Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Martin
[2016] NZHC 275
•25 February 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI-2015-404-285 [2016] NZHC 275
UNDER Section 107F Parole Act 2002 BETWEEN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Applicant
AND
JAMES TIMI MARTIN Respondent
Hearing: 16 February 2016 Counsel:
D J Dufty for Applicant
A Prasad and J Grainger for RespondentJudgment:
25 February 2016
JUDGMENT OF DAVISON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 25 February 2016 at 4:00pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Meredith Connell (Auckland) for Applicant
Public Defence Service (Auckland) for Respondent
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v MARTIN [2016] NZHC 275 [25
February 2016]
Introduction
[1] The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (the Applicant) has applied for an interim supervision order (ISO) against Mr Martin under s 107FA of the Parole Act 2002 (the Act).
[2] The application has been brought on the basis that Mr Martin’s current release conditions will expire before the extended supervision order (ESO) application can be heard.
[3] The application is opposed by Mr Martin.
Background
[4] Mr Martin’s extensive criminal conviction history includes five sexual offences. In 1974, he was convicted of his first sexual offence (indecently assaults female 12 to 16). He was aged 14. Some 18 years later, in 1992, Mr Martin was convicted of one count of rape and two counts of unlawful sexual connection. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and was released from prison in 1998.
[5] In 2001, Mr Martin was convicted of a rape that he had committed in November 1999, and was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment. He was released on parole on 30 July 2010 but was recalled to prison on 2 June 2011. His sentence came to an end on 29 November 2015. The conditions of release imposed by the Parole Board (release conditions) will expire on 28 February 2016.
Procedural history
[6] On 10 September 2015, in anticipation of Mr Martin’s release, the Applicant applied for an ESO. The application was scheduled for hearing on 10 December
2015.
[7] On 11 November 2015, Mr Martin’s then counsel, Mr Meyrick, was granted leave to withdraw as his counsel, and Ms Prasad was appointed as new counsel for Mr Martin. Given the change of counsel and that Ms Prasad had not yet received Mr Martin’s file, the hearing date of 10 December 2015 was vacated and a new
hearing date set for 6 April 2016. That date obviously post-dates the expiration of
Mr Martin’s release conditions.
[8] In order to cover the interval between the expiry date of Mr Martin’s release conditions and the hearing date of the ESO application, the Applicant applied for an order that, until the application for an ESO is finally determined, the offender be subject to the supervision conditions specified in the order.
[9] The application was opposed by Mr Martin when the ISO application was first called on 3 February 2016, and a hearing date for 16 February 2016 was set.
The statutory framework
[10] Section 107FA of the Act sets out the circumstances in which a court can make an ISO. That section provides:
107FA Sentencing court may make interim supervision order
(1) This section applies if, before an application for an extended supervision order is finally determined, 1 or more of the following events occur:
(a) the offender who is the subject of the application is released from detention:
(b) the offender who is the subject of the application ceases to be subject to an extended supervision order:
(c) the offender who is the subject of the application fails to appear at the hearing of the application and is brought before the court under a warrant issued under section 107G(3):
(d) an offender who is a person described in section 107C(1)(b)
arrives in New Zealand.
(2) The sentencing court may, on application by the chief executive, order that, until the application for an extended supervision order is finally determined, the offender is subject to the supervision conditions specified in the order.
(3) When the court makes an order under subsection (2) (an interim supervision order), it may impose any of the standard conditions that are (under section 107JA), or special conditions that may be (under section 107K), imposed under an extended supervision order.
(4) If, under an interim supervision order, the court imposes an intensive monitoring condition or residential restrictions, the period for which
the interim supervision order is in force is not to be taken into account for the purpose of the limits specified in section 107K(3)(b) and (ba).
(5) The court may suspend an interim supervision order subject to any conditions that the court thinks fit.
(6) An interim supervision order ceases to have effect when the application for an extended supervision order is finally determined or discontinued.
