Hastie v R

Case [2012] NZSC 58


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NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 139 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1985.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 120/2011
[2012] NZSC 58

MICHAEL ANDREW KEITH HASTIE

v

THE QUEEN

Hearing:         7 June 2012

Court:             Elias CJ, Tipping, McGrath, William Young and Chambers JJ

Counsel:         S W Hughes QC for Appellant
C L Mander for the Crown

Judgment:      23 July 2012

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS
(Given by Chambers J)

Majority verdicts

  1. After a retirement of a little over ten hours, the jury sent the following note to Judge Roberts, the trial judge:[1]

    We are unanimous on two counts but are unable to come to a consensus decision on the other six counts and are stalemate at 9 to 3.  We are unsure where to proceed from here.  We have made progress to get to this point from last night.  Can we have some direction please?

    [1]      Spelling corrected.  We do not know when the jury gave the note to the crier.

  2. As it happened, the Judge was seeing counsel in chambers at the time he received the note.  He told counsel the contents of the note.  Mrs Hughes QC, counsel for the accused, Michael Hastie, submitted to the Judge that he should take verdicts on the two counts on which the foreperson had indicated the jury was unanimous and should discharge the jury from delivering verdicts on the other six counts.  The Judge, while obviously having some sympathy with that submission, did not accept it.  Instead, he decided to explain to the jury what was required for majority verdicts.  In accordance with normal trial practice, the Judge had briefly alluded to the possibility of majority verdicts in certain circumstances in his summing-up.  But he had not at that stage given any details about the triggering circumstances.  Nor had he indicated how big “a majority” was required.  He now filled in the details as follows:

    Mr Foreman, ladies and gentlemen, I have your communication and I have discussed it with counsel prior to bringing you back into Court.

    You have told me that you are unanimous on two counts, and essentially that you are unable to come to a consensus on the other charges and you have nominated for me the divisions you have at the moment.  I gather the bottom comments are a plea – we’ve made progress to get this far can we have some direction please.  But what you’ve left unsaid is, you want out.

    It’s not unreasonable and I’m grateful to you all for applying yourself so diligently to this task.  Regrettably there’s a process we have to work through.

    Now I indicated to you when I commenced speaking to you that there had been a change in the law which now authorised Judges to seek, if it was possible, majority decisions.  While I alerted you to that prospect I haven’t yet directed you, and…

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Hastie v R [2012] NZSC 58
Case
[2012] NZSC 58
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hastie v R, Michael Andrew Keith Hastie appealed against his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge had erred in not giving a Papadopoulos direction or discharging the jury when they indicated they were stalemated on certain counts. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the direction on majority verdicts was appropriate and, if not, whether it gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court examined the appropriateness of the trial judge's decision to provide information about majority verdicts without putting any pressure on the jury to reach one. The Court found that the judge did the right thing, as he provided the jury with information about majority verdicts but did not put any pressure on them to reach one. The Court also noted that the trial judge had already mentioned the possibility of non-unanimous verdicts in his summing-up but had not provided details.

The Supreme Court then considered what judges should generally do when faced with an indication that jurors are having difficulty in reaching a unanimous result. The Court concluded that there is no standard response, as the trial judge must assess the matter carefully and consider various factors, such as the number of the accused, the number of charges, the complexity of the issues, and the length of time the jury has been deliberating. The Court suggested that it is generally desirable to keep an informational direction about the mechanics and requirements of majority verdicts separate from any Papadopoulos direction or its equivalent.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and found that the trial judge's decision to provide information about majority verdicts without putting any pressure on the jury to reach one was appropriate. The Court emphasised the importance of trial judge discretion in this area and did not wish to be prescriptive.

No specific orders were made in this case, as the appeal was dismissed.

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