| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA222/2014 [2014] NZCA 408 |
| BETWEEN | COMMISSIONER OF POLICE |
| AND | KIM DOTCOM BRAM VAN DER KOLK MEGASTUFF LIMITED MONA DOTCOM |
| Hearing: | 30 July 2014 |
Court: | O’Regan P, Wild and French JJ |
Counsel: | D J Boldt and B F Fenton for Appellant |
Judgment: | 21 August 2014 at 3.00 pm |
Recalled & Reissued: | 2 September 2014 as per Minute of even date. This reissued judgment replaces that issued on 21 August 2014 at 3 pm. |
Effective date of Judgment: | 21 August 2014 at 3 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe appeal is allowed.
BThe decision of the High Court is set aside.
C An order is made extending the duration of the registration of the restraining orders issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on 10 and 25 January 2012 and registered in New Zealand on 18 April 2012 for one year from 18 April 2014.
DThe application by the interested party for exclusion of her property from the restraining orders is declined.
EWe make no order for costs in this Court.
F Any award of costs in favour of the respondents or the interested party in the High Court is quashed. Costs in that Court should, in the absence of agreement, be re-determined in that Court in light of this judgment.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by O’Regan P)
This is an appeal against a decision of Thomas J, in which she dismissed an application by the appellant, the Commissioner of Police, for an order extending the duration of the registration in New Zealand of restraining orders over the assets of the respondents made by a United States Court.[1] The Judge proceeded on the basis that the Court had jurisdiction to extend the duration of the registration of the US restraining orders, but determined that it would be inappropriate to do so. The Commissioner contests the latter finding. The Judge did, however, extend the order pending the outcome of the present appeal.
The first respondent, Mr Dotcom, resists the appeal by supporting the reasoning of the Judge and also on the basis of other points not relied on in the High Court judgment. He cross-appeals against the finding that there was jurisdiction to extend the order. The jurisdiction to extend the order pending the outcome of this appeal is also contested in the cross-appeal.
Mr Dotcom’s estranged wife, Mona Dotcom, was represented at the appeal as an interested party. She supports Mr Dotcom’s position on the appeal and the cross‑appeal, and in addition seeks orders excluding items of her own property from the ambit of the registration order if its duration is extended.
The second and third respondents were not…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Commissioner of Police v Dotcom and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] NZCA 408
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred on the interpretation of s 137 of the MACMA. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the phrase “the High Court may order that the registration of a foreign restraining order be extended” in s 137(1) implied that the Court had the jurisdiction to extend a foreign restraining order. The court also needed to consider the discretionary nature of the application for an extension and the role of the High Court in exercising its power under s 137.
The court concluded that the language of s 137(1) clearly provided for the possibility of extending the duration of a registered foreign restraining order. The court rejected the argument that the provision did not confer jurisdiction on the Court to extend the order. It was held that the use of the word “may” indicated a discretionary power, but this did not negate the Court's authority to make an order if it chose to do so. The court found that the Attorney-General's authorisation and the Commissioner's application were integral parts of the statutory process, and the High Court's obligation under s 56(1) to register the order if satisfied of its validity reinforced the Court's role in extending the registration period.
The court ordered that the application for extension of the foreign restraining order be upheld, confirming that the High Court had the jurisdiction to extend the duration of the registration of the foreign restraining order in New Zealand.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The application for extension was made under s 137 of the CPRA, which provides:137 Extension of duration of registration of foreign restraining order(1)If the High Court has registered a foreign restraining order in New Zealand, the applicant for that order may, before the registration of the restraining order expires, apply to the High Court for an extension of the duration of the registration of the foreign restraining order in New Zealand.(2) If an application is made under subsection (1), the High Court may order that the registration of a foreign restraining order be extended for a further period not exceeding 1 year.(3) If an application is granted under this section, the registration of the foreign restraining order in New Zealand ceases at the time specified in the Court’s order. On the face of it, an argument that a provision that says “the High Court may order that the registration of a foreign restraining order be extended” does not give the Court jurisdiction to extend a foreign restraining order is a difficult argument to sustain. In order to understand the basis on which it is made in this case, it is necessary to traverse more of the factual background. The application to register the US restraining orders in New Zealand was made by the Commissioner after the then Deputy Solicitor-General, acting as delegate of the Attorney-General, authorised the Commissioner to make the application.[4] [4]For simplicity, we will refer to the Attorney-General from now on, since the then Deputy Solicitor-General, Mr Mander, was acting as the Attorney-General’s delegate. The Attorney-General’s authorisation was made after receipt of a request for assistance from the United States Government under s 54 of the MACMA. That section provides that a foreign country may request the Attorney-General to assist in enforcing a foreign restraining order that relates to property believed to be located in New Zealand.[5] The Attorney-General then has a discretion to authorise the Commissioner to apply to the High Court to register the foreign restraining order in New Zealand.[6] [5]Subsection (1). [6]Subsection (2). Once that authorisation was given in the present case, the Commissioner made the application to the High Court under s 56 of the MACMA. Section 56(1) provides that the High Court must make an order registering a foreign restraining order in respect of which an application for registration is being made by the Commissioner if the Court is satisfied that a foreign restraining order is in force in a foreign country. As Potter J noted in her judgment granting the registration order, s 56(1) “provides both the source and the sole guidance for the exercise of the Court’s power in registering the foreign order”.[7][7]Commissioner of Police v Dotcom, above n 2, at [86]. The process therefore provides for:(a)a request to be made by a foreign government to the Attorney‑General;(b)an authorisation by the Attorney-General to the Commissioner to make an application for registration;(c)a decision by the Commissioner, once such authorisation is given, to actually make the application; and(d)a decision by the High Court to register the foreign restraining order. As noted above, the High Court is obliged to make that decision if satisfied that the foreign restraining order is in force: there is no discretionary aspect to the decision.