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Cooper v Pinney

Cooper v Pinney

Case [2016] NZHC 1633 19 July 2016

Jurisdiction

Statutory Interpretation

Interim Maintenance

Discretion

Family Law

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NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 169 OF THE FAMILY PROCEEDINGS ACT 1980, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B TO
11D OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE COURT/LEGISLATION/RESTRICTIONS-ON-PUBLICATIONS.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND GREYMOUTH REGISTRY

CIV-2016-418-5 [2016] NZHC 1633

BETWEEN
RAEWYN PHYLLIS COOPER

Appellant

AND

MARCUS ROBERT WILLIAM PINNEY Respondent

Hearing: 23 June 2016

Appearances:

S Zindel for Appellant
Appearance for Respondent excused
A Wilding as Amicus Curiae

Judgment:

19 July 2016

JUDGMENT OF MANDER J

[1] Ms Raewyn Cooper has appealed a decision of the Family Court declining to hear her further application for interim spousal maintenance under s 82 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (the Act). Judge Somerville concluded the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to make more than one award of interim spousal maintenance. Ms Cooper maintains the Family Court’s jurisdiction is not so confined and that it may in the exercise of its discretion make more than one award of interim maintenance.

Background

[2] Ms Cooper and the respondent, Mr Marcus Pinney, lived together in a nine and a half year de facto relationship. In September 2014, Ms Cooper issued

COOPER v PINNEY [2016] NZHC 1633 [19 July 2016]

proceedings seeking a division of relationship property and the payment of spousal maintenance. She also filed a separate application for interim maintenance. These applications were opposed.

[3] In December 2014, the parties agreed to the Family Court making an order for interim maintenance. Mr Pinney would pay Ms Cooper the sum of $25,000 to support her over the six months the order would have effect.

[4] In June 2015, Ms Cooper filed a second application for interim maintenance. It was this application which Judge Somerville declined to hear, and it is against that decision this appeal lies.

The appeal

[5] Prior to the hearing of the appeal, Mr Pinney advised he would abide the decision of the Court and did not wish to participate. His counsel was excused.1
Because the outcome of the appeal could affect a significant number of separated couples who do not resolve their proceedings within six months of obtaining an interim order, counsel to assist the Court was appointed. Mr Wilding has fulfilled that role, and I am grateful for the assistance he has provided.2

[6] The appeal turns on the statutory interpretation of s 82 of the Act, and as such gives rise to a quintessential question of law. The issue is the same as that considered by Judge Somerville. Namely, whether the Family Court has jurisdiction after the expiry of an interim order for interim maintenance to exercise its discretion to make a further order when the substantive proceeding has not been finalised.

[7] Before turning to Judge Somerville’s decision, it is convenient to set out s 82 of the Act which the Judge considered prevented the Family Court from making
more than one order for interim maintenance:

1 Cooper v Pinney HC Christchurch CIV-20146-418-5, 22 February 2016 [Minute of

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Cooper v Pinney

Details

AGLC: Cooper v Pinney [2016] NZHC 1633
Case: [2016] NZHC 1633
Decision Date: 19 July 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cooper v Pinney involved an appeal by Ms Raewyn Cooper against a Family Court decision that declined to hear her further application for interim spousal maintenance under section 82 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. Ms Cooper and Mr Marcus Pinney had been in a de facto relationship for nine and a half years and had entered into an agreement whereby Mr Pinney would pay Ms Cooper $25,000 for her support over six months. Ms Cooper subsequently filed a second application for interim maintenance, which the Family Court declined to hear, leading to this appeal. The central issue was whether the Family Court had jurisdiction after the expiry of an interim order for interim maintenance to exercise its discretion to make a further order when the substantive proceeding had not been finalised. The appeal hinged on the interpretation of section 82 of the Act.

The Court examined the statutory interpretation of section 82, noting that it provided for the Court to make an order for interim maintenance until the final determination of the proceedings or until the order ceases to be in force, with no order continuing in force for more than six months. The Court observed that the purpose of the Act was to assist in meeting the reasonable needs of a party who could not practicably provide for those needs. The Court concluded that the provision did not restrict the Family Court to a single exercise of its discretion to order interim maintenance. The absence of any express prohibition on the number of times the Court may exercise its power under the section meant that the jurisdiction was not confined to the making of a single order.

The Court found that the purpose of the enactment and the objective of the Act supported the jurisdiction to make further interim orders. It was difficult to reconcile the requirement to provide for future maintenance with the view that an award of past maintenance at a substantive hearing would be a sufficient remedy. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the Family Court for the hearing of Ms Cooper’s further application for interim maintenance.

Orders