Helsby-Knight v R
[2015] NZCA 315
•21 July 2015 at 3.30 pm
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA261/2015 [2015] NZCA 315 |
| BETWEEN | MICHAEL HELSBY-KNIGHT |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| Hearing: | 1 and 3 July 2015 |
Court: | Winkelmann, Lang and Wylie JJ |
Counsel: | P J Kaye for Appellant |
Judgment: | 21 July 2015 at 3.30 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe appeal against sentence is allowed.
BMr Helsby-Knight’s sentence of three years and four months’ imprisonment is quashed. A sentence of three years and one months’ imprisonment is substituted.
CMr Helsby-Knight is to surrender his bail to the Registrar of the District Court at Manukau by presenting himself to the Customer Service Centre, 30 Manukau Station Road, between 1.00 pm and 3.00 pm on Thursday, 23 July 2015.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Wylie J)
Introduction
Initially this matter came before the Court, at short notice, as an application to vary conditions attached to a grant of bail ordered by Venning J in the High Court on 8 May 2015.[1] Mr Helsby-Knight had been in custody because, on 1 May 2015, he was sentenced by Judge Andrée Wiltens in the Manukau District Court to a term of imprisonment of three years and four months in relation to various fraud-related charges laid pursuant to the Crimes Act 1961.[2] Mr Helsby-Knight appealed this sentence. The appeal was due to be heard in this Court on 22 July 2015. There were a number of potential difficulties with the application to vary bail, and, at counsels’ request and after a two day adjournment to enable counsel to prepare, we heard the substantive appeal against sentence instead.
Background
[1]Helsby-Knight v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2015] NZHC 977.
[2]R v Helsby-Knight [2015] NZDC 7568.
Mr Helsby-Knight was facing 117 charges, all laid indictably under the Crimes Act, in 2012. There were 48 charges of dishonestly, and without claim of right, using a document with intent to obtain pecuniary advantage contrary to s 228(b) of the Crimes Act. There were 69 charges of causing loss to other persons by deception and without claim of right, contrary to s 240(1)(d) of the Crimes Act. All of the offending occurred between July 2011 and mid-2012.
Mr Helsby-Knight initially entered pleas of not guilty. He had a record of fraud-related offending and he was remanded in custody. There was a considerable delay in bringing the charges to trial and Mr Helsby-Knight applied for bail. This initial application was declined by Judge Field in November 2014.[3] Mr Helsby‑Knight appealed that decision. The appeal was allowed and he was granted Electronic Monitoring (EM) bail on a 24-hour curfew and on various other restrictive conditions by Gilbert J on 5 February 2015.[4]
[3]R v Helsby-Knight DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-13672, 7 November 2014.
[4]Helsby-Knight v R [2015] NZHC 85.
On 19 March 2015 Mr Helsby-Knight came before the District Court again. He sought to be released from the condition requiring that his bail be electronically monitored. The police in turn sought to remove a condition imposed by Gilbert J that permitted Mr Helsby-Knight to use a computer for limited purposes. The police asserted that this condition had been breached. Judge Andrée Wiltens declined Mr Helsby-Knight’s application for variation, but did vary the condition imposed by Gilbert J, to require that Mr Helsby-Knight was not to access the internet or use a computer for any purpose.[5]
[5] R v Helsby-Knight [2015] NZDC 4337.
Mr Helsby-Knight then appealed this decision to the High Court. The appeal was heard by Venning J on 27 March 2015, and his decision issued on 15 April 2015.[6] He upheld Judge Andrée Wiltens’ decision declining Mr Helsby‑Knight’s application to delete the condition requiring that the bail be electronically monitored. He varied the condition of bail relating to use of the internet and computers, to better control Mr Helsby-Knight’s activities in this regard.
[6]Helsby-Knight v R [2015] NZHC 702.
The charges came before Judge Andrée Wiltens in the Manukau District Court on 1 May 2015.[7] Mr Helsby-Knight sought a sentence indication. Judge Andrée Wiltens indicated that he would adopt a starting point of three years and six months’ imprisonment for the offending and that he would uplift that starting point by six months to recognise Mr Helsby-Knight’s extensive criminal record of fraud-related offending. He then observed as follows:[8]
I can give you 15 per cent discount for your pleas today ... I will say that the end term will be three years, four months imprisonment. You have been in custody for two and a half years which is more than that, so were you to plead to these matters today, the effect would be that you would not be incarcerated at all. You would be released immediately for time served.
