Conrad v Thomson

[2022] NZHC 2845

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA

TE ROTORUA-NUI-A-KAHUMATAMOMOE ROHE

CIV-2022-463-40

[2022] NZHC 2845

UNDER

the Land Transfer Act 2017, section 143(2)(b)

IN THE MATTER OF

an application to sustain a caveat

BETWEEN

CLEO SONIA CONRAD

Applicant

AND

DESMOND RONALD THOMSON

Respondent

Hearing:	4 October 2022
Appearances:	David G Hayes for the Applicant Priscilla Kirk for the Respondent
Judgment:	2 November 2022

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE C B TAYLOR

[Security for costs]

This judgment was delivered by me on 2 November 2022 at 11:00am

pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………. Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Hunwick Law Limited, Hamilton, for the Applicant

O’Sullivan Clemens (J W Murray/P Kirk), Rotorua, for the Respondent

Counsel:

David Hayes, New Zealand Commercial Law Corp Ltd, Hamilton, for the Applicant

CONRAD v THOMSON [2022] NZHC 2845 [2 November 2022]

Introduction

[1]        Desmond Thomson, the respondent in this proceeding, applies for security for costs against the applicant, Cleo Conrad.

Background

[2]        Ms Conrad lodged a caveat over the title to 274 Spencer Road, Lake Tarawera, Rotorua (the Caveat). Mr Thomson applied to lapse the caveat. Ms Conrad, in turn, on 2 June 2022 applied to the Court for an order that the Caveat not lapse. The Court made an interim order on 13 June 2022 that the Caveat not lapse pending further order of the Court.

[3]        Mr  Thomson  has  applied  for  security  for  costs  against  Ms  Conrad.    Mr Thomson’s security for costs application is to be heard and determined prior to the substantive hearing. This judgment determines Mr Thomson’s application.

[4]        The background to the Caveat is that in 1997, Ms Conrad was residing in the United Kingdom. Ms Conrad has deposed that she was looking for an investment property to purchase in  New Zealand.  Ms Conrad’s mother, Ms Bailey,  advised  Ms Conrad that she had found the Lake Tarawera property. Ms Conrad says she agreed for Ms Bailey to purchase the property for her as bare trustee for her interests for $268,000. She subsequently transferred that sum to New Zealand to enable settlement on 10 November 1997, in the expectation that Ms Bailey would be the only person named on the title.

[5]        Ms Conrad claims that a month  after  settlement  she  became  aware  that Mr Thomson, who was at that time  Ms  Bailey’s  de  facto  partner,  had  coerced Ms Bailey into agreeing to name him on the title with her. She says it was never her intention for Mr Thomson to have any interest in the property. Instead of insisting he be removed from the title, however, Ms Conrad had Ms Bailey execute a loan

agreement for a loan secured over the property and that was intended to protect her interest in the property.

[6]        Ms Conrad says she later discovered that Ms Bailey and Mr Thomson had executed a property relationship settlement, whereby Ms Bailey’s name was removed from the property’s title and only Mr Thomson’s name was left. She says, however, that by the time she discovered this, Ms Bailey and Mr Thomson had resumed their relationship. Ms Conrad claims she did not challenge Ms Bailey’s name being taken off the title at that time because she did not want to subject Ms Bailey to any unwanted conflict with Mr Thomson.

[7]        Ms Conrad now says Mr Thomson has mortgaged the property without her permission, and in the full knowledge that he and Ms Bailey were each only on the property title as a bare trustee for Ms Conrad’s interests. She says she is concerned Mr Thomson may attempt to claim the property as his own, and she has caveated the title to protect her position.

[8]        For his part, Mr Thomson says there is no contractual relationship between he and Ms Conrad, that he is not holding the property on trust for her and that he owns the property in his own right.

[9]        Mr Thomson deposes that he and Ms Bailey separated in February 2009 and on 22 December 2010 they entered into a Separation and Relationship Property Agreement and Contracting Out Agreement setting out the division of their assets. Mr Thomson deposes that he acquired the property in his own right under the Separation Agreement.

Interlocutory application for an order for security for costs

[10]      Mr Thomson seeks an order for security for costs in the sum of $20,315.00 or such other sum as the Court considers sufficient, or the giving of security for that sum.1

1 Interlocutory application on notice for security for costs by the respondent of the substantive application dated 10 August 2022 at [1].

