Dean v Associate Minister of Immigration

Case [2019] NZSC 119


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

 SC 82/2019
 [2019] NZSC 119
BETWEEN

FARISHA FARINA DEAN
Applicant

AND

ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION
Respondent

Court:

Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ

Counsel:

R J Hooker for Applicant
N T Butler for Respondent

Judgment:

4 November 2019

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

B        The applicant must pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing her appeal to that Court.[1]  The High Court had earlier dismissed her application for judicial review of the decision of the respondent refusing to cancel her liability to deportation from New Zealand under s 172 of the Immigration Act 2009 and to grant her a visa under s 61 of that Act.[2]

    [1]Dean v Associate Minister of Immigration [2019] NZCA 343 (Stevens, Duffy and Dobson JJ) [CA judgment].

  2. The respondent’s decision was a decision in the respondent’s “absolute discretion”, as that term is defined in s 11 of the Immigration Act.[3]  Section 11 provides, among other things, that such a decision may not be applied for, if an application is made there is no obligation to consider it and, whether the application is considered or not, there is no obligation on the decision‑maker to give reasons.

    [3]Immigration Act 2009, ss 61(2) and 172(5).

  3. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal reviewed the briefing material that had been provided to the respondent for the purposes of his consideration of the matter.  Both concluded the decision of the respondent not to intervene was not unreasonable.[4]

    [4]HC judgment, above n 2, at [67]; and CA judgment, above n 1, at [60].

  4. The applicant argues that her intended appeal would raise two issues of public importance.  The first relates to intensity of review.  The applicant wishes to argue that the court should apply a “heightened scrutiny of whether the decision is reasonable in the “Wednesbury” sense” when reviewing a decision under ss 61 or 172 of the Immigration Act.[5]  The second is a subset of the first.  The applicant wishes to argue that when undertaking a review of such a decision the court must first determine the scope and purpose of the provision under which the decision was made and whether the outcome had no intelligible justification or reflected a characterisation of an underlying error.

    [5]Citing Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA).

  5. We accept that the intensity of review to be applied in a judicial review challenge to a decision to which s 11 of the Immigration Act applies may be an issue worthy of consideration by this Court.  Having said that, there would appear to be some obstacles in the path of an argument for “heightened scrutiny” of a decision of this kind.  Further, we do not see the present case as a suitable vehicle for a consideration of the issue.[6]  The unusual facts of this case and its chequered history of litigation as set out and analysed in the Court of Appeal’s decision do not provide an auspicious context for the consideration of the issue.  Nor do we consider there is a risk of a miscarriage of justice arising if we do not give leave to appeal.

  6. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.  The applicant must pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.

Solicitors:
Vallant Hooker & Partners, Auckland for Applicant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Dean v Associate Minister of Immigration [2019] NZSC 119
Case
[2019] NZSC 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dean v Associate Minister of Immigration involved Farisha Farina Dean, who sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing her appeal. The appeal was against the High Court's dismissal of her application for judicial review, which challenged the respondent's decision not to cancel her deportation liability and to grant her a visa under the Immigration Act 2009. The respondent's decision was made under his absolute discretion, a term defined in section 11 of the Immigration Act. This section exempts such decisions from the obligation to consider applications, provide reasons, or be reviewed for reasonableness.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the applicant's intended appeal raised issues of public importance and whether the Court should apply a heightened scrutiny review to decisions made under sections 61 or 172 of the Immigration Act. Dean argued that the Court should review such decisions with heightened scrutiny, akin to the "Wednesbury" sense of reasonableness, and that the Court must first determine the scope and purpose of the provision under which the decision was made. The Court considered whether the case was suitable for addressing these issues, given the unique circumstances and the history of litigation involved.

The Court found that while the intensity of review for decisions under section 11 of the Immigration Act could be a matter worthy of consideration, there were obstacles to applying heightened scrutiny in this case. The unusual facts and the case's litigation history did not provide a suitable context for addressing the issue. The Court also noted that there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice if leave to appeal was not granted. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, and the applicant was ordered to pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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