IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
CRI-2017-470-7 [2017] NZHC 979
BETWEEN NICHOLAS EPIHA
Appellant
AND
TAURANGA CITY COUNCIL Respondent
Hearing: 12 May 2017 Appearances:
C Tuck for the Appellant
V Brewer for the RespondentJudgment:
12 May 2017
ORAL JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J
Solicitors:
Mr C Tuck, Barrister, Tauranga
Ms V Brewer, Cooney Lees Morgan, Solicitors, Tauranga
EPIHA v TAURANGA CITY COUNCIL [2017] NZHC 979 [12 May 2017]
[1] Mr Epiha appeals against conviction for an offence under s 57(2) of the Dog
Control Act 1996 (the Act).1
[2] Sections 57(1), (2) and (3) of the Act are as follows:
57 Dogs attacking persons or animals
(1) A person may, for the purpose of stopping an attack, seize or destroy a dog if—
(a) the person is attacked by the dog; or
(b) the person witnesses the dog attacking any other person, or any stock, poultry, domestic animal, or protected wildlife.
(2) The owner of a dog that makes an attack described in subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on … conviction to a fine not exceeding $3,000 in addition to any liability that he or she may incur for any damage caused by the attack.
(3) If, in any proceedings under subsection (2), the Court is satisfied that the dog has committed an attack described in subsection (1) and that the dog has not been destroyed, the Court must make an order for the destruction of the dog unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional and do not warrant destruction of the dog.
[3] There was a reasonably long procedural history which included an appeal to this Court following earlier conviction and remission of the matter to the District Court for a re-hearing resulting in the conviction now under appeal. Mr Epiha was sentenced the same day. The Judge imposed a fine of $250 with court costs of $130 and an award of $200 for emotional harm to a district nurse who had been attacked by Mr Epiha’s dog. Judge Rollo was satisfied in terms of s 57(3) that an order for destruction of the dog was required. He was satisfied that the exception recorded in subsection (3) had not been made out.
[4] The appeal that is now advanced is directed to questions of law. These may be summarised as follows:
(a) Does s 57(2) create an offence of strict liability so that the prosecutor is not required to prove mens rea (guilty mind of some sort on the part
of the defendant) but with the defendant having a defence, to be
1 Tauranga City Council v Epiha [2017] NZDC 4443.
established on the balance of probabilities, of a complete absence of fault?
(b)If it is not an offence of strict liability, with that defence available, and assuming it is not an offence of absolute liability, what is the nature of the mens rea element that the prosecutor would be required to prove?
[5] It was not argued…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Epiha v Tauranga City Council and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] NZHC 979
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether section 57(2) of the Act established an offence of strict liability, which would mean the prosecutor did not need to prove mens rea. If it was not an offence of strict liability, the court needed to determine the nature of the mens rea required by the prosecutor. The court examined relevant previous decisions and statutes to address these questions.
The court concluded that the offence under section 57(2) was indeed of strict liability, supported by the weight of authority in previous cases. The court found that Parliament intended to impose significant obligations on dog owners by creating this offence, which aligned with the objectives of the Act and the responsibilities of dog owners. The court observed that although there was a defence available, the policy decision regarding mens rea was for Parliament, not the court. The court also noted that a destruction order under section 57(3) could be made without requiring a conviction under section 57(2), provided the dog had committed an attack. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction of Mr. Epiha under section 57(2) of the Dog Control Act 1996 as an offence of strict liability. The court held that the offence did not require the prosecutor to prove mens rea, but allowed for a defence of absence of fault.