[11]The grounds on which the order is sought are:2

a.On 2 June 2022, the Applicant applied against the Respondent for an Order that a Caveat not to Lapse.

b.The respondent has filed a Notice of Defence.

c.The Application that A Caveat not Lapse has been set down for a hearing 6 October 2022.

d.The Applicant is resident out of New Zealand; and

e.There is reason to believe that the Applicant will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if the Applicant is unsuccessful in the Applicant’s proceeding.

f.It is just in all the circumstances, for an order to be made against the Applicant that they give security for costs.

Affidavit of Desmond Thomson dated 10 August 2022

[12]      Mr Thomson has made an affidavit in support of his application for security for costs. He deposes that Ms Conrad resides in Queensland, Australia. He says he is aware that Ms Conrad was bankrupt from 6 October 2010 until 27 September 2013 and that she has not provided any evidence about her current financial circumstances. He says further that he does not believe Ms Conrad’s claim has any merit — he has no contractual relationship with Ms Conrad and he does not accept that there is any trust relationship between them.3

[13]      Mr Thomson says he is 80 years old, retired and reliant on his superannuation for income. He says he has already had to incur significant legal fees in this proceeding. He says he is entitled to protection against being drawn into unjustified litigation and that an order for security for costs is therefore reasonable and necessary. He says he believes he will be successful in the substantive proceedings, and that in that event he would seek costs against Ms Conrad based on a 2B scale. He estimates Ms Conrad would owe him costs in the amount of $20,315.00. His sought order for security for costs is calculated on that basis.4

2 At [2].

3      Affidavit of Desmond Ronald Thomson in support of interlocutory application for order for security for costs dated 10 August 2022 at [7]–[11].

4      At [12]–[16].

Notice of opposition

[14]      Ms Conrad opposes Mr Thomson’s application for security for costs on the following grounds:5

(a)An application to sustain a caveat is merely the caveator responding to an application under s 143(1)(b) Land Transfer Act 2017 to lapse a caveat, and therefore cannot be reasonably be regarded as commencing a proceeding. As such the Applicant here is effectively a defendant; and a defendant should not be subject to an order for security of costs.

(b)The Respondent’s case is unlikely to succeed, as he admits in his own evidence that he did not provide any monies towards the purchase of the property; and it has been confirmed in sworn evidence before the Court that the Applicant provided all the monies.

(c)If the fundamental common law principle of “money in – money out” was applied, the Applicant has sufficient interest in the property, - that is registered in the Respondent’s name, - to fully secure the Respondent for the security for costs that he seeks in his application.

Affidavit of Cleo Conrad dated 23 August 2022

[15]      Ms Conrad has made an affidavit in support of her notice of opposition. She deposes that Mr Thomson has always known that she paid for the Lake Tarawera property, and that it was always to be held on trust — the caveatable interest she claims was therefore always known to him. She says the last time she specifically discussed her ownership of the property with Mr Thomson was in February 2009, when she told Ms Bailey and Mr Thomson that she wanted to sell it and apply the funds to pay out the mortgage over a different property. She says Mr Thompson reacted quite violently to the proposal and left soon afterward, leaving the matter unresolved.6

[16]      Ms Conrad says it was not until some years later that she learned Mr Thomson had “coerced” Ms Bailey into taking her name off the title pursuant to a purported relationship property settlement. She says further that Thompson is being deliberately untruthful as he has always known that neither he nor Ms Bailey have ever had any ownership interest in the Lake Tarawera property. She says that it is incorrect to say that her Australian bankruptcy affects her interest in the Lake Tarawera property —

5 Notice of opposition to application by the respondent for security of costs of the substantial application dated 26 August 2022 at [3].

