CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND JOSHUA GREY

[2023] NZHC 3238

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2023-404-491

[2023] NZHC 3238

UNDER

Section 107F of the Parole Act 2002

BETWEEN

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Applicant

AND

JOSHUA GREY

Respondent

Hearing:	9 November 2023
Appearances:	STL Teppett and A N Dawson for applicant S Kim for respondent
Date of judgment:	16 November 2023

JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 16 November 2023 at 3.30pm.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Meredith Connell, Auckland

Public Defence Service, North Shore

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v GREY [2023] NZHC 3238 [16
November 2023]

[1]    The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (Corrections) sought an extended supervision order (ESO) in respect of Joshua Grey, in anticipation of his indecent assault conviction imprisonment sentence’s expiry.1 The sentence now has expired, but Mr Grey remains remanded in custody on a charge of indecent assault. But for that remand, Mr Grey is entitled to be released from detention.

[2]    An ESO is “to protect members of the community from those who … pose    a real and ongoing risk of committing serious sexual or violent offences”.2 The ESO application is for hearing on 21 March 2024. Pending its determination, in anticipation of his prospective release, Corrections now seeks an interim supervision order (ISO) in respect of Mr Grey.3 An ISO provides, “until the application for an [ESO] is finally determined, the offender is subject to the supervision conditions specified in the [ISO]”,4 being any of the standard or special conditions imposed or imposable under an ESO.5 An ISO is “parasitic” on the ESO application.6

[3]    Corrections proposes the same conditions for the ISO as it seeks for the ESO,7 including an intensive monitoring condition.8 It prefers imposition of residential conditions 1.3–1.6 await identification of an appropriate residence for Mr Grey’s release and the requisite s 34 report then is available. For Mr Grey, Sue Kim advises she discussed the sought conditions with Mr Grey (aided by a communications assistant), who opposes only the intensive monitoring condition.

Mr Grey

[4]    Mr Grey now is 38 years old. As implied by reference to the communications assistant, he has cognitive vulnerabilities — including frequent engagement with mental health services and hospitalisation, with diagnosed schizophrenia and

1      Parole Act 2002, s 107F.

2      Section 107I(1).

3      Section 107FA(1).

4      Section 107FA(2).

5      Section 107FA(3).

6      Chisnall v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 114, [2018] 1 NZLR 83 at [37].

7      The sought conditions are set out at the Schedule to this judgment, including at 1.11 an additional condition.

8      Parole Act, s 107FA(4).

schizoaffective disorder — and was assessed in the borderline range of intellectual functioning.

[5]    Mr Grey was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for the rape of a 14-year- old girl after breaking into her home on 6 August 2004.9 Prior to the active charge of indecent assault,10 allegedly of a 17-year-old [Redacted] in 2020 or 2021, Mr Grey was serving a one year and one month’s imprisonment sentence also for indecent assault, then of a woman walking home through central Auckland during the early afternoon of 21 March 2022.

[6]    In the intervening years, Mr Grey has served sentences of short-term imprisonment, home detention and intensive supervision  — by my calculation, for   a cumulative period of nearly six years and six months — for a variety of violence and drugs related offending and breaches of release conditions. They include convictions for assaults on a woman and on people in family relationships with him. His earlier offending in 2002 and 2003 was of a similar (if mostly less serious) nature, giving rise to six months’ imprisonment and a year’s supervision, but including assault (including assault on a child) and family violence.

[7]    In total, in the  approximately 20 years  to 2023, Mr Grey  has spent some   16 years either in prison or under court-ordered supervision. Some additional period also has been spent in hospital.

The law

[8]    Section 107F entitles Corrections to seek an ESO in respect of an “eligible offender”, relevantly defined as an offender who:11

… is not subject to an indeterminate sentence but is a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a relevant offence (and that sentence has not been quashed or otherwise set aside) and has not ceased, since his or her latest conviction for a relevant offence (that has not been quashed or otherwise set aside), to be subject to any or all of the following:

(i)     a sentence of imprisonment (whether for a relevant offence or otherwise):

(ii)   release conditions (whether suspended or not):

9      Crimes Act 1961, s 128(1)(a); maximum penalty 20 years’ imprisonment.

10     Section 135; maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

11     Parole Act, s 107C(1)(a).

(iii) an extended supervision order … .

