Churton v Attorney-General

[2025] NZHC 2422

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2023-485-219

[2025] NZHC 2422

IN THE MATTER OF

Unextinguished Customary Title

BETWEEN

DAVID WAYNE CHURTON

Plaintiff

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Defendant

Hearing:

12 August 2025

Counsel:

G A Paine for Plaintiff

J M Prebble for Defendant

Judgment:

25 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

Introduction

[1]    This proceeding concerns an area of land in the Port Nicholson block which the plaintiff, David Churton, submits is subject to unextinguished customary title.  Mr Churton brings this proceeding in his personal capacity and as a trustee of the Ngāti Tama Te Kaeaea Trust.

[2]    Before me, the Attorney-General applies for an order that Mr Churton provide further particulars and serve a more explicit amended statement of claim.1 The Attorney-General’s position is that Mr Churton’s second amended statement of claim, dated 7 August 2024, is defective and fails to give fair notice of his cause of action and particulars of the pleadings.2

1      High Court Rules 2016, r 5.21.

2      Rule 5.26.

CHURTON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2025] NZHC 2422 [25 August 2025]

Background and procedural history

[3]    In brief, Mr Churton in his amended statement of claim outlines the historic position relating to his claim as follows. In  or  around  1822,  Ngāti  Tama  and Ngāti Mutunga came to occupy the Wellington Harbour and surrounding area, including the land in issue  in  this  proceeding.  After  1823,  Ngāti  Tama  and  Ngāti Mutunga held mana whenua and customary title with respect to the land. In November 1835, a large group of Ngāti Mutunga and Ngāti Tama left the Wellington region to travel to the Chatham Islands. Both iwi maintain ahi kaa in respect of the land, according to their tikanga. After 1835, Ngāti Tama continued to hold mana whenua and customary title with respect to the land. In 1839, approximately 5,000 acres of land situated at Petone was sold to the New Zealand Company, including the area in dispute in this proceeding. In 1842, Taringa Kuri, on behalf of Ngāti Tama, objected to the land being alienated in the Native Land Commission. Despite this, the Crown purported to  make a grant  of the land to the  New Zealand Company, but  Mr Churton submits the Crown had no legal basis to do this. In February 1846, Governor Grey took military action to take the land from Ngāti Tama in Wellington and the Hutt Valley, meaning Ngāti Tama ceased to be able to occupy the land. Much later, in August 2008, Mr Churton notes that the Crown, Ngāti Tama and others were parties to a deed of settlement which he says, however, concerns other historic claims. He maintains that this deed does not in any way settle his present claims concerning the land in question.

[4]    Mr Churton filed this proceeding, including an initial statement of claim broadly detailing this position, on 11 May 2023. His initial statement of claim went on to seek a declaration that the land in question is unalienated aboriginal or customary title, which continues to be held by Ngāti Tama as mana whenua. In addition, costs and such other relief as the Court considers appropriate were sought in this pleading. That statement of claim recorded too that Mr Churton is bringing this proceeding as trustee of the “Ngati Tama Trust… which represents the interests of Ngati Tama O Ngati Wai”, with a mandate to do so. Further, it records that he brings this proceeding “as an individual whose rights may be affected by the declaration sought”.

[5]    On 4 July 2023, the Attorney-General filed a statement of defence. This recorded the position that the Crown, Taranaki Whānui ki Te Upoko o Te Ika (Taranaki Whānui) and the Port Nicholson Block Settlement Trust entered into a deed of settlement (the Deed) on 19 August 2008. For the purposes of the Port Nicholson Block (Taranaki Whānui ki te Upoko o te Ika) Claims Settlement Act 2009, Ngāti Tama is a part of Taranaki Whānui, and all historic claims were said to be settled. The statement of defence also sets out various other affirmative defences.

