the June earthquake. Mr Moore's house was insured with IAG New Zealand Limited for accidental loss over the relevant period. The insurance policy had a sum insured of $2.5 million (excluding GST). Mr Moore claimed he was entitled to be paid up to $2.5 million for each earthquake event. This claim hinged on the interpretation of the aggregation clause in the insurance policy, which required, in certain circumstances, that losses arising from separate events be aggregated together for the purpose of applying the policy limit.

The case began in the High Court where Dunningham J ruled in favour of IAG New Zealand Ltd, finding that under the aggregation clause the maximum sum payable was the sum insured. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, where Cooper, Gilbert, and Courtney JJ reversed the High Court's decision in favour of Mr Moore. IAG New Zealand Ltd then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting the term "series of losses" to require temporal proximity.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that a series must have a common cause.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal made a misstep in its reasoning regarding the application of the aggregation clause.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the test for causation to the facts of the case.

Held
1. The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
2. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision in the matter of IAG New Zealand Limited v Moore. The Court was tasked with determining whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of the term "series of losses" and whether there was a requirement for temporal proximity between the events. The Court also examined if the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that a series must have a common cause and whether there was a misstep in the application of the aggregation clause. Furthermore, the Court assessed whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the test for causation to the facts of the case.

In addressing the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting "series of losses" to require temporal proximity. The Court found that while overseas authorities cited by the Court of Appeal did require some connection between the elements of a series, they also acknowledged that the events usually follow each other temporally. The Court found that the Court of Appeal's interpretation of "series of losses" as requiring temporal proximity was inconsistent with the authorities relied upon.

Regarding the second issue, the Court found that the Court of Appeal was incorrect in asserting that a series must have a common cause. The Court noted that the requirement of a common cause is often imposed separately, as in the case of the policy in question. The Court held that all that is required is a linkage between the losses, and the common cause requirement is often a separate criterion.

The Court then examined the third issue and found that the Court of Appeal made a misstep in its reasoning regarding the application of the aggregation clause. The Court of Appeal had stated that "one event" could include a series of events with the same cause, but then proceeded on the incorrect basis that the series of losses had to be caused by the same event. The Court found that this misstep was likely to cause confusion in the application of similar clauses in the future.

Lastly, the Court assessed the Court of Appeal's application of the test for causation to the facts of the case. The Court found that while the Court of Appeal had correctly applied the test for causation, the appeal would ultimately turn on a factual inquiry into the agreed expert evidence. The Court held that such an inquiry would not raise a question of general commercial importance.

In conclusion, the Court found that even if the Court of Appeal's errors were resolved in IAG's favour, the outcome of the appeal would not change unless the Court overturned the factual finding as to causation. As such, the Court held that the criteria for leave to appeal were not met, and the application was dismissed. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the interpretation of "series of losses" does not necessarily require temporal proximity, and a common cause is not a prerequisite for a series. The Court also found that the Court of Appeal made a misstep in its reasoning regarding the application of the aggregation clause.