[7]R v Helsby-Knight DC Manukau CRI-2012-004-13672, 1 May 2015.
[8]At [6].
Mr Helsby-Knight immediately entered pleas of guilty to three representative charges — two of using a document to obtain a pecuniary advantage, and one of using a forged document. Judge Andrée Wiltens then proceeded to sentence him without further delay.[9]
[9]R v Helsby-Knight, above n 2.
Following the sentencing, Mr Helsby-Knight was returned to the cells. He was then taken to the Mt Eden Remand Centre for processing through its receiving office. The prison authorities however declined to release him thereafter. They took the view that he either had to serve the sentence imposed or await release by the Parole Board.
Judge Andrée Wiltens had overlooked the fact that the sentence imposed was for more than two years’ imprisonment. As a result, Mr Helsby-Knight could only be released during the term of his sentence by the Parole Board. Although Mr Helsby-Knight had become eligible for parole having served in excess of one third of his sentence, the Parole Board had not made a decision that he should be released on bail.[10]
[10]See Parole Act 2002, s 84(1).
As a consequence of this oversight, Judge Andrée Wiltens’ clear intent at sentencing was frustrated. Moreover Mr Helsby-Knight had entered guilty pleas on an assumption which turned out to be erroneous.
Mr Helsby-Knight promptly applied for habeas corpus. This application came before Venning J on 8 May 2015.[11] He dismissed the application because the committal warrant for Mr Helsby-Knight authorising his detention was valid. Justice Venning did however record that he had sympathy for the position that Mr Helsby-Knight found himself in. He observed as follows:[12]
… It was clearly the intention of the District Court Judge that he not remain in custody. For those reasons ... I propose to accept from [Mr] Helsby-Knight an oral application for leave to appeal against conviction and/or sentence, (leaving that open for Mr Helsby-Knight to take further advice on), and to grant Mr Helsby-Knight bail in the interim pending the hearing of that appeal.
[11]Helsby-Knight v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 1.
[12]At [14].
Mr Helsby-Knight was released on EM bail, on a 24 hour curfew. Justice Venning also directed that Mr Helsby-Knight file a formal application for leave to appeal his conviction and/or his sentence within one week.
Mr Helsby-Knight complied with this latter direction. An application for leave to appeal the sentence imposed was filed on 15 May 2015, not with the High Court, but rather with this Court. The charges had been laid indictably, and the proceedings were commenced before the appeal provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 came into effect. Any appeal lay to this Court.[13]
[13]Crimes Act 1961, s 383; Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 397.
It seems that Venning J may not have had jurisdiction pursuant to the Bail Act 2000 to grant bail to Mr Helsby-Knight.[14] The High Court does however have inherent jurisdiction to grant bail, unless that inherent jurisdiction is displaced.[15] Whether Mr Helsby-Knight had been granted bail by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, and whether this Court has jurisdiction to vary bail granted by the High Court, are moot points. Rather than deal with these essentially peripheral issues, counsel asked us to deal with the substantive appeal against sentence. We agreed to do so, and as noted, adjourned the hearing for two days to enable counsel to prepare.
The offending
[14]Bail Act 2000, s 70. This was the relevant section at the time proceedings were commenced, prior to amendment by the Bail Amendment Act 2011.
[15]Zaoui v Attorney-General [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (SC) at [36]–[37].
Between July and September 2011 Mr Helsby-Knight set up a business from premises located in Ponsonby. He used the name Michael Caughey. He used the premises to conduct much of the offending in issue. In addition, Mr Helsby-Knight employed a number of Chinese-speaking employees to help him put his fraudulent schemes into effect.
The offending fell into three distinct groups. The first group of charges related to a scheme known as the “Canton Trade Fair Scheme”.