Mr Grey’s sentences of imprisonment on the rape and indecent assault convictions are for relevant offences.12 (His sentences on other convictions are not.) He has ceased to be subject to the last of them. His current remand on bail is not a relevant constraint. He accordingly is an ‘eligible offender’.

[9]Section 107I(2) of the Parole Act 2002 provides:

A sentencing court may make an extended supervision order if, following the hearing of an application made under section 107F, the court is satisfied, having considered the matters addressed in the health assessor’s report as set out in section 107F(2A), that—

(a)    the offender has, or has had, a pervasive pattern of serious sexual or violent offending; and

(b)    either or both of the following apply:

(i)there is a high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant sexual offence:

(ii)there is a very high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant violent offence.

Such satisfaction is:13

… concerned with present or past behaviour, which determine an eligible offender’s susceptibility to an ESO, and future risk, which ultimately determines whether an ESO ought to be made. These are distinct criteria, both of which must be satisfied.

By ‘pervasive pattern’ is meant a pattern “sufficiently characteristic of the offender to serve as a predictor of future conduct”.14

[10]   Section 107F(2A) requires every health assessor’s report to “address one or both of the following questions”:

(a)  whether—

(i)the offender displays each of the traits and behavioural characteristics specified in section 107IAA(1); and

(ii)there is a high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant sexual offence:

(b)    whether—

(i)the offender displays each of the behavioural characteristics specified in section 107IAA(2); and

12     Section 107B.

13     Kiddell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2019] NZCA 171 at [17].

14     Kiddell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 13, at [23(a)].

(ii)there is a very high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant violent offence.

For completeness, s 107IAA(1) and (2) provide:

107IAA Matters court must be satisfied of when assessing risk

(1)    A court may determine that there is a high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant sexual offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a)displays an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence; and

(b)has a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending; and

(c)has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(d)displays either or both of the following:

(i)     a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending:

(ii)   an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

(2)    A court may determine that there is a very high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant violent offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a)has a severe disturbance in behavioural functioning established by evidence of each of the following characteristics:

(i)     intense drive, desires, or urges to commit acts of violence; and

(ii)   extreme aggressive volatility; and

(iii) persistent harbouring of vengeful intentions towards 1 or more other persons; and

(b)either—

(i)     displays behavioural evidence of clear and long-term planning of serious violent offences to meet a premeditated goal; or

(ii)   has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(c)displays an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her violence on actual or potential victims.

[11]   There is a three-step process following determination of the offender as “eligible” for an ESO: if a pervasive sexual or violent offender; the offender’s specific qualification in terms of s 107IAA traits and behavioural characteristics; and, if so qualifying, the risk of future serious sexual or violent offending.15 Given ESOs are to be regarded as imposing a penalty, a second punishment unjustifiably inconsistent with

15     Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Alinizi [2016] NZCA 468 at [13]; see also Kiddell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 13, at [16]–[27].

the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,16 “strong justification” is required to make an ESO.17

Health assessor’s report

[12]   As implied by s 107I(2), an ESO requires prior assessment of the subject by  a health assessor.18 Corrections will rely on Dr Stephanie Fisher’s 1 September 2023 report. Dr Fisher is a registered clinical psychologist.

[13]   After outlining Mr Grey’s background and criminal history — including the active charge and reports of Mr Grey’s “inappropriate sexual behaviour and sexualised comments toward female staff” while in custody, and Mr Grey’s diagnosed personality profile as having elevated narcissistic, avoidant and antisocial aspects — Dr Fisher considered:

[H]is sexual offending is driven by his general antisocial personality and lifestyle, likely exacerbated by his poorly managed mental health and substance use difficulties, his limited perspective taking and consideration of others, high sexual compulsivity, and sex as coping[.]