6      Affidavit of Cleo Sonia Conrad dated 23 August 2022 at [1]–[5].

it has been subject to a trust for her two children since their births, which pre-dates the bankruptcy, and it was accordingly never a part of her bankrupt estate.7

Affidavit of Maxwell Conrad dated 23 August 2022

[17]      Ms Conrad’s husband, Maxwell Conrad, has also made an affidavit in support of her notice of opposition.  He says he was present at the 2009 meeting between   Ms Conrad and Mr Thomson, and that he can confirm Ms Conrad’s ownership of the Lake Tarawera property was discussed. He says there is no doubt in his  mind that Mr Thomson knew Ms Conrad had always owned the property.8

[18]      Mr Conrad also confirms he is aware that Ms Conrad provided all the funds for the purchase of the Lake Tarawera property, and that it was always agreed that it would be held on trust exclusively for Ms Conrad and her interests. He says it was never intended that Mr Thomson ever have any ownership interest in the property.9

Reply affidavit of Desmond Thomson dated 15 September 2022

[19]      Mr Thomson has made an affidavit in reply to Ms Conrad and Mr Conrad’s affidavits. He deposes that issues arose between 2006 and 2009, after the Conrads purchased a Gold Coast property for $13.5 million. He says it transpired that the Conrads were unable to afford the property and they eventually sold it for a loss of

$4.5 million. He says this led to the Conrads’ bankruptcy. He says that was the background to the discussion that took place in 2009, to which both Ms Conrad and Mr Conrad alluded.10

[20]      Mr Thomson deposes that at the 2009 meeting, the Conrads told Ms Bailey that her Queensland property would need to be sold to meet the Conrads’ debts and to ensure they would not be made bankrupt. He says he was incredulous that Ms Bailey should lose her home as a result of the Conrads’ poor investment choices. He stresses, however, that at that meeting there was no mention of the Lake Tarawera property at all. He denies the allegation that he coerced Ms Bailey into signing the relationship

7      At [5]–[13].

8      Affidavit of Maxwell Damian Conrad dated 23 August 2022 at [1]–[3].

9 At [4].

10     Further affidavit of Desmond Ronald Thomson dated 15 September 2022 at [1]–[9].

property agreement. And he says the Lake Tarawera property cannot have been the subject of a trust for Ms Conrad’s two children, because neither was born at the time the Conrads say the alleged trust was set up.11

Mr Thomson’s submissions

[21]      Priscilla Kirk, for Mr Thomson, submits that when a plaintiff is resident outside New Zealand, the Court may order security for costs against them. Primary considerations in the exercise of the discretion are the ease, convenience, and costs of enforcing a costs judgment in the plaintiff’s country of residence. She says there will be very few situations where the Court will have a reason not to order security from a solvent foreign plaintiff that is more compelling than the need to protect a defendant against a barren costs order.12

[22]      Ms Kirk says further that a central question is whether there are reasonable grounds for thinking that Ms Conrad will not be able to pay the costs of litigation if she is unsuccessful. She submits that there will need to be credible evidence of surrounding circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred Ms Conrad will be unable to pay costs.13

[23]      Ms Kirk says that once it has been established that a plaintiff is non-resident or there is reason to believe a plaintiff is unable to pay a defendant’s costs, then the jurisdiction to order security is available. The quantum of security should be such sum as the Court thinks fit in the circumstances. And a stay of proceedings pending payment of the security is the ordinary course.14

[24] Ms Kirk turns to consider each of these legal points in terms of the present facts. She submits that it is an agreed fact that Ms Conrad resides in Queensland, Australia. She says that, notwithstanding the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, enforcement of a costs order in Australia would be significantly more costly than enforcing a costs order in New Zealand. With Mr Thomson being 80 years old and

11     At [10]–[13] and [19].

12     Submissions of counsel for the respondent in relation to application for security for costs dated  3 October 2022 at [14]–[19].

13     At [20]–[24].

14 At [25].

reliant on his superannuation income, issuing proceedings to recover costs in Australia will be stressful and difficult.  An order for security  for costs  now would  protect Mr Thomson from a barren costs order later.15

[25]      Next, Ms Kirk submits that it is reasonable to infer Ms Conrad will be unable to pay Mr Thomson’s costs. She says Ms Conrad was bankrupt from 6 October 2010 until 27 September 2013, and that Ms Conrad has so far refused to address the issue of security in a reasonable and cost-effective way. She points out that Ms Conrad has provided no evidence about her current financial circumstances and that she does not appear to have any interest in property in New Zealand.16