Mr Helsby-Knight purchased a database that contained over 3,800 business names, all located in the greater Auckland area. He targeted these businesses by email. In the emails he identified himself as the New Zealand and Australian agent for the Guangzhou and Canton Trade Fair, which was to be held in Guangzhou between October 2011 and April 2012. There was in fact a trade fair being held at that time in Guangzhou. Mr Helsby-Knight represented that he was putting a trade delegation together to attend the trade fair. The email advised interested businesses that their representatives would be flown over to China to attend the trade fair at no cost, with two nights’ free accommodation, in return for permitting various Chinese firms to pitch their products to them. The email advised that a related business entity in China would send airfare vouchers and accommodation vouchers to interested parties.
Mr Helsby-Knight was not an authorised agent for the trade fair organisers and he did not have permission to affiliate himself with the trade fair or to use its logo and associated materials.
A total of 45 individuals paid Mr Helsby-Knight approximately $125 each as a registration fee. In return they received a package, purportedly couriered from China. The outside of the courier package was made to look as though it originated from China, with official-looking stamps and marks on it. It contained four false airline vouchers with a Cathay Pacific aeroplane printed on each, together with documentation printed with the name and logo of the organisers of the Guangzhou trade fair. There were also false accommodation vouchers and a false business card with the trade fair logo on it and the name “Michael Caughey — NZ and Australia agent”. The package also contained blank Chinese visa application forms and a false letter of invitation to the trade fair, which also exhibited its logo.
The false documentation had been created in Ponsonby by Mr Helsby‑Knight.
The total sum defrauded by this scheme was some $5,620.
The second scheme was known as the “Mike Caughey Trading Scheme”.
Mr Helsby-Knight represented that he acted for a Hong Kong‑registered company called “Michael Caughey Trading Company” that imported discounted electronic items such as iPads, iPhones, flat-screen TVs and the like into New Zealand. The prices for these products were listed on a brochure which was provided to potential customers by Mr Helsby-Knight and his associates. Interested customers were required to pay 50 per cent of the purchase price when they placed their orders, with the balance due upon delivery of the goods into New Zealand.
A total of 64 customers accepted these terms.
Mr Helsby-Knight left New Zealand in August 2011. However, his employees remaining in this country continued to take orders and deposits paid continued to go into Mr Helsby-Knight’s personal bank account.
In October 2011 the customers who were awaiting the products they had ordered were sent an email by Mr Helsby-Knight advising that their orders had been delayed by the New Zealand Customs Service. No moneys were refunded to them.
Deposits totalling some $129,027 were paid into Mr Helsby-Knight’s bank account from this fraud. In the days leading up to his departure from New Zealand, Mr Helsby-Knight withdrew $25,000 from his account. The then balance was transferred to one of Mr Helsby-Knight’s associates — a Mr Patel. Mr Patel subsequently transferred $86,270 offshore by wire transfer to Mr Helsby-Knight. In September 2011 Mr Helsby-Knight used ATM machines overseas to continue withdrawing funds to a total of $18,000.
When he was spoken to by the police, Mr Helsby-Knight said that Mr Patel had stolen the money, and that he was not responsible for the frauds. When he was spoken to again by the police a few months later, he denied receiving funds from Mr Patel while he was overseas.
There was a third scheme known as “Foxconn Traders Scheme”.
In June 2012 Mr Helsby-Knight changed his name by deed poll to Foxconn Group plc. He obtained a passport in that name and opened a bank account in the same name with ANZ Bank. An office was opened in Quay Street, Auckland. He also set up an associated website.
Mr Helsby-Knight produced glossy, coloured brochures offering discounted high-end electronic products for delivery in the Auckland area. The brochure was widely circulated. A number of persons placed orders for multiple items, and paid either the total purchase price of the items or a 50 per cent deposit. The moneys went into the Foxconn Group plc account. The goods were never delivered. In July 2012 Mr Helsby-Knight again left New Zealand, this time for Thailand. The moneys in the account were withdrawn through ATMs in Thailand. Persons dealing with Foxconn Group plc lost a total sum of $22,142.
The total loss incurred by participants in all three schemes was some $156,790.
The District Court sentencing decision
As noted above, Judge Andrée Wiltens gave a sentencing indication. He referred to this Court’s decision in R v Varjan.[16]He noted that a large number of people had lost relatively small amounts of money, and that the fraudulent activity in which Mr Helsby-Knight had been involved had extended over a period of more than 12 months. He observed that a number of people had been taken in by the glossy adverts, and that there had been blatant fraud. He also considered that Mr Helsby‑Knight’s previous convictions were relevant. He said that a six month uplift would be appropriate in the circumstances. As already noted, he then indicated that he would give Mr Helsby-Knight a 15 per cent discount for guilty pleas, and that the end sentence would be one of three years and four months’ imprisonment.