[6]    Subsequently, discussions were held between counsel for the parties, but these proved unsuccessful. On 10 May 2024, the Attorney-General filed a notice that she would apply for a more explicit statement of claim and seek particulars of any allegations of fraud made against the Crown. This was based on prior correspondence that had passed between the parties. On 3 July 2024, Associate Judge Skelton ordered, by consent, that the plaintiff was to file and serve an amended statement of claim.3 This was to set out the jurisdictional basis for the plaintiff’s claim, the specific declarations sought, and also to plead the elements of the land transfer fraud alleged. Initial disclosure was also ordered. By consent, Associate Judge Skelton recorded too that:4

(a)the plaintiff does not seek declarations to call into question any title to, or interest in, land held by any person other than His Majesty or departments or agencies listed in schedule 2 part 1 of the Public Service Act 2020;

(b)the plaintiff does not seek, on the basis of this litigation, to prevent or impede the lawful transfer of titles or interests in land;

(c)the plaintiff accepts that these proceedings cannot seek “resumption” of title to land for transfer to Māori, and that such steps are governed by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.

[7]    Mr Churton filed his second amended statement of claim on 7 August 2024. This statement of claim cites cl 8.2.3 of the Deed to the effect that Mr Churton claims he is not precluded from bringing this proceeding. Mr Churton further particularises his claim contending that:

3      Churton v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2023-485-219, 3 July 2024.

4 At [9].

(a)On 27 September 1839, Colonel William Wakefield entered into a deed of purchase purporting to transfer some 160,000 acres of land from Māori ownership to the New Zealand Company, which was an invalid sale, with no effect. In particular, the boundaries of the land affected were inadequate, the explanation to Māori who entered into the sale was deficient and not well-understood, and those who entered into the purported sale were not properly authorised to do so.

(b)In November 1840, the Crown and the New Zealand Company reached an agreement that the New Zealand Company was entitled to four acres of land for every pound expended. An arbitration was held concerning the status of the land and, in February 1844, Colonel Wakefield paid

£1500 as compensation for the land. The arbitration was also defective because it lacked proper consultation with Māori or their informed consent.

(c)Between 1844 and 1846, disputes over the status of the land continued. In February 1846, Governor Grey, the governor at the time, occupied the land with armed forces, forcing Ngāti Tama from it and destroying their crops. In January 1848, Governor Grey issued a Crown grant to the New Zealand Company for 209,247 acres—the majority of which had never been validly purchased from Māori. When the New Zealand Company collapsed in 1850, this land was vested in the Crown.

(d)Governor Grey was governor when the vesting occurred and, having been responsible for the occupation of the land, he had actual knowledge of the manner in which the land had been taken when it was vested in the Crown.

(e)With respect to the Crown land transferred out of Crown ownership and subsequently acquired by the Crown or departments listed in pt 1 of sch 2 of the Public Service Act 2020, constructive knowledge of the manner in which the land was taken can be imputed to those actors.

[8]    In this statement of claim, Mr Churton also cites s 52 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 (and its predecessor sections). He submits that this section does not protect an owner who acquires land with knowledge of an interest not registered over the title. His position is that either:

(a)the Crown holds title to the Crown land subject to the unextinguished rights of Ngāti Tama as the holders of the aboriginal or customary title that was never validly extinguished; or

(b)the title to the Crown land is only clear of the Ngāti Tama interest through registration under the Land Transfer Act, or a prior Act.

[9]    Mr Churton now seeks declarations under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 or this Court’s inherent jurisdiction that aboriginal or customary title in respect of the Crown land was never validly extinguished or transferred. He further seeks declarations that the Crown land is being held subject to Ngāti Tama’s interest or is only clear of the Ngāti Tama interest as a result of Land Transfer Act registrations that took place.

[10]   With respect to the affected land not owned by the Crown, Mr Churton’s position is that the land was acquired by the registered owners without knowledge of the facts alleged within the statement of claim. Further, he says that s 52 of the Land Transfer Act (and equivalent predecessors) protect owners who acquire the land without knowledge of an interest not registered on the title. He therefore seeks declarations that customary title to the land was never validly extinguished or transferred and that the title to that land is only clear of the Ngāti Tama interest through registration under the Land Transfer Act or a prior Act. Finally, in his second amended statement of claim, Mr Churton seeks costs and any other relief this Court considers appropriate.

[11]   On 5 February 2025, the Attorney-General filed an amended statement of defence to this 7 August 2024 pleading. Mr Churton then filed a reply to the statement of defence on 20 February 2025. The proceeding was subsequently adjourned so that service on potential interested parties could be progressed.