The relationship between his sexual and violent offending appears to be related to his lack of interpersonal skills, which means a regular sexual partner is difficult to maintain, and may also not be a desirable goal for Mr Grey. Therefore, he sometimes engages in a relationship with a vulnerable individual, where they engage in frequent sex, but reactive violence becomes a part of the relationship when he does not cope with conflict.

[14]Dr Fisher additionally noted:

Mr Grey has engaged in intensive group treatment commensurate to his risk level, however, this may have been targeted at him being a child sexual offender, when his pattern of sexual offender appears more akin to that of an adult sexual offender, with an indiscriminate pattern of victim selection and offending. Furthermore, his limited cognitive capacity and mental health difficulties (although managed well at the time) likely made it more difficult for him to succeed in such a group. Mr Grey has not maintained his treatment learning and has since reoffended. It seems likely that he would need long- term specialist treatment in order to make changes to mitigate his risk, and this would require him to be able to maintain his medication regime and a stable

16 Chisnall v Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 24, (2022) 13 HRNZ 107 at [3(a)] and Chisnall v Attorney-General [2021] NZCA 616, [2022] 2 NZLR 484 at [138].

17 R (CA586/2021) v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 225 at [53], citing Chisnall v Attorney-General [2021] NZCA 616, above n 16, at [190]; Wilson v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 289 at [47].

18 Parole Act, ss 107A(a) and 107F(2A).

lifestyle to be successful. There are a number of barriers to Mr Grey being able to successfully implement treatment learning in the community setting.

[15]   Using standard risk actuarial tools,19 Dr Fisher located Mr Grey’s prospects by reference to s 107IAA(1)’s risks (as engaged by s 107F(2A)). She considered Mr Grey presented “a high risk of committing a further relevant sexual offence if left unsupervised in the community”, which risk was enduring.

Discussion

[16]   The Parole Act makes no specific statutory reference to a threshold for the making of an ISO, even if by reference to the criteria for an ESO.20 A “balancing test” has been applied in derivation from consideration of interim applications in civil proceedings,21 but queried in favour of a test for the Court’s satisfaction on the balance of probabilities the threshold for an ESO is crossed.22

[17]   The civil test is if a plaintiff has a serious question for trial, and the balance of convenience and overall justice favour granting interim relief.23 ‘Overall justice’ is the ultimate consideration, being “whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other”.24

19 Static-99R (see L Maaike Helmus and others Static-99R & Static-2002R Evaluators’ Workbook (SAARNA, 28 September 2021)); Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offence Version (VRS-SO) (see Mark Olver and other Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offense Version (VRS-SO): Users’ Workbook (Psynergy.ca, August 2020)); Stable-2007 (see “STABLE-2007/ACUTE-2007” (2021) SAARNA

< Chisnall v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 6, at [24].

21 At [26]–[27], citing Chief Executive of Department of Corrections v [W] HC Auckland CIV-2015- 404-2878, 7 December 2015 (Minute of Brewer J) at [8]; Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Martin [2016] NZHC 275 at [38]; and Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Bradbury [2016] NZHC 2461 at [21].

22 At [40]–[41]. On unsuccessful further appeal, in the context of interim detention orders under the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014, Elias CJ explained the relevant criteria for final orders under that Act were distinguishable from those under the Parole Act: Chisnall v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 6, at [14]–[15], and at [20], at least in the 2014 Act’s context, applications for ISOs “are necessarily determined on a provisional view of the evidence because until the substantive hearing of the public protection order application the evidence may not yet be fully tested or countered by evidence called on behalf of the respondent”. (Allowing an ISO could be made in that context, the majority limited itself to approving the test adopted by the Court of Appeal for making an interim detention order: at [43] and [84].)

23 Commerce Commission v Viagogo AG [2019] NZCA 472, [2019] 3 NZLR 559 at [30]–[31], citing American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL). See also NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90 at [12], citing Roseneath Holdings Ltd v Grieve [2004] 2 NZLR 168 (CA) at [35] –[37].