[16]R v Varjan CA97/03, 26 June 2003.
The sentence indication was accepted and Mr Helsby-Knight entered guilty pleas to these charges. The sentencing notes are brief. They read as follows:[17]
1.Mr Helsby-Knight, for the reasons that I indicated earlier during the sentence indication hearing I am going to convict you and sentence you to three years four months’ imprisonment on the three charges concurrently.
2.By my reckoning you have more than served that already so it is a time served sentence.
3.As I understand the process that has to be worked out by somebody. That should be done this afternoon hopefully, and if I can get a fine’s report I will remit fines.
4. Under s 347 counts 4 – 117 are dismissed.
Grounds of appeal
[17]R v Helsby-Knight, above n 2.
Mr Kaye noted that Mr Helsby-Knight has spent 27 months in custody, and that he has been on EM bail for five months. He suggested that a starting point of 32 months’ imprisonment was appropriate, and accepted that it should be uplifted by three months, to take account of Mr Helsby-Knight’s prior criminal record. He suggested that Mr Helsby-Knight should be entitled to a discount of four months for the time that he spent on EM bail, and that he should be entitled to a further discount of 15 per cent to recognise his guilty pleas. He argued that this approach would take the end sentence to one of approximately 26 and a half months’ imprisonment, which would broadly equate with the time served.
Mr Kaye took us through the various authorities referred to by the Crown in its written submissions. He discussed the facts in each, and sought to relate them to Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending. He acknowledged that Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending was sophisticated, and that it involved a high level of organisation and premeditation. He did point out however that there was no breach of trust involved. He suggested that a sentence of 26 and a half months would not be “out of kilter” with existing authorities, and that it could be justified in principle.
Mr Downs for the Crown submitted that the offending here in issue requires the Court to undertake a culpability assessment, as discussed in Varjan.[18] He discussed Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending, and commented that it appears to have been committed with considerable industry. He submitted that it was not unfair to describe it as fraud on a commercial scale. He acknowledged that Mr Helsby‑Knight’s offending did not involve a breach of trust, and that the amount defrauded was not particularly high. He nevertheless suggested that a starting point of not less than three years’ imprisonment was required, and suggested that the starting point needs to be uplifted given Mr Helsby-Knight’s existing fraud convictions. He submitted that an uplift of not less than three months’ imprisonment should be imposed to reflect those convictions. He acknowledged that Mr Helsby‑Knight was on EM bail between 5 February 2015 and 1 May 2015, and that he was readmitted to EM bail on 8 May 2015. He accepted that this is a relevant consideration, but that it should at best negate the uplift that would otherwise be appropriate given Mr Helsby-Knight’s prior offending. Mr Downs also acknowledged that Mr Helsby-Knight was entitled to a credit for his guilty plea. He did point out that the prosecution commenced in August 2012, and the guilty pleas were not entered until May 2015. He accepted that the proceedings were delayed by several pre-trial applications, but he argued that a discount of beyond 10–15 per cent of the end sentence could not be sustained. He submitted that a sentence imposed on this basis would correspond, or very nearly correspond, to the time served, but that such “serendipity would also reflect the application of principle”.
Analysis
[18]R v Varjan, above n 16, at [22]–[23].
We record that, at the outset of the hearing, we indicated to Mr Kaye that the Court did not consider that it was constrained by the “time served” approach adopted by Judge Andrée Wiltens. Given the basis on which the pleas had been entered, Mr Helsby-Knight (who was present in Court) was advised that if he wanted to argue that he had pleaded guilty on an erroneous basis, his remedy was to apply to vacate his guilty pleas.[19] Mr Kaye advised that Mr Helsby-Knight elected to proceed with the sentence appeal.
[19]As proceedings were commenced prior to July 2013, this would be pursuant to s 42 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957: a plea of guilty may, by leave of the court, be withdrawn at any time before the defendant has been sentenced or otherwise dealt with.
First, we consider the appropriate starting point.