[11] Section 7 of the Act provides principles that guide any decision made by the Parole Board relating to the release of an offender into the community. That section relevantly provides:
7 Guiding principles
(1) When making decisions about, or in any way relating to, the release of an offender, the paramount consideration for the Board in every case is the safety of the community.
(2) Other principles that must guide the Board’s decisions are—
(a) that offenders must not be detained any longer than is consistent with the safety of the community, and that they must not be subject to release conditions that are more onerous, or last longer, than is consistent with the safety of the community; and
(b) that offenders must, subject to any of sections 13 to 13AE, be provided with information about decisions that concern them, and be advised how they may participate in decision- making that directly concerns them; and
(c) that decisions must be made on the basis of all the relevant information that is available to the Board at the time; and
(d) that the rights of victims (as defined in section 4 of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002) are upheld, and submissions by victims (as so defined) and any restorative justice outcomes are given due weight.
[12] Although by its terms, s 7 refers to the making of decisions by the Parole Board as regards the release of an offender, I consider that, having regard to the scheme of the Act and its purpose, the provisions of s 7 and the guiding principles set out therein are relevant and applicable to the Court’s consideration of whether to make an interim order pursuant to s 107FA.
[13] I also have regard to s 107I which sets out the ESO regime. Section 107I(1) states that the purpose of an order of extended supervision is to protect members of the community from those who, following receipt of a determinate sentence, pose a real and ongoing risk of committing serious or sexual violent offences. That confirms that the paramount consideration of the safety of the community, as set out under s 7, is applicable to the sentencing court in the ESO context. Given an ISO is in effect until the application for an ESO is finally determined, I consider that s 107I(1) should inform the Court’s approach to the making of an order in the ISO context.
Nature of the orders sought
[14] The Applicant submitted that an ISO should be imposed from 28 February
2016 until the application for an ESO is finally determined, on the basis that: (a) Mr Martin has been released from detention; and
(b) Mr Martin will cease to be subject to release conditions from
28 February 2016;
(c) on that date, the application for an ESO will not be finally determined;
and
(d)an ISO is necessary to protect the position, and maintain supervision of Mr Martin until the final determination of the ESO application.
[15] The Applicant pointed to the fact that the ISO would only apply and restrict Mr Martin’s freedoms for a relatively short period of time as the ESO is presently scheduled for hearing on 6 April 2016, and it is likely that the Court’s decision will be available either on that date or shortly thereafter.
[16] The Applicant also noted that the Act does not stipulate that it is an offence to breach any conditions of an ISO. Accordingly, the Applicant submitted that the Court should, under s 107G(6) of the Act, impose a bail condition stipulating that
Mr Martin must comply with the conditions of the ISO until the final determination of the ESO application.
[17] Originally, the Applicant sought the imposition of all the standard extended supervision conditions set out under s 107JA. However, in the course of oral discussion, counsel for the Applicant, Mr Dufty, responsibly conceded that the condition requiring Mr Martin not to associate with persons under the age of 16 would be inapplicable and unnecessary (s 107JA(1)(i)). This is because Mr Martin does not have any convictions for sexual offences against children. His history of offending has involved adult victims. His one previous conviction involving offending against a young girl occurred when Mr Martin was a youth himself, aged
14.
[18] The Applicant also sought the following special conditions be imposed on
Mr Martin:
1.To reside at an address approved by a Probation Officer and not to move from that address without the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.
2.In the absence of a residential address, to report on a daily basis to a Community Corrections service centre (or other location) as directed in writing by a Probation Officer, and remain at this location for up to two hours for the purpose of charging your GPS anklet. This condition will remain in force until such time that suitable accommodation has been secured.
3.To attend a reintegration meeting with support people or agencies as may be directed by a Probation Officer.
4.Not to communicate or associate with Black Power Gang members or associates or any other people identified in writing by the Probation Officer, unless you have the prior written consent of your Probation Officer.