24 Commerce Commission v Viagogo AG, above n 23, at [30]–[31], citing Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 142 and National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corp Ltd [2009] UKPC 16, [2009] 1 WLR 1405 at [16] and [17].

—qualification for ISO

[18]   Mrs Kim resists Corrections’ proposition Mr Grey has or had a pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending. She contends for no material comparability between his rape and indecent assault offending, pointing to the earlier rape offending against a young person asleep in her bed after breaking into her home at night and the latter indecent assault offending against an adult in public during the day. She emphasises Mr Grey is presumed innocent of the active charge of indecent assault of [Redacted], which otherwise might be thought to bridge characteristics of his offending.

[19]   For Corrections, relying on those convictions and charge for Mr Grey’s contended pervasive  pattern  of  serious  sexual  offending,  Sam  Teppett  points  to s 107F(3), which entitles the health assessor to take into account any of Mr Grey’s conduct, irrespective if it constitutes an offence or Mr Grey has been convicted for it.

So too may the Court considering if to make an ESO.25

[20]   Given Mr Grey’s eligibility and the health assessor’s report,  Corrections has a serious question for trial if an ESO should be imposed. I may not have all the evidence to be able, and am not required, to determine if serious sexual offending is characteristic of Mr Grey and predictive of his future conduct. Dr Fisher’s derivation of such is not only from his rape and indecent assault offending and charge and other conduct but also from her assessment of some relationship between his sexual and violent offending, and in terms of s 107IAA(1). Thus Mr Grey alternatively would cross the threshold for imposition of an ESO on the balance of probabilities.

[21]   Analogously with the civil test, by ‘balance of convenience’ is meant if refusing the ISO would be harder on Mr Grey if successful in opposing the ESO, than granting it would be in the interests of those then entitled to the ESO’s protection.26 The entire point of the ISO is to avoid  immediate community risk  given rise by    Mr Grey’s release pending the ESO’s determination. Given Mr Grey’s acceptance of

25 Kiddell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 13, at [20], citing Holland v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZCA 504 at [41]–[42].

26  Wellington International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington CIV 2007-485-1756, 30 July 2008 at [4], citing [Cayne] v Global Natural Resources Plc [1984] 1 All ER 225 (CA) at 237.

proposed ISO conditions including for his rehabilitation and reintegration, I consider the balance of convenience and overall justice also favour making the ISO. His acceptance means he is less irremediably prejudiced by the ISO’s imposition than the exposed community would be by its refusal.

[22]   Nonetheless, had Mr Grey’s opposition been comprehensive, I would have held the balance here still favoured making an ISO, only supported by conditions addressing immediate risk (and omitting conditions addressed predominantly to future risk, including for Mr Grey’s rehabilitation and reintegration).

—the ISO’s conditions

[23]   Given Corrections’ deferred pursuit of the Schedule’s conditions 1.3–1.6, and Mr Grey’s acceptance of all but the sought condition 1.1, my ISO will include the Schedule’s conditions 1.2, 1.7–1.15 and 2.1–2.12.

[24]   I turn to consider the remaining opposed sought condition 1.1, for an intensive monitoring condition.27

[25]   If an ESO is made, the Court may make an order requiring the Parole Board to impose an intensive monitoring condition,28 and to specify its maximum duration, which can be no longer than 12 months.29 Notably, that is not an order requiring the Board to impose such a condition of any specified duration; only that the Court is to specify the maximum duration of any condition it orders the Board to impose.

[26]   Only the Parole Board imposes intensive monitoring conditions; the Court’s role is to “make an order requiring the Board” to do so.30 If so ordered, the Board is to impose an intensive monitoring condition.31 The maximum duration of that condition is to be specified by the Court.32 Whatever duration up to that maximum is imposed

27   Parole Act, s 107IAC(2): “An intensive monitoring condition is a condition requiring an offender to submit to being accompanied and monitored, for up to 24 hours a day, by an individual who has been approved, by a person authorised by the chief executive, to undertake person-to-person monitoring.”