[26]      Ms Kirk says Mr Thomson has already had to incur significant legal fees in order to file his notice of defence and to make this application. She says he is entitled to protection against being drawn into unjustified litigation. And she submits there is no evidence that an order for security in the sum of around  $20,000 will  prevent  Ms Conrad from pursuing any claim she believes she may have.17

[27]      Ms Kirk says Ms Conrad’s claim is meritless, discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, and is otherwise an abuse of the Court’s processes. She submits that there is a concern that if the Caveat is allowed to remain, it will be relied upon by Ms Conrad to pressure Mr Thomson into paying her funds despite her not having any real claim to the property.18

[28]      Pointing to a likely sum of $20,315.00 in 2B costs, Ms Kirk says Mr Thomson seeks that amount be ordered be as security. She says it is appropriate that Ms Conrad be required to pay that sum before Mr Thomson incurs any further legal fees.19

Ms Conrad’s submissions

[29]      David Hayes, for Ms Conrad, submits Ms Conrad should not be denied her day in court simply because of Mr Thomson’s reliance on her past bankruptcy. He says

15     At [34]–[38].

16 At [39].

17     At [40]–[42].

18     At [43]–[47].

19     At [48]–[50].

Mr Thomson is inappropriately seeking to stifle Ms Conrad’s claim on the basis of her alleged impecuniosity. He says further that Mr Thomson cannot seek security for costs because, similar to the context of applications to set aside bankruptcy notices, he has arranged for a notice to remove the Caveat — Ms Conrad’s application that the Caveat not lapse is simply a response that preserves the existing position. It does not qualify as the commencement of a proceeding.20

[30]      Mr Hayes says that, in reality, it is Mr Thomson that commenced the proceedings. He knew that legal proceedings would be the response to his request to remove the Caveat. Accordingly, Ms Conrad is not a “plaintiff” within the meaning of r 5.45 of the High Court Rules 2016. Further, Mr Hayes submits, the strength of the case favours Ms Conrad. He submits a full hearing will be required the assess the evidence.21

[31]      Finally, Mr Hayes submits that the claimed security of $20,135.00 is excessive for this type of hearing. He says no security for costs should be ordered at this time.22

Legal principles

[32]Rule 5.45 of the High Court Rules provides:

5.45     Order for security of costs

(1)Subclause (2) applies if a Judge is satisfied, on the application of a defendant,—

(a)that a plaintiff—

(i)  is resident out of New Zealand; or

(ii)  is a corporation incorporated outside New Zealand; or

(iii)   is a subsidiary (within the meaning of section 5 of the Companies Act 1993) of a corporation incorporated outside New Zealand; or

(b)that there is reason to believe that a plaintiff will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if the plaintiff is unsuccessful in the plaintiff’s proceeding.

20     Submissions of counsel for application regarding security for costs dated 3 October 2022 at [1]– [12].

21     At [13]–[19].

22     At [20]–[21].

(2)A Judge may, if the Judge thinks it is just in all the circumstances, order the giving of security for costs.

(3)An order under subclause (2)—

(a)requires the plaintiff or plaintiffs against whom the order is made to give security for costs as directed for a sum that the Judge considers sufficient—

(i)  by paying that sum into court; or

(ii)  by giving, to the satisfaction of the Judge or the Registrar, security for that sum; and

(b)may stay the proceeding until the sum is paid or the security given.

(4)A Judge may treat a plaintiff as being resident out of New Zealand even though the plaintiff is temporarily resident in New Zealand.

(5)A Judge may make an order under subclause (2) even if the defendant has taken a step in the proceeding before applying for security.

(6)References in this rule to a plaintiff and defendant are references to the person (however described on the record) who, because of a document filed in the proceeding (for example, a counterclaim), is in the position of plaintiff or defendant.

[33]      In determining applications under r 5.45, the Court will generally follow these steps:23

(a)Has the applicant satisfied the court of the threshold under r 5.45(1)?

(b)How should the court exercise its direction under r 5.45(2)?

(c)What amount should security for costs be fixed at?

(d)Should a stay be ordered?