5.Not to approach or enter the city boundaries of Rotorua unless you have the prior written consent of your Probation Officer and then only on such conditions as may be stipulated.
6.To comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring, and provide access to the approved residence to the Probation Officer and representatives of the monitoring company, for the purpose of maintaining the electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the Probation Officer.
7.If directed, to undertake and complete appropriate treatment/counselling/programme, as may be recommended to the satisfaction of the Probation Officer and treatment provider.
8.If directed, to attend for a psychological assessment. Attend and complete any treatment/counselling as recommended by the psychological assessment to the satisfaction of your Probation Officer and treatment provider.
9. Not to possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs.
10.To submit to electronic monitoring in the form of Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer to monitor compliance with any condition relating to your whereabouts.
Respondent’s submissions
[19] Ms Prasad and Mr Grainger appeared for Mr Martin. Ms Prasad noted that s 107FA does not provide a statutory test that must be met before an ISO can be imposed. Ms Prasad drew attention to the absence of any case law guiding the court’s discretion under this provision. In her submissions, she proposed following a three-stage process:
(a) Stage one: determine whether there is a reasonable chance that the application for the ESO can succeed. If there is no reasonable chance, the application should be dismissed.
(b)Stage two: determine as a matter of discretion whether the court will impose an ISO, taking into account all relevant factors.
(c) Stage three: if discretion is exercised to impose an ISO, determine what ISO conditions will be imposed. Each of these conditions should be linked to the particular risks of the offender, and with the least restriction on liberty appropriate in the circumstances.
[20] Ms Prasad emphasised that the proposed ISO conditions significantly restrict and intrude upon Mr Martin’s rights and freedoms as affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). She also submitted that the ESO regime is inconsistent with some of the rights affirmed in that Act. Accordingly, she
submitted, the decision to impose an ISO should attract a high level of judicial scrutiny because of the individual rights and freedoms thereby affected.
[21] Ms Prasad further submitted that, on the available evidence, there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant’s case succeeding. She specifically relied on a passage in the Health Assessor’s Report (the Report) which, she said, is an effectively insuperable obstacle to the prospects of the ESO application succeeding. This passage is referred to and set out later in this Judgment.
[22] In his submissions which addressed the proposed conditions, Mr Grainger objected to the following conditions being sought by the Applicant:
(a) That Mr Martin must obtain prior consent of a Probation Officer before changing his employment and must not engage in any employment in which the Probation Officer has directed him not to engage.
(b)That Mr Martin is restricted from associating or having contact with a person under the age of 16.
(c) That Mr Martin is electronically monitored.
[23] Mr Grainger argued that these conditions are unnecessary given the nature of the risk that Mr Martin poses to the community. Mr Grainger emphasised that Mr Martin’s offending can be characterised as having been opportunistic (rather than predatory) in nature and has involved adult victims. He submitted that the standard ESO conditions were originally designed to protect the public from child sex offenders and, therefore, those conditions are of no relevance to Mr Martin’s case.
The evidence
[24] In support of its application, the Applicant relied on the contents of the Report prepared by a registered psychologist, Mr Anton van Dyk. For the purpose of preparing his report, Mr van Dyk met with and interviewed Mr Martin. He undertook a review of the probation and prison psychological files held relating to
Mr Martin, and reviewed a number of Probation Office pre-sentence reports and the Judge’s Sentencing Notes in relation to the index offence and in respect of the 1990 offence. He also interviewed the “treating psychologist” and a Community Support person from Waikato PARS, who had both had involvement with Mr Martin. The Report, dated 31 July 2015, is detailed and comprehensive. In it, he set out a detailed review of Mr Martin’s relevant previous offences which he concluded demonstrated a pattern of offending. He reviewed the psychological treatment that Mr Martin had received, and also assessed the potential for Mr Martin to reoffend and the nature and degree of the risk of Mr Martin reoffending. I summarise the key conclusions reached in that Report.