[12]   On 26 May 2025, Mr Churton by his counsel responded to the Attorney- General’s notice seeking further and better particulars, clarifying the following points:

(a)Mr Churton reiterated that he is a trustee of the Ngāti Tama Trust, which represents the interests of Ngāti Tama O Ngāti Wai. He also clarified that he is a trustee of the Ngāti Tama Te Kaeaea Trust, which represents all actual and potential beneficiaries of Ngāti Tama Mandate Ltd and Ngāti Wai O Ngāti Tama Charitable Trust. Mr Churton’s position is that he holds a right in his own name to bring the claim before this Court, on behalf of affected Māori customary owners.5

(b)In respect of the claim of representation, Mr Churton confirms that it is “for Ngati Tama iwi of which it  relates  to  a  specific  group  of  Ngati Tama persons being the hapu of Ngati Wai and those people that were under the Chief Taranga Kuri”. He further goes on to state “the Ngati Tama iwi today is divided and there is Ngati Tama iwi in the top of the South Island, Ngati Tama iwi in Taranaki, Ngati Tama in Wellington, Ngati Tama in Porirua, and Ngati Tama in the upper Whanganui river”. In light of the “independent” nature of these groups, “the right to one group in land does not give another group those rights or equal rights”. He concludes “We, Ngati Tama O Ngati Wai hold exclusive Aboriginal title to the area marked on the map attached to the Statement of Claim with respect to Mutunga”.

(c)Mr Churton also reiterates his position that the historical account contained in the Deed is not relevant to this proceeding:

With respect to this matter, Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutanga held original Aboriginal title over most of 207,000 acres that made up the Port Nicholson Block from about 1823. It was Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutanga that occupied the area that is now Wellington City and lower Hutt Valley.

In December 1835, Ngati Awa (Te Atiawa) came to occupy part of this land, the hapu were Te Metehou, Ngati

5      For this proposition, Mr Churton cites the status of Mr Rore Stafford for the purposes of the Wakatū decision: see Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423, for example at [592].

Tawhirikura, Ngati Tawirkura, Ngati Puketapu and also Ngati Ruanui.

In or about 1835, 500 people of Ngati Mutanga left on the ship Rodney and 400 Ngati Tama. Ngati Tama did not panui any land to Te Atiawa. Both Ngati Mutanga and Ngati Tama did not permanently depart to the Chatham Islands.

[13]   On 12 June 2025, the Attorney-General served Mr Churton with an additional request for further and better particulars. By 23 June 2025, the Attorney-General had filed the application presently before me, seeking further particulars and a more explicit statement of claim.

Further particulars orders sought

[14]   Before me, the Attorney-General now seeks orders requiring further particulars and a more explicit statement of claim, in relation to:

(a)the standing of Mr Churton as plaintiff to bring a collective claim—that is Mr Churton’s representative status. This is so the defendant can understand the nature and identity of the collective interests claimed;

(b)the nature of the alleged fraud and the relevant conduct involved—in particular, which agent of the Crown acted fraudulently, and the knowledge they had of an identifiable interest in land that this conduct operated against at the relevant time. This is to enable the defendant to respond to the allegations of fraud; and

(c)the land that is the subject of the alleged fraud—that is, which declarations sought apply to which parcels of land in the claim area, by reference to the land registration system. This is to allow the defendant to properly understand how the relief sought relates to those parcels and their corresponding history of ownership.

[15]   With respect to the latter point, the particulars sought about the ownership history of the relevant land include:

(a)which land was transferred out of Crown ownership and subsequently acquired by the Crown or by departments listed in the Public Service Act 2020, sch 2, pt 1; and

(b)when was this land so reacquired by the Crown, what were the circumstances, who were the relevant agents, and what interests not registered did they have of knowledge at the relevant times, and/or what other particular knowledge did they have of the manner in which the land had been purchased that rendered the transfer fraudulent.

Legal principles

[16]   Rule 5.21(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides that a party may request that another party give such particulars of its pleadings as may be necessary “to give fair notice” of the cause of action or particulars required by the rules. This Court may, under r 5.21(3)–(4), order a more explicit pleading to be filed and served.

[17]Rule 5.26 meanwhile states:

5.26     Statement of claim to show nature of claim

The statement of claim—

(a)must show the general nature of the plaintiff’s claim to the relief

sought; and

(b)must give sufficient particulars of time, place, amounts, names of persons, nature and dates of instruments, and other circumstances to inform the court and the party or parties against whom relief is sought of the plaintiff’s cause of action; and

(c)must state specifically the basis of any claim for interest and the rate at which interest is claimed; and

(d)in a proceeding against the Crown that is instituted against the Attorney-General, must give particulars of the government department or officer or employee of the Crown concerned.

