Chen v Liu

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2015-404-002150 [2017] NZHC 911

UNDER

Section 145A of the Land Transfer Act

1952

AND UNDER

The Administration Act 1969

AND UNDER

The Property (Relationships) Act 1976

BETWEEN

XIAOLONG CHEN First Applicant

ROYAL REED as Administrator of the estate of BIN (CISSY) CHEN

Second Applicant

AND

YUN QING LIU Respondent

Hearing: 27 April 2017

Appearances:

Mr D Liu for Applicants
Ms So and Ms E Ho for Respondent

Judgment:

9 May 2017

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J P DOOGUE

This judgment was delivered by me on

09.05.17 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to

Rule 11.5  of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

CHEN & Anor v LIU [2017] NZHC 911 [9 May 2017]

[1]      The respondent filed notices with Land Information New Zealand (“LINZ”) which had the effect of triggering the lapsing mechanism under s 145A of the Land Transfer Act in respect of caveats that the applicants had lodged.  For reasons which are discussed below there was confusion on the part of LINZ which has led to the present application for order sustaining caveats.

[2]      The brief background is as follows. It is necessary to briefly explain the position with regard to LINZ.  It would appear that the notice was given to LINZ on behalf of the respondent by his previous legal advisors in October 2015 triggering the lapsing mechanism.  However due to inactivity on the part of a staff member at LINZ, the notices were apparently overlooked until January 2017.  That month LINZ contacted the former legal advisers for the respondent to ascertain whether it was still the respondent’s contention that notice should be given to the applicant’s lapsing the caveats.   I am told that LINZ did not respond to this request for information. LINZ then  gave  the notices  lapsing the  caveats  which  had  to  be  dealt  with  in circumstances of urgency which resulted in the applicants filing an application to sustain the further caveats on 6 April 2017 and copies were served on the respondent’s former legal advisors.  An urgent hearing was scheduled by the High Court for 12 April 2017.

[3]      On 11 April 2017, the respondent instructed his present legal advisors and was represented by them at a first call of the matter on 12 April 2017.

[4]      Attempts were made prior to the hearing and on the day at the hearing to reach agreement as to an interim basis upon which the caveats might be sustained. No agreement was possible.  The applicants contend that the respondent refused to consent to any order of that kind and that contention has not been contradicted by the respondent.

[5]      At the hearing on 12 April the Court made arrangements for an opposed hearing to take place on 27 April and timetable orders were made.  On 19 April 2017 the respondent’s current legal advisors stated that the respondent would accept the making of an order sustaining the caveats but would not agree to costs which he

contended ought to…

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Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 911
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Xiaolong Chen and Royal Reed as the administrator of the estate of Bin (Cissy) Chen, filed an application to sustain caveats lodged on certain property, against the respondent, Yun Qing Liu. The application arose after notices were lodged with Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) to trigger the lapsing mechanism under section 145A of the Land Transfer Act 1952. The applicants sought orders to sustain the caveats on the basis of the delay in LINZ processing the notices, leading to the present proceedings. The court was required to decide whether the respondent should bear the costs of the application and, if so, the appropriate quantum of those costs.

The court held that the respondent should bear the costs of the application. The starting point was the presumption that the respondent should pay costs as he was, if not literally, analogously the party who had failed with respect to the proceeding. The court rejected the respondent's argument that he should not be held responsible for the costs due to the fault of LINZ. The court also found that the failure of the applicants to serve a copy of the affidavit in support of the application did not provide a discretionary reason for declining to order costs in favour of the applicants. The court concluded that the real cause of the legal costs incurred was the necessity to file an application due to the respondent's failure to recall the notices to LINZ. The court further held that the respondent's financial ability to pay costs was not a relevant consideration. Lastly, the court ordered that the applicants were entitled to 2B costs, as sought, and that all claimed items were reasonable and should be paid together with the disbursement for sealing the Court order.

The court made orders in terms of the draft judgment submitted by the parties, sustaining the caveats and directing the respondent to pay the applicants' costs.

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