The nature of Mr Martin’s offending
[25] Mr van Dyk noted that Mr Martin’s criminal history shows a pattern of sexual offending commencing from an early age. His offending escalated over time in both frequency and severity.
[26] His sexual offending occurred against three peer-aged female victims who were reported to have been known to him. Mr van Dyk concluded that Mr Martin’s offending appeared “more opportunistic (exploitative-impulsive) in nature”.
Potential to reoffend
[27] Mr van Dyk concluded that Mr Martin was at a “high risk” of committing a
further relevant sexual offence, saying:
It is considered that there is a high risk that Mr Martin will engage in relevant sexual offending within ten years of release.
[28] Mr van Dyk considered that if Mr Martin was to reoffend sexually, the offending may range from indecent assault to rape and is likely to be opportunistic in nature, involving a peer-age victim.
[29] Mr van Dyk also considered that any future offending, more generally, is likely to occur in the context of relationship difficulties; resumed gang affiliation; substance use; increased thoughts about perceived injustices; perceiving himself as a
victim (from authorities); becoming overly rigid in his thinking; and in circumstances where he is unable to utilise his support network effectively.
Intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence
[30] As I noted earlier, Ms Prasad placed considerable emphasis on the passage in the Report where Mr van Dyk, in relation to “Risk Issues”, commented that:
In summary, despite having a sexual pre-occupation or elevated sex drive in the past that included promiscuity, there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that Mr Martin has demonstrated an intense drive or urge to commit a further sexual offence or that such an urge has persisted over recent time.
[31] Ms Prasad referred me to s 107IAA of the Act which sets out the matters that a Court must be satisfied of when assessing and determining whether a sexual offender poses a high risk of re-offending. That section relevantly provides:
107IAA Matters court must be satisfied of when assessing risk
(1) A court may determine that there is a high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant sexual offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—
(a) displays an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence; and
(b) has a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending;
and
(c) has limited self-regulatory capacity; and
(d) displays either or both of the following:
(i) a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending:
(ii) an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.
[32] Ms Prasad correctly submitted that before concluding that an offender poses a high risk of committing a further relevant sexual offence, the Court must be satisfied that all matters listed under subsection (1) have been met.
[33] Ms Prasad accepted that the contents of the Report are not determinative of the issue of risk, and that the Court must itself decide whether all four of the criteria
set out in s 107IAA are present in Mr Martin’s case. Ms Prasad submitted, however, that the Report will be the primary source of evidence from which the Court determines whether the four criteria are in fact met. In Ms Prasad’s submission, given the passage of the Report set out in para [30] above, one of the essential statutory criteria was not satisfied and, accordingly, the ESO application must be considered to have very limited prospects of success.
The making of an ISO
Relevant law
[34] Section 107FA provides that the Court “may” order that an offender is subject to supervision conditions specified in an ISO. It does not contain a statutory test that must be satisfied before the Court can make an ISO. Neither counsel were able to direct me to any case law that would directly assist the Court in deciding whether or not to make an order under s 107FA(2).
[35] In my view, when looking for guidance, the starting point must be s 7 of the Act. As I have earlier noted, that section is titled “guiding principles” and applies to all decisions that pertain to the release of an offender. Pursuant to that section, the paramount consideration “in every case is the safety of the community”. The purpose of an ESO, as set out in s 107I(2), being to protect members of the community from those who, following receipt of a determinate sentence, pose a real and ongoing risk of committing serious sexual or violence offences, is also relevant. Applying these principles in the context of determining whether to make an ISO, primacy must be given to the safety of the community, whilst also recognising and applying the principle that offenders must not be subject to conditions that are more
onerous, or last longer, than is consistent with the safety of the community.1
[36] Turning to the purpose of an ISO, it is apparent that the making of an ISO is intended to allow interim supervision of an offender following release on parole, before due consideration can be given to whether an ESO should be made. An ISO is therefore a temporary measure intended to cover a situation where there would
otherwise be a period of no supervision. It is likely to be appropriate and indeed
1 Parole Act 2002, s 7(2)(a).
necessary in cases such as the present where an ESO application hearing post-dates the expiry of release conditions.