[18]   The Court of Appeal, in Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd, observed that the purpose of a pleading is to:6

6      Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 19.

…supply an outline of the case advanced, sufficient to enable a reasonable degree of pre-trial briefing and preparation. Discovery and interrogatories are only an adjunct, not a substitute for pleading.

[19]   This Court has previously observed that particulars of pleadings are important to:7

(a)inform the defendant as to the case they have to meet;

(b)limit the scope of matters the plaintiff may put in issue at trial;

(c)enable a defendant to know what witnesses will need to be retained and to enable it to start preparing evidence ahead of the formal exchange of evidence; and

(d)provide an opportunity for a defendant to seek summary determination of a claim on the basis that, as pleaded, it is untenable.

[20]   The adequacy of the pleading depends on factors such as the nature of the case, the scope of the pleadings, the issues in dispute, and the stage of the proceeding.8 Where over-pleading will obscure the issues or where excessively refined pleadings will prove unnecessary and wasteful of costs and court time, they should be avoided.9 The ultimate issue for determination, in the circumstances of the claim, is whether the pleading is sufficiently particular to state a clear issue and inform the opposite party of the case to be met.10

[21]   A useful framework for considering this point was set out in Body Corporate 74246 v QBE Insurance (International) Ltd:11

(a)Has sufficient information been provided to inform the other party of the case they have to meet and to enable them to take steps to respond?

7      Platt v Porirua City Council [2012] NZHC 2445 at [19].

8      Body Corporate 355492 v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2020] NZHC 2590 at [29].

9      BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2008) 23 NZTC 21,821 at [45].

10     Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd, above n 6, at 19.

11     Body Corporate 74246 v QBE Insurance (International) Ltd [2015] NZHC 1360 at [18](h).

(b)Is there a real risk that the other party may face a trial by ambush if the further particulars are not provided?

(c)Is the request an unreasonable burden or oppressive for the party concerned?

Discussion

Standing—Mr Churton’s representative status

[22]   First, the Attorney-General seeks further and better particulars in respect of Mr Churton’s representative status. Mr Prebble submits, on the Attorney-General’s behalf, that Mr Churton has not provided pleadings that establish the basis for his representative status, despite suing the Attorney-General as a representative of others (being Ngāti Tama or Ngāti Tama o Ngāti Wai).12 The Attorney-General argues that Mr Churton has not provided the basis on which  the  relevant  trust  represents  Ngāti Tama or Ngāti Tama o Ngāti Wai, nor the basis on which Mr Churton, as trustee, has been authorised to bring this proceeding. Mr Churton endeavours to rely on certain comments in the Supreme Court decision in Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General on this point.13 The Attorney-General would have me distinguish the finding of standing in that case as fact-specific. Further, the Attorney-General argues that the Wakatū case did not deal with customary land issues but instead addressed private law obligations resulting in constructive trusts. The Attorney-General emphasises that the effect of Wakatū was to confirm the scope for recognition of representative status, and not to dispose of standing and pleading requirements. Mr Churton has not, the Attorney-General submits, pleaded a factual basis for his standing in relation to a collective claim or for one on behalf of individual descendants of customary owners.

[23]   In respect of a mandate to establish Mr Churton’s standing to bring this claim on behalf of Ngāti Tama, Mr Paine, for Mr Churton, submits that there “have been several huis of Ngati Tama and there has been circulated a simple sheet of paper which contains the signatures of Ngati Tama” in support. Mr Churton argues too that he is not required to provide a mandate here, because that is a term used in the Waitangi

12     High Court Rules 2016, r 4.24.

13     Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General, above n 5.

Tribunal (and this is not a Waitangi Tribunal proceeding). Mr Churton contends that he has been given status to bring this proceeding since 1997. In addition, he submits that he can bring the claim in his personal capacity under tikanga and in accordance with the Wakatū decision.

