IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NELSON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHAKATŪ ROHE
CIV-2019-442-67
[2020] NZHC 362
UNDER Section 143 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 IN THE MATTER
of Caveat number 5195680.1
BETWEEN
LESLIE JAMES HOLLYMAN
Applicant
AND
BRUCE DOUGLAS HOLLYMAN AND CAROL JOY HOLLYMAN
Respondents
Hearing: 24 February 2020 Appearances:
S Galbreath for Applicant
L F McDonald for Respondents
Judgment:
3 March 2020
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
This judgment was delivered by me on 3 March 2020 at 3.00pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar 3 March 2020
HOLLYMAN v HOLLYMAN [2020] NZHC 362 [3 March 2020]
[1] Two brothers who farmed in partnership, divided the partnership land between them under a Deed dated 10 June 1992 (“the 1992 Deed”). As a result, the brothers remained neighbours. Under the Deed, one brother granted a right of way to the other, but they fell out over what the Deed meant. As a result of that falling out, the applicant (Leslie) who had the benefit of the right of way, issued District Court proceedings against his brother, Bruce and his wife Carol, seeking specific performance of the 1992 Deed – proceedings being issued in 2003. Those proceedings were settled at a settlement conference and a consent order, which contained some fine tuning of the settlement, was sealed in the District Court on 16 December 2003.
[2] The following year, Bruce and Carol sought to challenge the terms of the consent order claiming it did not reflect the terms of the settlement. That challenge resulted in a judgment in the District Court dated 18 February 2005 in which the learned District Court Judge noted that the terms struck at the settlement conference had been the subject of further negotiation between the parties, including the attachment of a diagram showing where the right of way was to be located. He said that the parties were bound by the agreement they had reached at the end of a period of negotiation and that “[t]he firmest agreement requires giving by all parties to it”.
[3] Under the 1992 Deed, each of the brothers granted the other a first right of refusal in respect of the land that they had divided under the Deed. Leslie considered that Bruce breached this obligation by transferring his property into joint ownership with Carol in December 2000. It seems that Leslie lodged a caveat dated 18 April 2002 in response.
[4]The interest claimed by Leslie under the caveat is:
As granted under an agreement to grant right of way bearing date the 10th day of June 1992 and made between Bruce Douglas HOLLYMAN as landowner and Leslie James HOLLYMAN of Nelson, Watersider, the caveator hereunder, which agreement is binding upon the registered proprietor Bruce Douglas HOLLYMAN and Carol Joy HOLLYMAN.
[5] In September 2019, Bruce and Carol applied to lapse Leslie’s caveat and Leslie has applied to sustain the caveat.
The Deed of 10 June 1992 (“the 1992 Deed”)
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- Case
- [2020] NZHC 362
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the rights Leslie had under the 1992 Deed merged in the consent order, which meant that the caveat could not be sustained as it referred to rights that had been superseded. However, the court held that Leslie was entitled to lodge a new caveat to protect his rights under the consent order. The court rejected the claim of fraud by Carol, as it was not adequately pleaded or evidenced, and dismissed the application to sustain the original caveat.
In summary, the court dismissed Leslie's application to sustain his caveat, but granted him leave to lodge a new caveat to protect his rights under the 2003 consent order. The respondents were awarded costs on a standard basis plus disbursements. The respondents also undertook not to deal with the land in question for 90 days to allow for the lodging of the new caveat and for discussions between the parties.
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