There is no tariff case for offending of this kind. Rather, such offending requires the court to assess an offender’s culpability. As noted by this Court in Varjan, culpability in cases of this kind falls to be assessed by reference to the circumstances, and factors such as the nature of the offending, its magnitude and sophistication, the type, circumstances and number of victims, the motivation for the offending, the amounts involved, the losses, the period over which the offending occurred, in appropriate cases the seriousness of breaches of trust involved, and the impact on victims. [20]
[20]R v Varjan, above n 16, at [22].
Here Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending involved three distinct schemes — the Canton Trade Fair Scheme, the Mike Caughey Trading Scheme and the Foxconn Traders Scheme. We accept Mr Downs’ submissions that all involved deception, and that the offending was committed with considerable industry. It was fraud on a commercial scale, involving, for example, the leasing of premises, the employment of persons to assist in perpetrating the fraud and the printing of brochures and other misleading and dishonest material. There was significant premeditation and it was offending of some considerable sophistication.
In total 113 victims suffered loss. Individual losses were modest, but the overall profit derived by Mr Helsby-Knight was not. He defrauded in total $156,790. Mr Helsby-Knight was obviously motivated by the pecuniary gain. He used the funds generated by the frauds for his own personal use.
The offending occurred over a lengthy period. It commenced in July 2011, and continued into mid-2012.
Counsel were unable to refer us to any authority directly on point. We were referred to three cases which involved fraud-related offending. They differed from the present case in significant respects. All involved offenders who stole from a single entity, either the Accident Compensation Corporation as in R v Hapuku, or employers as in R v Davis and R v Mears.[21] Davis and Mears involved breaches of trust, and the amounts taken were significantly greater than that taken by Mr Helsby‑Knight. There the starting points imposed were four years’ and four years six months’ imprisonment respectively. In Hapuku, the defendant dishonestly obtained $126,877 from the Accident Compensation Corporation. This Court upheld a starting point of three years and three months’ imprisonment.[22] While these cases are not directly comparable, they suggest that the starting point of three years six months’ imprisonment adopted by Judge Andrée Wiltens was within range.
[21]R v Hapuku [2007] NZCA 368; R v Davis [2009] NZCA 26; R v Mears [2014] NZCA 30.
[22]At [17].
We have considered two additional cases, which were not referred to us by counsel. They reinforce that the starting point adopted by the Judge was not too high. Indeed they suggest that, while it was within range, it was arguably a little low.
In Blackmore v R, the offender pleaded guilty to 18 charges of offending involving dishonesty.[23] He approached people and offered to carry out repairs on their vehicles and/or to sell the vehicles on their behalf. He provided written agreements using various assumed identities. He did not follow through with the promised services. In some cases he secured cash from his victims and in one instance he took a mental health patient out of hospital and withdrew $1,800 using her Eftpos card. In total there were 17 victims, and $63,420 was defrauded from them. The total loss after some vehicles were recovered was $16,395. This Court characterised the offending as not particularly sophisticated, and noted that it did not involve serious breaches of trust. The Court took the view that a starting point of four years was too high, and that three and a half years was more appropriate.[24]
[23]Blackmore v R [2014] NZCA 109.
[24]At [14].
The case we have found to be of most assistance is Silcock v Police.[25]The offender in that case was convicted of 23 charges of either causing a loss or obtaining money by false pretences. He was a self-employed paving contractor. He offered prospective customers an attractive and competitive price. Once the price was accepted, he then sought a down payment of approximately 50 per cent of the total contract price, in cash. Often the customers did not have sufficient cash on them, and the appellant would ask for a cheque or take them to an ATM machine. He then failed to complete the promised work. He also purchased a number of expensive power tools from hardware stores, paying with cheques that he knew would subsequently be dishonoured. Once he obtained the power tools, he took them to second-hand and pawn shops, and sold them for cash. In total the value of the losses from both sets of offending amounted to $29,765. The offending was reasonably protracted. It began in September 2009 and continued through until March 2013. Justice Venning on appeal upheld a starting point of three years’ imprisonment. He cited Cole v Police for the principle that the amount of money lost or dealt in is not determinative of the seriousness of the offence, and noted that some of the victims in the case before him were elderly and others were disadvantaged.[26]
[25]Silcock v Police [2014] NZHC 1515.
