Dewes v IAG New Zealand Limited

In Dewes v IAG New Zealand Limited, the High Court of New Zealand considered an application for leave to appeal against the transfer of a proceeding to the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal. The plaintiffs, trustees of the Dewes Green Family Trust, sought to transfer their insurance claim proceeding to the Tribunal, which included third-party claims against QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited. QBE argued that the third-party claims should not be transferred as they did not fall within the scope of the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal Act 2019, which governs the transfer of insurance claims arising from the Canterbury earthquakes. QBE sought leave to appeal the decision of Associate Judge Lester, who had ruled that the entire proceeding, including third-party claims, should be transferred to the Tribunal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Act permitted the transfer of third-party claims to the Tribunal and if the discretion to transfer should have been exercised in QBE's favour. The court considered the plain language of the Act and the purposes behind it, emphasizing that the Act aimed to provide fair, speedy, flexible, and cost-effective services for resolving insurance claims. The court found that the Act did not prohibit the transfer of third-party claims and that the decision regarding the role of third parties in the Tribunal should be made by the Tribunal itself, not the High Court. The court concluded that there was no reasonably arguable error of law or fact in the original decision and that the appeal did not warrant further delay or serve the interests of justice.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were reserved. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to the statutory framework and the role of the Tribunal in determining the appropriate resolution of claims, including those involving third parties. The court highlighted that the decision to transfer a proceeding, including third-party claims, set a precedent that would need to be followed in future cases, thereby addressing a matter of general or public importance. However, the specific exercise of discretion in this case did not warrant an appeal, as it did not raise issues of significant public importance or justify further delay.