[37] It follows that when deciding whether to make an ISO, the Court need not be satisfied to the same extent as is required when considering whether to make an ESO. For that reason, I reject the submission made on Mr Martin’s behalf that the Court should effectively be satisfied that an ESO should be made before an ISO is made.
[38] I consider that the nature of the Court’s decision in the s 107FA context has much in common with other types of interim orders made by a Court, such as interim injunctions generally and, particularly, interim orders sought under s 8 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. Here the Court should have regard to all the circumstances, which include the prima facie strength of the application by reference to the matters and material relied upon, the statutory framework and also the likely effect of an ISO upon the individual in respect of whom it is sought. The statutory framework has been considered at paras [10] to [13] above; the emphasis upon the safety of the community will clearly be a matter of significant weight in the Court’s assessment. In light of these considerations, the court should then decide whether those factors justify the temporary restrictions that will be imposed upon the offender pending the Court’s full consideration of the matter at the ESO hearing.
[39] If, having regard to those factors, the Court is satisfied that there is a sufficient and reasonable foundation for the ISO application – and that its operation will be of short duration and on conditions limited to those necessary to protect the safety of the public – the Court has the power to, and will be justified in, making an ISO.
[40] Accordingly, I do not accept Ms Prasad’s submission that the Court should consider whether the ESO application has a “reasonable chance of success”. For the same reasons, I am equally unpersuaded by the submission that the Court should take a “hard look” when doing so. Thorough and detailed evaluation of the merits of the ESO application should properly be left until the hearing of the ESO application itself.
[41] Of course, there is a threshold that must be demonstrated before an ISO should be made. Were it to be shown that the grounds and material relied upon in support of an application were insubstantial and unconvincing, as against the nature and extent of the restrictions to be imposed upon the respondent, then the Court should decline to make an ISO, in much the same way and on much the same basis as it would decline to make other interim orders.
Application
[42] As stated earlier, Ms Prasad relied heavily on one passage in the Report. That passage concluded that there is “not sufficient evidence” from which to conclude that Mr Martin displays an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence. For the ESO application to succeed, the Court must be satisfied that Mr Martin displays these characteristics.
[43] I do not consider that I should decline to make an ISO solely on the basis of this single passage in the Report. That passage, itself, is not determinative. The Report must be read as a whole. In any event, it is expert evidence that is to be considered together with all and any other relevant evidence. I do not consider, therefore, that the ESO application must necessarily fail on this point alone. As the Court of Appeal in R v Peta held, “[t]he making of an ESO is a judicial decision and
not that of the health assessor”.2 The Court will make its own assessment of the
evidence to be adduced at the ESO hearing rather than “rubber-stamping health
assessors’ reports”.3
[44] In any event, despite his observation that “…there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that Mr Martin has demonstrated an intense drive or urge to commit a further sexual offence….”, Mr van Dyk nevertheless concluded that:
Based on a multi-method assessment, and noted clinical factors, it is considered that there is a high risk of Mr Martin committing a further relevant sexual offence.
2 R v Peta [2007] NZCA 28, [2007] 2 NZLR 627 at [7].
3 At [7].
[45] Having regard to all the contents of the Report prepared by Mr van Dyk, and also to the other relevant facts and circumstances, I consider that there are in fact strong and substantial grounds present in support of the making of an ESO and there is at the very least a prima facie basis for the making of an ESO. That conclusion is not necessarily precluded by the opinion expressed by Mr van Dyk on whether or not Mr Martin has demonstrated an intense drive or urge to commit a further sexual offence.
[46] By applying the guiding principle that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration, I am well satisfied that this is a proper and appropriate case where an ISO should be made. Moreover, the ISO is only likely to be in place for a comparatively short period of time until the determination of the ESO application. The temporary restrictions on Mr Martin’s liberty are therefore, likely to be short-lived.