28     Section 107IAC(1).

29     Section 107IAC(3).

30     Section 107IAC(1).

31     Section 107IAC(4).

32     Section 107IAC(3).

by the Board, the condition only applies during the first 12 months of the ESO.33 It may not be made more than once, even if the offender is subject to repeated ESOs.34

[27]   Except for the coincident making of an ESO, and the Chief Executive’s application, there is no statutory threshold for an intensive monitoring condition or factors to be taken into account in its consideration.35 But its exceptionally intrusive, time-limited and one-off aspects all are indicia it is a response to a need to assert external control at a transitional point of high risk,36 as Mr Grey will be on release in advance of determination of the ESO.

[28]   Imposition of an intensive monitoring condition under s 107IAC is not expressly one of the standard or special conditions under respectively ss 107JA and 107K the Court is entitled to impose in connection with an ISO under s 107FA. Section 107FA(4) implies it nonetheless may do so. Inferentially that includes specifying the maximum duration of the intensive monitoring condition.37

[29]   Mrs Kim argues an intensive monitoring condition is “more onerous and not least restrictive of what is required to provide safety of the community”. I disagree. An intensive monitoring condition only is to accompany and monitor the offender by person-to-person monitoring.38 It does not enable any direction of or provision of assistance to the offender. It exclusively is to address immediate community risk presented by the offender’s return to it.39 The risk presented by Mr Grey appears from Dr Fisher’s report to extend to any female person in his presence, including those charged with his supervision. Residential restrictions alone do not exclude the risk.40

[30]   Consistently with my perception immediate community risk is the least to be addressed by an ISO’s conditions,41 and the Act’s determined reservation of the

33     Section 107K(3)(ba).

34     Section 107IAC(5).

35     Te Pania v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2023] NZCA 161 at [15], citing

Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Paniora [2018] NZHC 1505 at [46].

36     See also Chief Executive of Department of Corrections v Paul [2017] NZHC 1294 at [39].

37     Section 107IAC(3).

38     Section 107IAC(2).

39     Compare Te Pania v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 35, at [27].

40     At [29]–[31], again comparatively.

41     At [21] above.

duration of intensive monitoring conditions to the Parole Board, my ISO will be subject also to an intensive monitoring condition.

[31]   I have no basis to contemplate limiting the Board’s or Court’s discretion. In connection with an ESO, neither the Court in specifying the maximum duration, nor the Board in imposing the condition, is either required to take or prohibited from taking into account time spent on intensive monitoring conditions in association with ISOs.42 That suggests an intensive monitoring condition’s intrusion, duration and singularity may not be material considerations in connection with an ISO. But, conservatively, an ISO’s intensive monitoring condition still should not exceed the statutory maximum duration.

[32]   Consistently with the interim nature of an ISO — while maintaining the greatest discretion for the Board as to the duration of the ISO’s intensive monitoring condition, and  for  the  Court  if  imposing  an  intensive  monitoring  condition  as  a condition of an ESO — I will specify the maximum duration as being until the earlier of either the Court’s determination of the ESO or 12 months from the date of the ISO.

Result

[33]   Under s 107FA of the Parole Act, until Corrections’ 18 September 2023 application for an ESO finally is determined, I order Joshua Grey is subject to the supervision conditions set out at paras 1.1–1.2, 1.7–1.15 and 2.1–2.12 of the Schedule to this judgment,  the  intensive  monitoring  condition  set  out  at  para  1.1  having a maximum duration of until the earlier of either the Court’s determination of the ESO or 12 months from the date of this judgment.

—Jagose J

42     Paniora v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2018] NZCA 607 at [28] and [33].

Schedule: ISO conditions sought

1.   The Department of Corrections seeks the imposition of the following special conditions:

1.1.To be subject to intensive monitoring and to submit to being accompanied and monitored, for up to 24 hours a day, by an individual who has been approved, by a person authorised by the Chief Executive, to undertake person-to-person monitoring.