[26]Silcock v Police, above n 25, at [15], citing Cole v Police [2001] 2 NZLR 139 (HC) at [12].
In contrast with all of these cases, Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending involved a large number of victims, sophisticated offending and distinct, albeit overlapping, fraudulent schemes. We consider Mr Helsby-Knight’s offending to be more serious than that in any of the cases we have referred to. It is no overstatement to say that Mr Helsby-Knight seems to have treated fraud as his occupation.
We consider that the starting point of three years and six months’ imprisonment adopted by Judge Andrée Wiltens was within, albeit at the lower end of, the available range. It could well have been higher but given the unusual circumstances of the case, we are not minded to increase it.
We now turn to consider whether that starting point should be increased and/or decreased to take into account Mr Helsby-Knight’s personal circumstances.
Mr Helsby-Knight has a number of prior fraud convictions. In particular, he has four convictions for forgery committed in 2004. That offending carried sentences of imprisonment. He committed other incidents of fraud in 1985 and in 1992. There was also offending against the Fair Trading Act 1986 in 2000, and what appears to have been Companies Act 1993-related offending in 2007. Both counsel accepted that an uplift was appropriate. We agree. It is clear that serial dishonesty is not out of character for Mr Helsby-Knight. We uplift the sentence by four months to recognise this. This is slightly less than the uplift imposed by Judge Andrée Wiltens. It takes the sentence to three years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
We accept that Mr Helsby-Knight is entitled to have this starting point discounted, because of mitigating factors personal to him.
First, he was admitted to EM bail on 5 February 2015. The bail was on strict conditions, including a 24-hour curfew. That bail remained in place until 1 May 2015. He was readmitted to bail, on essentially the same terms and conditions, on 8 May 2015. The Sentencing Act 2002 acknowledges that this can be a relevant consideration when sentencing.[27] It does not however fix a formula to recognise this consideration. Nor have the courts done so. Indeed this Court has recently observed as follows:[28]
Mr Niven took us to a number of cases where various discounts had been granted for periods spent on electronic bail. We have found them of no assistance. While the time spent on EM bail acts as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there is no rule about how much of a discount should be given. Section 9(3A) of the Sentencing Act 2002 sets out several factors to be taken into account in determining any discount. However, the level of discount is within the judge's discretion and there is no arithmetical formula that should be applied. On occasions judges in the process of exercising their sentencing discretion will provide for some modest discount under this head. This is what Judge Rea did on this occasion. We see no error in his approach.
[27]Sentencing Act 2002, ss 9(2)(h) and 9(3)(A).
[28]Rangi v R [2014] NZCA 524 at [10] (footnotes omitted).
Judge Andrée Wiltens did not make any allowance for this factor. In our view he should have done so. We consider that a three month discount to recognise the fact that Mr Helsby-Knight was on very restrictive bail for a period of some five months is appropriate. This discount is perhaps generous, but we repeat that the circumstances of this case are very unusual.
Secondly, Mr Helsby-Knight is entitled to a discount for his guilty pleas.[29] In our view the discount of 15 per cent adopted by Judge Andrée Wiltens was broadly appropriate. The guilty pleas saved a lengthy trial — estimated at eight to ten weeks — in the District Court at Manukau. The Crown accepted before us that a discount of up to 15 per cent was appropriate.
[29]Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607.
We allow a discount of six months (14 per cent) from the sentence we would otherwise impose.
It follows that the end sentence is one of three years and one month’s imprisonment. This is three months less than the sentence imposed by Judge Andrée Wiltens. Although the difference is not large, in the particular circumstances of this case we do not consider that we are tinkering by allowing the appeal and reducing the sentence.
Result
The appeal against sentence is allowed.
Mr Helsby-Knight’s sentence of three years and four months’ imprisonment is quashed. A sentence of three years and one month’s imprisonment, in respect of each of the three charges to which he pleaded guilty, is substituted therefore. The sentences are to be served concurrently.
Mr Helsby-Knight is to surrender his bail to the Registrar of the District Court at Manukau by presenting himself to the Customer Service Centre, 30 Manukau Station Road, between 1 pm and 3 pm on Thursday, 23 July 2015.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
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