Conditions to be imposed
[47] Having decided to make an ISO, I next consider which conditions shall be attached to that order.
[48] Pursuant to s 107FA(3), when the court makes an ISO, it may impose any of the standard conditions that are, or special conditions that may be, imposed under an ESO.
[49] I accept Mr Grainger’s submission that in determining whether a restriction is justified or not, the inquiry should be fact-specific. That is, there must be a nexus between the perceived risk posed by the offender and the effectiveness of the proposed condition. I now consider the opposed conditions with this consideration in mind.
Association with persons under the age of 16
[50] Mr Dufty accepted in the course of oral discussion that this condition was unnecessary. Mr Martin is not a child sex offender.
[51] Accordingly, I will not impose this condition on the order for interim supervision.
Employment conditions
[52] Mr Grainger placed emphasis on the Report’s conclusion that Mr Martin is an opportunistic (rather than predatory) offender. What is meant by the term “opportunistic” is that Mr Martin’s offending has been exploitative or situational rather than premeditated. On this basis, Mr Grainger submitted that the proposed employment conditions were unnecessary because there was only a tenuous link between the perceived risk and the effectiveness of the condition. I do not agree. The benefit of the employment conditions is that the Parole Officer can limit the situations in which Mr Martin can place himself that may be conducive to opportunistic offending. There is therefore a clear link between the perceived risk and the effectiveness of the provision.
[53] I impose both of the employment conditions sought by the Applicant.
Electronic monitoring
[54] Once again, Mr Grainger emphasised the opportunistic nature of Mr Martin’s offending. He also stressed that Mr Martin was not a child sex offender. He submitted that the standard ESO conditions were originally designed to protect the public from child sex offenders, specifically by preventing offenders from entering places such as parks where young people often congregate. Mr Grainger submitted, therefore, that a condition requiring electronic monitoring would not be necessary for Mr Martin. Mr Grainger referred me to s 107RB of the Act which recognises that electronic monitoring is a “high impact” condition requiring review every two years. Moreover, Mr Grainger drew my attention to reports of the Attorney-General made pursuant to s 7 of the NZBORA which considered electronic monitoring to be inconsistent with the rights affirmed in that Act. In light of those reports, Mr Grainger submitted that the Court, when imposing special conditions on an interim or an extended basis, should not impose conditions that appear to be inconsistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA. To that extent, Mr Grainger’s submission is consistent with the s 7 Parole Act guiding principle that
offenders must not be detained any longer than is consistent with the safety of the community, and that they must not be subject to release conditions that are more onerous, or last longer, than is consistent with the safety of the community.
[55] In response, Mr Dufty submitted that electronic monitoring serves a much broader purpose than that contended by Mr Grainger. He said that electronic monitoring allows Parole Officers to monitor the whereabouts of the offender and to ensure compliance with other parole or supervision conditions. I agree. The electronic monitoring regime cannot be dismissed as an unnecessary hangover from its origins in protection against child sex offending. In fact, s 15A(1) of the Act makes it very clear that the purpose of electronic monitoring is to:
… deter the offender from breaching conditions that relate to his or her whereabouts, and to monitor compliance with those conditions.
[56] Accordingly, electronic monitoring is a justified restriction of Mr Martin’s liberty in that it ensures compliance with many of the other conditions imposed by the ISO. I impose the electronic monitoring condition sought by the Applicant.
Special condition 9
[57] This condition provides that Mr Martin is not to possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs. Although this condition was not specifically raised during the course of oral discussion, I have decided to amend that condition to the following:
Not to possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs or enter onto any licensed premises.
[58] I do so on the basis that Mr Martin’s offending has previously involved
meeting his victims in a bar environment.
Other conditions
[59] I impose the other conditions sought by the Applicant.