[24]   In Wakatū, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Mr Stafford had standing to claim relief as a beneficiary of the tenths reserve (per Elias CJ, William Young, and Glazebrook JJ) and as a kaumātua of part of the collective customary owners (per Elias CJ, Glazebrook, Arnold and O’Regan JJ).14 Elias CJ observed:15

There is no question of Mr Stafford’s right as a beneficiary of the tenths reserves to claim relief in proceedings for breach of trust or fiduciary duty. Any beneficiary is entitled to have such matters investigated by the Court, as Lord Blackburn made clear in Kinloch. I also agree with the Court of Appeal that his customary authority as an acknowledged kaumātua of part of the collective customary owners permits him to bring a representative claim without the need to seek a representative order. Chiefs of high standing have long advanced such collective claims. I do not accept the submission that the fact that Mr Stafford cannot represent all interested hapū should affect his entitlement to claim as someone of standing who is directly interested.

[25]Meanwhile, Glazebrook J observed:16

Where there are conflicting claims as to customary authority and entitlement, it seems to me that these would usually be much better dealt with at the relief stage, rather as an issue of standing. This would mean that all findings of fact would have been made, enabling the decision on authority and rights to be customised for the particular case…

…

A flexible approach to facilitate claims of this nature, rather than one that obstructs such claims with procedural hurdles, is to be preferred. I would hold that all three appellants have standing to bring the claim relating to the breach of trust, which is how the claim was ultimately run.

[26]   Whilst I acknowledge the need for flexibility in claims involving customary authority with respect to standing, I accept the Attorney-General’s submission here that the standing in which Mr Churton brings this claim, based on his current pleadings, remains unclear. It is open to Mr Churton to bring this proceeding as a trustee or in accordance with tikanga. However, if he is bringing the proceeding as a

14     At [494], [673], [807] and [952].

15     At [494] (footnotes omitted), per Elias CJ.

16     At [672]–[673] (footnotes omitted), per Glazebrook J.

trustee, he must provide a basis on which first, the relevant trust in question represents Ngāti Tama or Ngāti Tama o Ngāti Wai. Secondly, he must show that, as trustee, he has been authorised by the trust to bring this proceeding. In my view, he has not done this here. Without that information, the Attorney-General is likely to remain unclear on the case to respond to.

Allegations of fraud

[27]   In respect of the allegations of fraud, the Attorney-General submits that the onerous pleading requirements for fraud have not been met in this case.  Further,   Mr Churton has not established a factual basis to demonstrate fraud of any kind on the part of the Crown. This includes that Mr Churton has not detailed the specific conduct that constitutes fraud, who committed it, and what knowledge they had at the time. The Attorney-General notes that, despite Mr Churton’s suggestion that these points are matters of evidence to be clarified by a “Waitangi Tribunal negotiations file” held by the Attorney-General, the obligation of defining the plaintiff’s case does not rest with her. In any event, contemporary negotiations are unlikely to relate to Mr Churton’s claim of customary title and land transfer fraud.

[28]   As to issues over the relevant conduct, Mr Churton emphasises the difficulties with respect to historical claims. He argues that the taking of the land by force (as depicted in the painting the Battle of Thorndon he provided) must meet the definition of fraud in the Land Transfer Act, as  does  the  disposition  of  that  land  to  the New Zealand Company.

[29]   In addition to the stringent requirements to establish fraud through the acquisition of land, in Schmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd, the Court of Appeal observed:17

Allegations of fraud or dishonesty are very serious. They must be pleaded with care and particularity. As the authors of Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings emphasise, counsel must not draft any originating process or pleading containing an allegation of fraud unless they have reasonably credible material which, as it stands, establishes a prima facie case of fraud — that is, material of such a character which would lead to the conclusion that serious allegations could properly be based upon it. Fraud

17     Schmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd [2012] NZCA 565 at [15] (footnotes omitted).

cannot be left to be inferred from the facts — fraudulent conduct must be distinctly alleged and as distinctly proved. General allegations, however strong the words may appear to be, are insufficient to amount to a proper allegation of fraud.

[30]Rule 5.17(2) of the High Court Rules also provides:

(2)If a party alleges a state of mind of a person, that party must give particulars of the facts relied on in alleging that state of mind.

[31]   I acknowledge that Mr Churton’s most recent amended statement of claim represents an improved step toward particularising the allegations of fraud, as opposed to those contained in his original statement of claim. Nonetheless, I consider that the claim requires further particularisation in the terms I will stipulate below, in light of the case law’s strict approach to pleading fraud or dishonesty.