[34]      The decision to order security, and the quantum of such security, are at the Court’s discretion. It is generally not to be to be fettered by constructing “principles” from the facts of previous cases.24 But the Court is to balance the competing interests

— being the defendant’s interest in protection from a costs order that is incapable of fulfilment and the plaintiff’s right of access to justice.25 Courts will be slow to make

23     Busch v Zion Wildlife Gardens Ltd (in rec and in liq) [2012] NZHC 17 at [2].

24     A S McLachlan Ltd v MEL Network Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 747 (CA) at [13] and [14].

25     Clear White Investments Ltd v Otis Trustee Ltd [2016] NZHC 2837 at [4].

an order for security that will stifle a genuine claim.26 This balancing exercise is the Court’s overriding consideration.27

[35]The Court should assess whether there is:28

… credible (that is, believable) evidence of surrounding circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred that the [party] will be unable to pay the costs. This does not, of course, amount to proof that the [party] will, in fact, be unable to pay them.

[36]      The Court will assess the claim’s merits and prospects of success, to the extent that is possible at an early juncture.29 The Court will also consider the extent to which the plaintiff’s impecuniosity may have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.30

[37]      A plaintiff’s unwillingness to pay previous judgment debts weighs in favour of an order for security.31 But whether a plaintiff has been a responsible litigant is secondary to the issue of whether the lack of merit of the claim justifies security that would prevent the claim from proceeding.32

[38]      Quantum of security is discretionary and is assessed in the round. It need not be fixed by reference to likely cost awards.33 It is to be what the Court thinks fit in all the circumstances.34

[39]A Court will generally stay a proceeding until the security ordered is given.35

26 Reekie v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 63, [2014] 1 NZLR 737 at [3].

27 Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288, [2013] NZAR 1017 at [24(c)].

28   Concorde Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd (No 2) [1977] 1 NZLR 516 (SC) at 519; NZ Kiwifruit Marketing Board v Maheatataka Coolpack Ltd (1993) 7 PRNZ 209 (HC) at 212; and Stephenson v Jones [2013] NZHC 638.

29     Meates v Taylor (1992) 5 PRNZ 524 (CA); and Lee v Lee [2019] NZCA 345 at [73].

30     Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General (1986) 1 PRNZ 457 (HC).

31     Taylor v Adair [2018] NZHC 1975 at [30]–[31], citing Burden v Dixie Cummings New Zealand

[2016] NZHC 729 at [22]; and Mawhinney v Auckland Council [2014] NZHC 3207.

32     Wright v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 3046 at [26].

33     Sharp v Pillay [2017] NZHC 647; and Red 9 Ltd v The Learning Ladder Ltd (in liq) [2021] NZCA 284 at [30].

34     A S McLachlan Ltd v MEL Network Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 747 (CA).

35     Tomanovich Holdings Ltd v Gibbston Community Water Co 2014 Ltd [2018] NZHC 990 at [68] and [85].

Analysis

[40]The issues to be determined in this judgment are:

(a)Are the criteria in r 5.45(1) met so that the jurisdiction to award security for costs is available to the Court?

(b)If the answer to the question at [40](a) is “Yes”, should the Court exercise its discretion under r 5.45(2) to award security for costs, and if so, what should the quantum of the award be?

(c)If the answer to the question at [40](b) is “Yes” and the quantum of the security for costs is fixed, should the Court order a stay of the proceedings pending the security being paid into Court?

[41]I deal with each of these questions in turn.

Are the criteria in r 5.45(1) met so that the jurisdiction to award security for costs is available to the Court?

[42]      In my view, the threshold under r 5.45(1) is met. There is no significant argument that the plaintiff resides in Queensland, Australia, and therefore falls within r 5.45(1)(a)(i). I do not accept Mr Hayes’ argument that Ms Conrad is not really a “plaintiff” because she is only responding to Mr Thomson’s application for lapse the caveat by bringing an application to sustain the caveat. In my view, this argument ignores the fact that the application to remove the caveat only became necessary because Ms Conrad had lodged the Caveat in the first instance. In substance, she is the instigator of these proceedings, and a plaintiff.