1.2.To reside at an address approved in writing by a Probation Officer, and not move from that address unless you have the prior written approval of a Probation Officer.

1.3.To comply with the requirements of full residential restrictions. You must be at [specified address] at all times unless you have the approval of a Probation Officer or:

a)   To seek urgent medical or dental treatment;

b)   To avoid or minimise a serious risk of death or injury to you or any other person;

c)   For humanitarian reasons approved by a probation officer.

1.4.To submit to electronic monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer in order to monitor your compliance with any conditions relating to your residential restrictions.

1.5.Upon release from prison, to travel directly to [specified address] and await the arrival of a Probation Officer and a representative from the monitoring company.

1.6.Upon expiry of the residential restrictions condition, you must reside at an address approved in writing by a Probation Officer.

1.7.To comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring and provide unimpeded access to your approved residence by a Probation Officer and/or representatives of the monitoring company for the purpose of maintaining the electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a Probation Officer.

1.8.To engage with a local community health agency, to the satisfaction of your Probation Officer and to attend appointments with a mental health provider as directed by a Probation Officer.

1.9.Subject to s 15(5) of the Parole Act 2002, to take any medication prescribed by a health professional in accordance with any directions given by the health professional.

1.10.To attend a psychological assessment and attend, participate in and complete any recommended treatment if and as directed by a Probation Officer.

1.11.To attend and participate in a programme for the purposes of any psychiatric or other counselling or assessment, attendance at any medical, psychological

social, therapeutic, cultural, educational, employment-related, rehabilitative, or reintegrative programme for up to 8 hours per day daily between the hours of 8am and 4pm.

1.12.Not to possess, use, or consume alcohol, controlled drugs or psychoactive substances except controlled drugs prescribed for you by a health professional.

1.13.Not to enter or loiter near any place where children under 16 are congregating unless you have the prior written approval of a Probation Officer, or unless an adult who has been approved by a Probation Officer in writing, is present.

1.14.Not to enter or loiter near any school, early childhood education centre, park, library, swimming pool, other recreational facility, church, or other area specified in writing by a Probation Officer, unless you have the prior written approval of a Probation Officer, or unless an adult approved by a Probation Officer in writing, is present.

1.15.To submit to electronic monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer in order to monitor your compliance with any conditions relating to your whereabouts.

2.   The Department of Corrections also seek the imposition of the following standard conditions under the ISO:

2.1.The offender must report in person to a probation officer in the probation area in which the offender resides as soon as practicable, and not later than 72 hours, after commencement of the extended supervision order.

2.2.The offender must report to a probation officer as and when required to do so by a probation officer, and must notify the probation officer of his or her residential address and the nature and place of his or her employment when asked to do so.

2.3.The offender must obtain the prior written consent of a probation officer before moving to a new residential address.

2.4.The offender must not reside at any address at which a probation officer has directed the offender not to reside.

2.5.The offender must not leave or attempt to leave New Zealand without the prior written consent of a probation officer.

2.6.The offender must, if a probation officer directs, allow the collection of biometric information.

2.7.The offender must obtain the prior written consent of a probation officer before changing his or her employment.

2.8.The offender must not engage, or continue to engage, in any employment or occupation in which the probation officer has directed the offender not to engage or continue to engage.

2.9.The offender must take part in a rehabilitative and reintegrative needs assessment if and when directed to do so by a probation officer.

2.10.The offender must not associate with, or contact, a person under the age of 16 years, except—

a)with the prior written approval of a probation officer; and

b)in the presence and under the supervision of an adult who—

i.        has been informed about the relevant offending; and

ii.        has been approved in writing by a probation officer as suitable to undertake the role of supervision.

2.11.The offender must not associate with, or contact, a victim of the offender without the prior written approval of a probation officer.

2.12.The offender must not associate with, or contact, any person or class of person specified in a written direction given to the offender for the purposes of this paragraph.