Glaister v Harris - [2014] NZHC 1285

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

CIV-2014-412-000049 [2014] NZHC 1285

BETWEEN
GEORGE PETER GLAISTER

Plaintiff

AND

SONIA LEE HARRIS Defendant

Hearing: 5 June 2014

Appearances:

D R Tobin for Plaintiff
R Kelly for Defendant

Judgment:

9 June 2014

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE OSBORNE
as to initial disclosure

The issues

[1] The Court is called upon to determine an apparently novel issue as to whether a plaintiff who applies for summary judgment must comply with the requirements of initial disclosure under r 8.4 High Court Rules. If there is such a duty, there is a consequential issue as to what was required by way of initial disclosure in this case.

Background

[2] The plaintiff (Mr Glaister) applied for summary judgment when he issued this proceeding against the defendant (Ms Harris).

[3] Mr Glaister’s application was accompanied by an affidavit in support, in

which he exhibited (in addition to the statement of claim) two documents.

[4] Mr Glaister did not, after filing his proceeding, serve on Ms Harris a bundle of principal documents as referred to in r 8.4(1) High Court Rules.

GLAISTER v HARRIS [2014] NZHC 1285 [9 June 2014]

Initial disclosure under the High Court Rules

The constitution of r 8.4 on its face

[5] Initial disclosure of a party’s principal documents is provided for in r 8.4

High Court Rules which states:

8.4 Initial disclosure

(1) After filing a pleading, a party must, unless subclause (2) applies, serve on the other parties, at the same time as the service of that pleading, a bundle consisting of—

(a) all the documents referred to in that pleading; and

(b) any additional principal documents in the filing party's control that that party has used when preparing the pleading and on which that party intends to rely at the trial or hearing.

(2) A party need not comply with subclause (1) if—

(a) the circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to comply with subclause (1); and

(b) a certificate to that effect, setting out the reasons why compliance is impossible or impracticable, and signed by counsel for that party, is filed and served at the same time as the pleading.

(3) A party acting under subclause (2) must, unless the other parties agree that initial disclosure is not required, or that a longer period is acceptable, either serve the bundle referred to in subclause (1) within
10 working days from the service of the pleading or apply for a variation of that requirement within that period.

(4) If a party fails to comply with subclause (1) or (3), a Judge may make any of the orders specified in rule 7.48.

(5) Despite subclause (1), a party does not need to disclose any document in which the party claims privilege or that a party claims to be confidential.

(6) Despite subclause (1), a party does not need to disclose any document that either—

(a) is the subject of a claim of public interest immunity; or

(b) is reasonably apprehended by the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Glaister v Harris

Details

AGLC: Glaister v Harris [2014] NZHC 1285
Case: [2014] NZHC 1285
Decision Date: 9 June 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Glaister v Harris is a case involving a dispute between George Peter Glaister and Sonia Lee Harris, which was heard in the High Court of New Zealand at Dunedin. Glaister sought summary judgment against Harris, but the case turned on whether he had to comply with the initial disclosure requirements under r 8.4 High Court Rules. The court had to decide if there was a duty for a plaintiff applying for summary judgment to comply with initial disclosure and, if so, what was required in this specific case.

The legal issue was whether the initial disclosure requirements under r 8.4 applied to a plaintiff who filed a summary judgment application. The court examined the provisions of r 8.4, which generally requires parties to serve a bundle of principal documents after filing a pleading, with certain exceptions. The court also considered whether r 12.4(4), which details the documents to be served in summary judgment applications, could be seen as a comprehensive code excluding initial disclosure. Ultimately, the court concluded that r 8.4 should be applied literally, meaning it does apply to summary judgment applicants, and rejected arguments that a purposive approach or the mischief rule should limit its application.

The court reasoned that the initial disclosure requirement was clear and comprehensive, covering all parties filing pleadings. The exceptions in r 8.4(7) and the absence of any exclusion for summary judgment applications supported this interpretation. The court also found that the mischief identified by the Rules Committee related to the broader discovery process rather than initial disclosure specifically. Therefore, the court held that Glaister was indeed bound by the initial disclosure requirements and ordered him to complete his obligation within 10 working days. Costs of $1,492.50 were awarded to Harris for the preparation of submissions and hearing on the initial disclosure issue.

The final orders required Glaister to complete his initial disclosure within 10 working days and pay costs to Harris. The case was adjourned for further directions regarding the interlocutory application and the proceeding generally.

Orders