Fog v Frimley Estate Ltd

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2015-404-001990 [2015] NZHC 3301

BETWEEN

MARIANNE FOG

Plaintiff

AND

FRIMLEY ESTATE LIMITED First Defendant

STEPHEN DUFF (AKA NICK DUFF) Second Defendant

Hearing: 20 November 2015

Counsel:

RB Hucker and J Schwarcz for Plaintiff
PM Fee and AR Durrant for First and Second Defendants

Judgment:

18 December 2015

JUDGMENT OF PALMER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 18 December 2015 at 12 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Hucker & Associates, Auckland.

Fee Langstone, Auckland.

FOG v FRIMLEY ESTATE LIMITED [2015] NZHC 3301 [18 December 2015]

Summary

[1]      Mr Stephen Duff, the second defendant, is a director of property development company Frimley Estate Ltd (Frimley), the first defendant.   Mr Duff was also the financial adviser to Ms Marianne Fog, the plaintiff.   Mr Duff offered shares in Frimley to Ms Fog without a registered prospectus.  Ms Fog seeks repayment of her three subscriptions totalling $149,400 by Frimley and Mr Duff under s 37 of the Securities Act 1978 (the Act).   She seeks summary judgment and says there is no arguable defence to  her  claim.    I am  not  satisfied  that  the defendants  have no limitation defence in relation to the original subscription.   I therefore decline the application for summary judgment for that subscription but grant it for the other two subscriptions.  My reasons follow.

Summary Judgment Principles

[2]      Where a defendant has no defence to a claim the plaintiff can apply for summary judgment.   Rule 12.2 of the High Court Rules provides, relevantly, that “the court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff satisfies the court that the defendant has no defence to a cause of action in the statement of claim”.

[3]      There is no dispute about the relevant principles, which the Court of Appeal has summarised in this way:1

The principles are well settled. The question on a summary judgment application is whether the defendant has no defence to the claim; that is, that there is no real question to be tried: Pemberton v Chappell [1987] 1 NZLR 1 at 3 (CA). The Court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty. The onus is on the plaintiff, but where its evidence is sufficient to show there is no defence, the defendant will have to respond if the application is to be defeated: MacLean v Stewart (1997) 11 PRNZ 66 (CA). The Court will not normally resolve material conflicts of evidence or assess the credibility of deponents. But it need not accept uncritically evidence that is inherently lacking in credibility, as for example where the evidence is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable: Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 at 341(PC). In the end the Court's assessment of the evidence is a matter of judgment. The Court may take a robust and realistic approach where the facts warrant it: Bilbie Dymock Corp Ltd v Patel (1987) 1 PRNZ

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 3301
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Marianne Fog, the plaintiff, sought summary judgment against Frimley Estate Ltd and Stephen Duff, the second defendant and a director of Frimley, to recover subscriptions totaling $149,400 made for shares in Frimley. Mr Duff had offered shares in Frimley to Ms Fog without a registered prospectus, and Ms Fog sought repayment under section 37 of the Securities Act 1978. The court had to decide whether there was no defence to Ms Fog's claim for summary judgment. The court found that there was no arguable defence for the 2009 and 2010 subscriptions, but there was a potential limitation defence for the original 2004 subscription. The court granted summary judgment for the 2009 and 2010 subscriptions but declined it for the original subscription due to the possibility of a limitation defence. The court also considered whether the doctrine of issue estoppel applied to prevent the defendants from challenging Ms Fog's status as a member of the public, but found that it did not. The court concluded that the defendants' appeal of Ms Fog's status as a member of the public did not constitute a stay under section 37AL(5) of the Securities Act, and that the defendants had not provided sufficient evidence to argue that Ms Fog was not a member of the public. The court also found that the defendants had not provided an arguable defence to show that Mr Duff's negligence or misconduct did not cause Frimley's default in the repayment of subscriptions.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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