[43]      While meeting the criteria under r 5.45(1)(a) is sufficient to engage the Court’s discretion under r 5.45(2), I continue on to consider briefly whether, for the purposes of r 5.45(1)(b), there is reason to believe that Ms Conrad will be unable to pay the costs of Mr Thomson if Ms Conrad is unsuccessful in the proceedings. Ms Kirk submitted that there is a reasonable inference that Ms Conrad will be unable to pay Mr Thomson’s costs  as  Ms  Conrad  was  bankrupt  from  6  October  2010  until  27 September 2013. However, given the period of time which has passed since

Ms Conrad was discharged from  bankruptcy,  I  do  not  place  much  weight  on  Ms Conrad’s previous bankruptcy.

[44]      In my view, the position is that the Court does not have sufficient information to draw a conclusion as to whether, for the purposes of s 5.45(1)(b), there is reason to believe Ms Conrad will be unable to pay Mr Thomson’s costs if the proceedings are unsuccessful. It is noted that Ms Conrad has chosen not to put information before the Court in relation to her financial position and ability to pay the costs award.

[45]      The answer to the  question raised at  [40](a) as  to whether the criteria in      r 5.45(1) are met is “Yes”. Consequently, the Court’s jurisdiction to award security for costs is engaged.

If the answer to the question at [40](a) is “Yes”, should the Court exercise its discretion under r 5.45(2) to award security for costs, and if so, what should the quantum of the award be?

[46]      Ms Kirk has submitted that Mr Thomson has already had to incur significant legal fees to file his notice of defence and make the application for security for costs. Ms Kirk submits that Mr Thomson is entitled to protection against being drawn into unjustified litigation. She submits that Mr Thomson is 80 years old, retired, and relying on his superannuation for an income.

[47]      As to the merits of Ms Conrad’s claim, there is a significant conflict of evidence as to whether the Lake Tarawera property is held on trust for Ms Conrad and her interests. Clearly, the issues will need to be explored by further evidence dealt with at a trial. Ms Conrad’s case is not hopeless in that she had submitted the loan agreement entered into by Ms Bailey on 31 December 1997 and the statutory declaration made by Ms Bailey in May 2019. Mr Thomson, on the other hand points to Ms Bailey’s obligations of disclosure relating to the Separation Agreement signed between himself and Ms Bailey,  and makes the point that no reference to the trust or a loan from    Ms Conrad was referred to in the disclosures or discussions leading up to signing the Separation Agreement.

Conclusion

[48]      In my view, it is appropriate that an order for security for costs be made in favour of Mr Thomson. The reasons for this are as follows:

(a)Ms  Conrad  resides  in   Queensland  and   hence  the  threshold  in    r 5.45(1)(a)(i) is met to engage the Court’s jurisdiction to make an award of security for costs pursuant to r 5.45(2).

(b)Ms Conrad has not provided any financial information about her circumstances or ability to pay an award of costs should she be unsuccessful in the proceedings.

(c)Ms Conrad has explained the delay in her taking any action to claim her alleged interest in the Lake Tarawera property, based on not wishing to cause conflict between Ms Bailey and Mr Thomson.  However,   Mr Thomson has relied on the Separation Agreement and his ownership of the property for 11 years. Ms Conrad has taken no action to enforce an alleged claim during that period of time. Given the long delay in bringing her claim, leading to the claim being brought against Mr Thomson in circumstances where he is elderly and, according to his evidence, has limited financial resources, this is a factor which weighs in favour of Mr Thomson being given some protection against the litigation costs.

(d)Mr Thomson’s personal circumstances, being 80 years old and reliant on the superannuation as his only form of income. A barren award of costs could cause financial hardship for him.

[49]      As to the quantum of the security for costs, in my view, the amount sought by Mr Thomson of $20,315.00 is excessive. Assessed in the round, security for costs of

$10,000 would be appropriate in the present circumstances.

If the answer to the question at [40](b) is “Yes”, and the quantum of the security for costs is fixed, should the Court order a stay of the proceedings pending the security being paid into Court?

[50]      I propose that the usual position should apply in the present instance, and the proceedings should be stayed until the amount of the security for costs is paid into Court.

Result

[51]I make the following orders:

(a)Ms Conrad is to provide security for costs in the amount of $10,000, to be paid into the High Court at Rotorua.

(b)The proceedings are stayed until the security for costs is paid into Court.

(c)Costs in respect of this application are reserved to be dealt with at the substantive hearing.

…………………………….. Associate Judge Taylor