The granting of bail
[60] The Applicant submitted that the Court should, pursuant to s 107G(6), impose a bail condition stipulating that Mr Martin must comply with the conditions of the ISO until the final determination of the ESO application. That is because the Act does not stipulate that it is an offence to breach any condition of an ISO.4
[61] I have carefully considered counsels’ submissions on this point and I decline to impose a bail condition. Section 107G deals with the granting of bail in the context of an ESO hearing. The present case, however, deals with an ISO application. Parliament has not addressed the consequences of non-compliance with conditions imposed by an ISO, and I am not satisfied there is any jurisdiction to apply the provisions of s 107G(6) in the ISO context.
[62] However, that is not to say that the offender’s breach of any ISO conditions is without consequences. As I have already stated, an ISO is a short term arrangement that remains in effect until full consideration can be given to an ESO application. Any breach of the ISO conditions is likely to be relevant to the determination of the ESO application notwithstanding there are no direct sanctions under the Act.
Result
[63] The application for the making of an ISO is granted, with the following conditions which are to take effect from 28 February 2016 and which are to expire upon the final determination of the ESO application.
Standard conditions
(a) Mr Martin must report in person to a Probation Officer in the probation area in which he resides as soon as practicable, and not later than 72 hours, after commencement of the interim supervision order.
(b)Mr Martin must report to a Probation Officer as and when required to do so by a Probation Officer, and must notify the Probation Officer of
4 It is, however, an offence to breach a condition of an extended supervision order under s 107T of the Parole Act.
his residential address and the nature and place of his employment when asked to do so.
(c) Mr Martin must obtain the prior written consent of a Probation Officer before moving to a new residential address.
(d)If consent is given under para (c) and Mr Martin is moving to a new probation area, he must report in person to a Probation Officer in the new probation area in which he is to reside as soon as practicable, and not later than 72 hours, after his arrival in the new area.
(e) Mr Martin must not reside at any address at which a Probation Officer has directed him not to reside.
(f) Mr Martin must obtain the prior written consent of a Probation Officer before changing his employment.
(g)Mr Martin must not engage, or continue to engage, in any employment or occupation in which the Probation Officer has directed him not to engage or continue to engage.
(h)Mr Martin must take part in a rehabilitative and reintegrative needs assessment if and when directed to do so by a Probation Officer.
(i)Mr Martin must not associate with, or contact, a victim of his offending without the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.
(j)Mr Martin must not associate with, or contact, any person or class of person specified in a written direction given to him for the purposes of this paragraph.
Special conditions
(a) Mr Martin is to reside at an address approved by a Probation Officer and not to move from that address without the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.
(b)In the absence of a residential address, Mr Martin is to report on a daily basis to a Community Corrections service centre (or other location) as directed in writing by a Probation Officer, and remain at this location for up to two hours for the purpose of charging a GPS anklet. This condition is to remain in force until such time that suitable accommodation has been secured.
(c) Mr Martin is to attend a reintegration meeting with support people or agencies as may be directed by a Probation Officer.
(d)Mr Martin is not to communicate or associate with Black Power Gang members or associates or any other people identified in writing by the Probation Officer, without the prior written consent of a Probation Officer.
(e) Mr Martin is not to approach or enter the city boundaries of Rotorua without the prior written consent of a Probation Officer and then only on such conditions as may be stipulated.
(f) Mr Martin is to comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring, and provide access to the approved residence to a Probation Officer and representatives of the monitoring company, for the purpose of maintaining the electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a Probation Officer.
(g)If directed, Mr Martin is to undertake and complete appropriate treatment/counselling/programme, as may be recommended to the satisfaction of a Probation Officer and treatment provider.
(h)If directed, Mr Martin is to attend for a psychological assessment. He is to attend and complete any treatment/counselling as recommended by the psychological assessment to the satisfaction of a Probation Officer and treatment provider.
(i)Mr Martin is not to possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs or enter onto any licensed premises.
(j) Mr Martin is to submit to electronic monitoring in the form of GPS
monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer to monitor compliance with any condition relating to his whereabouts.
Davison J
17