The land in issue

[32]   Finally, in relation to the land that is the subject of the claim, as I understand the position, there are potentially many hundreds of land titles in issue. The Attorney- General emphasises that she lacks clarity about the declarations sought in relation to different parcels of land that simply have not been individually identified. The Attorney-General emphasises that it is not the defendant’s task to define the parameters of the claim here. This is particularly so where the material particulars sought are entirely within the knowledge or control of the plaintiff.18

[33]   Mr Churton’s position is that this Court is able to make the declarations sought by reference to the map provided alongside Mr Churton’s first statement of claim, given that it is said the land is subject to customary title.

[34]   I accept that to identify by reference to the land transfer system the parcels of land to which Mr Churton alleges the claim relates, may be a significant endeavour for either party. I accept the Attorney-General’s submission that the responsibility does not lie with her. I am however conscious of both the historical nature of the claims alleged and the risk that providing a detailed account of the fraud alleged in respect of each parcel of land is likely to prove oppressive for the plaintiff.

18     Poros v Bax [2015] NZHC 1579 at [16].

[35]   Accordingly, balancing the interests at play and in the interests of just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this proceeding,19 I consider that it is appropriate for the plaintiff to identify, by reference to title number, the parcels of Crown land only that the plaintiff considers were transferred out of Crown ownership and subsequently acquired by the Crown or departments listed in pt 1 of sch 2 of the Public Service Act 2020, in a fraudulent manner. The plaintiff should also briefly particularise the circumstances of Crown re-acquisition of the land in question, so as to provide clarity to the Attorney-General in respect of the points at which fraud are alleged in respect of each title.

Other points

[36]   Before me, Mr Paine, for Mr Churton, claimed that the affidavit filed in support of the Attorney-General’s interlocutory application:

…does not in any way supply the details that one would necessarily expect in an affidavit in support and no reason has been given as to why the information supplied in the defendant’s view is “insufficient”.

[37]   As is evident from my findings above, I consider that the material before me is more than sufficient to specify why the information supplied is insufficient, in the Attorney-General’s  view.  I  do  not  consider  that  this  procedural  point  assists  Mr Churton in the context of this application.

[38]   Mr Churton alleges too that the Attorney-General is in possession of a claims negotiation file which the plaintiff has seen, and he contends this will answer various questions raised by the Crown in the context of the present application. Mr Churton therefore seeks an order that the file be made available within seven days, and that within a further 14 days, the plaintiff is to consider whether or not any further amendments or additional causes of action should be pleaded. With respect to disclosure concerns raised by the plaintiff, the Attorney-General’s position is that she has provided all required initial disclosure. In any event, the Attorney-General notes that Mr Churton has previously acknowledged that the “deed of settlement background and historical account is not relevant to these proceedings”. I am inclined to agree

19     High Court Rules 2016, r 1.2.

with the Attorney-General that, for the purposes of initial disclosure/discovery, her obligations have been discharged. If further discovery is required by Mr Churton, he can seek to agree that with the Attorney-General or apply for a further order of this Court in due course.

Result

[39]   For all the reasons I outline above, the Attorney-General’s application for further particulars and a more explicit amended statement of claim succeeds.

[40]   An order is now made that within thirty (30) working days of the date of this judgment, the plaintiff is to file an amended statement of claim that pleads as far as possible, given the historical nature of the claim:

(a)Mr Churton’s representative status, in accordance with the terms specified at [25] of the Attorney-General’s memorandum in support of the present application dated 23 June 2025;

(b)the material factual basis for the claim of land transfer fraud, in accordance with the terms specified at [32] of the Attorney-General’s memorandum in support dated 23 June 2025; and

(c)how the relief sought relates to specific parcels of Crown land, specifying those parcels by reference to the land registration system as specified above at [35].

Costs

[41]   As I understand the position, the Attorney-General, although the successful party on her present application, does not seek costs here on the basis that it is understood that Mr Churton is legally aided. If that is not the case, the parties should endeavour to agree on any issues as to costs. If agreement cannot be reached then memoranda may be filed (not exceeding three pages, excluding costs schedules) and costs will be determined on the papers.

Gendall J

Solicitors:

Holland Beckett Law, Solicitors, Rotorua for Plaintiff Crown Law, Wellington for Defendant